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Abstract
This thesis offers a new interpretation of the literary techniques of the Noctes At-
ticae, a second-century Latin miscellaneous work by Aulus Gellius, with new readings
of various passages. It takes as its main subject the various ways in which Gellius nar-
rates and otherwise represents mental and intellectual activity. It proposes a typology
for these representations in Chapter One, the Introduction. Chapter Two examines
the “dialogic” scenes, which relate the conversations of characters, in the context of
the history of dialogic writing. It argues that Gellius’s unique approach to relating
conversation, besides revealing specific concerns about each stage of ancient education,
encourages readers to develop strategies for imagining and reconstructing the intellec-
tual character and lifestyle that lie behind an individual’s speech — in short, to see
every instance of conversation as a glimpse at others’ mental quality. Chapter Three
of the thesis examines Gellius’s narrative accounts of his own reading experiences, a
body of ancient evidence unparalleled in both substance and detail. Focusing on his de-
pictions of reading Pliny the Elder, it shows the way Gellius, in the traditionally public
contexts of ancient reading, seeks to invent a performative space in the privacy of the
reader’s mind. Chapter Four explores Gellius’s essays and notes which, despite lack-
ing clear narrative frameworks, nonetheless share common themes with the rest of the
Noctes, and can be understood as representations of the mental activity and standards
that Gellius associates with his contemporaries’ relationship to the past. The Con-
clusion points the way for further applications of the thesis’s conclusions in Imperial
intellectual culture and beyond. This thesis suggests a new approach for examining
depictions of the acquisition, evaluation and use of knowledge in the Imperial period,
and contributes to the ongoing scholarly discussion about the reading of miscellaneous
literature.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: approaching Gellius
1.1 Staging mental activity in the Noctes Atticae
1.1.1 Text and context
That Aulus Gellius and his late second century CE essay collection, the Noctes
Atticae, are only now beginning to receive substantial mainstream scholarly attention
is not nearly so surprising as that, for so long, he was the sole purview of those few
Classicists who dared venture into the latter half of the second century; that those prac-
titioners who so traditionally preferred the Latin of the “golden age” failed to engage
Gellius as a kindred spirit in that preference is perhaps the strongest evidence of that
stylistic preference’s pernicious influence.1 For Gellius’s work has radical importance
for our understanding of the arc of Latin literature in antiquity, sitting as it does at
the apex of so many literary trends, including but not limited to the increasing soph-
istication and subtlety of “miscellaneous” writing, and of authorial self-construction in
intimate, intellectual terms; and these literary qualities are quite beside the rich evid-
ence he provides for a cultural history of the mind in antiquity. One reason Gellius has
1Vessey 1994: 1867-8.
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persisted as a blind spot — stylistic prejudices aside — may be the complex interplay
of sympathy and alienation that surrounds his most obvious literary qualities. On the
one hand, his “miscellaneous” form is difficult to square with traditional ideas of what
a “literary” text should look like.2 On the other, the high level of intimacy with which
he relates his experiences, coordinates authorities and ideas against one another, and
generally passes judgment on or prescribes behaviours for the life of the mind is so close,
so apparently familiar to what Classicists and philologists see themselves as doing that
they may escape notice entirely as the interesting Imperial Roman phenomena that
they are. This sympathetic reaction continues to dominate Gellius scholarship, provid-
ing the driving force behind the most seminal English-language work in the last two
decades.3 In this thesis I hope to take a step back from the sympathetic perspective in
which Gellius’s “scholarly” gestures are taken for granted, and examine them in a new
light.
The subject of this thesis is the stories that Aulus Gellius tells, about his own mind
and others’, in the Noctes Atticae. The values of learning and thought that underlie
Gellius’s careful literary play of readerly performance are very different from our own as
modern scholars; moreover, the very reflexivity and reflection that has made Gellius so
attractive a subject for post-antique readers to project their own concerns on is, I will
argue, an integral part of Gellius’s intent, a carefully calibrated effect to engage and
prompt his ancient reader. This thesis takes as its subject these particularly literary
phenomena of Gellius’s own text: before we indulge in the effect they have on us, we
must first make an attempt to characterise and understand the qualities of the text
that cause that effect (and, perhaps, those which that effect might otherwise distract
us from).
It is a substantial task, to account for the full range of different ways in which Gellius,
2Cf Morgan forthcoming.
3Holford-Strevens 1988, 2nd ed. 2003, to which I refer henceforth. Gunderson 2009: 270-81.
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in the nearly 400 articles of his Noctes, narrates and otherwise represents activities of
the intellect. This thesis will seek not only to account for the wide variety of forms
these articles take — the dialogic scenes, accounts of reading, and collected notes or
essays that make up the Noctes — but also to understand them as part of a whole,
a systematic programme, a coherent work of literature. Gellius relates conversations
between people: I will argue that these scenes of discourse have a unique interest in
understanding their characters’ mental lives. He narrates (uniquely) his own reading: I
will argue that these reading scenes create a new evaluative space for Roman reading in
which Gellius plays out values of intellectual discipline and character. And he collects
material from centuries’ worth of primary and secondary material on a variety of topics:
I will argue that these essays and notes are composed and arranged to represent specific
intellectual processes and assert specific values that map exactly onto those advanced
in the dialogic and reading scenes. In short, I will identify in Gellius’s programme key
innovations in the literary art of representing mental activity, and forceful values of self-
awareness, critical thought and contextual analysis intended for the Imperial Roman
reader.
Gellius could feature comfortably in any of several larger stories of classical literat-
ure. He is just one of the Imperial authors who experiment with rearranging antiquarian
material;4 his is just one attempt to grapple with the critical mass of both knowledge
and authorities facing Imperial elites;5 and his use of storytelling fits equally well into
the development of fiction and dialogue.6 But perhaps the most interesting story to
tell would be the one of Latin literary form, in which Gellius — the paucity of evidence
notwithstanding — seems a true innovator. This story would follow a trajectory from
the poems of Catullus through the letters of the Younger Pliny, and it is the story of
4Langlands 2008 on Valerius Maximus, Duff 1999 on Plutarch’s Lives.
5E.g.: Pliny the Elder (T. Murphy 2004 inter al), Lucian (Branham 1989.)
6Keulen 2004 on Gellius and Apuleius; Oikonomopoulou 2007 on Gellius and sympotic dialogue.
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Latin writers exploring the way the aesthetics of variety and the literary pretence of in-
timate forms of personal writing, collected, can be used to illustrate a life of emotional
and intellectual experience. Each genre has its own version of this story, in poetry
as well as epistolary collections. Gellius’s contribution is the world of commentarii, a
form at once more personal than either and yet more literarily ambiguous. He has his
own metapoetics of commentary, alluding periodically to the wide variety of reasons for
which they are written and the equally wide variety of ways in which readers respond
to them. And he achieves a similar disordered effect of representing a life, successive
snapshots of a mind at different times and in different situations. Marchesi’s assessment
of the Younger Pliny’s “reality effect”, the almost documentary verism created by the
illusion of rifling through the author’s papers, applies equally, if not better, to Gellius’s
own text.7 From the micro scale to the macro, Gellius could be the hero of many tales.
But there is much to be said yet of the Noctes in its own right: to place Gellius
accurately in context, we must first understand his work. This thesis’s goal is to char-
acterise and analyse what I take to be his most interesting feature, his regular staging
of encounters with knowledge. He has long been a source of knowledge, but if he is
to feature in any of the above stories, it will be because of the way he presents that
knowledge: layered in particular value judgments, embedded in narrative contexts, set
up in opposition to and alongside other kinds of knowledge and experience. Processes
of scrutiny and distinction surround any particular datum we could wish to extract
from the text.8 By offering close readings of the literary effects of these passages, by
understanding data and frameworks together as literarily coherent pieces, I will argue
that not only is this a consistent style, but it is one with significance for its time and
place. In response to an Imperial culture saturated with experts and professionals, and
Imperial libraries overflowing with centuries of primary and secondary literature, Gel-
7Marchesi 2008: 24 for the phrase.
8Cf Rust 2009: 25.
7
lius blends existing trends in compiled and fictional texts — a fusion of technical and
literary writing styles — with his own innovations in narrating and constructing private,
individual mental activity in order to engage his reader in an entertaining and provoc-
ative reflection on how and why to improve his or her relationship with encountering,
acquiring and using knowledge.
1.1.2 Characterising the text
Below, I will discuss other prior approaches to the Noctes, but first, it is worth
explaining how I characterise it for my purposes. The Noctes this thesis examines is a
lengthy and complex set of overlapping and concentric narratives of mental activity. Its
form is one carefully chosen by Gellius for its unique capacity to represent the activit-
ies of minds. It teems with characters and people: teachers and students, friends and
strangers, a dozen different versions of the author himself; and, emerging from its chal-
lenging, almost interactive nature, the reader himself or herself, reflected, provoked and
guided along paths of learning as surely as the rest of the cast. For every person in the
Noctes is narrated and described — and so observed and seen to perform — in terms
of his mental character and capacity. Whether a character speaks, an author writes, or
a reader reads, Gellius’s narrative is in terms of the mental processes surrounding that
action. These tales of mind are collected in a fractured form that purports to reflect
Gellius’s own mental life, mirroring the serendipity and disorder of intellectual life and
challenging the reader to find his or her own order in it. The text’s disordered, almost
stream-of-consciousness structure enacts the thought that it is its subject. The narrat-
ives that achieve this effect come in several forms: there are the most familiar ones,
the dialogic encounters in which two characters enact mental perspectives in discussing
some topic; there are the more curious narratives of reading, in which Gellius relates
the experience of reading and considering things; and finally there are the essays and
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notes that imply through their rhetoric and arrangement processes of mental encounter
that parallel those narrated explicitly in the previous two types. I will return to this
typology below.
This thesis’s Noctes is unique in many ways, but hardly so in its general interests.
It is concerned with what kind of mental lifestyle — what skills, ethics and interests of
attention and thought — a person should have, and in this it follows a philosophical
tradition at least as old as Plato. Gellius’s concern with rhetoric, and with a wide,
self-directed and critically received education being necessary for the orator, likewise
descends from Roman rhetorical thought. Traditional approaches from rhetoric and
philosophy mingle in Gellius’s direct confrontation of reading practices, and his reports
of his own researches recall the methods and interests of grammarians, jurists and
other antiquarians. So often concerned, as we will see, with how to read the classics of
antiquity, the Noctes is itself thoroughly steeped in those traditions.
This thesis’s Noctes is also a product of Antonine Rome. Its already traditional
concerns of mind and learning are brought to bear on an Imperial literary culture: one
that had long since reached a critical mass of available reading material, was already
struggling with the changing social nature of intellectual authority, and faced ongoing
questions about the modern relevance of traditional values of Greekness and Latinity
and the place in society of the classical orator. That Gellius rarely discusses post-
Augustan literature hardly means he did not read it; to the contrary, it only underscores
the significance of his insistence on a classical canon, asserting strongly the merit of (but
also conditioning carefully the approach to) Classical Latinity. If the intellectual culture
of the late Republic was “catching up” to Classical Greece, the mindset of at least this
Imperial Roman is far more confident:9 Gellius cherishes and prizes Greek knowledge,
making a point of conveying its value to his fellow Romans, but within a context of total
9Rawson 1988: 320-5.
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control. Time and again, through the narratives of discovery and judgment, Greek and
Roman knowledge and literature are brought into parity; the former may have come
first, but it has been subsumed into the latter, which has equalled or surpassed it in its
own ways. If this is philhellenism, it is certainly a Roman’s philhellenism, Attic nights
being a journey from which Romans must return.
The ostensible site of the work’s composition — Roman study at Athens — is just
one stage in a student’s growth and life, suggesting how the work itself is to fit into
a reader’s learning experience: as a starting point, an enriching experience on which
to build. This sets the work up in opposition, by way of the dynamism with which
it imbues its content, to the idea of a “commonplace-book”, a miscellany of things to
be memorised and regurgitated, an example of Gellius’s engagement with that most
commented-upon aspect of Imperial culture: scrutinised performance, of the sort that
fills the works of Lucian and the VS of Philostratus.10 The eye for observing performed
mind — the capacity to extrapolate, from watching and hearing someone’s speech,
their overall intellectual ability and moral character — that Gellius brings to his whole
spectrum of experiences is one every Roman possessed. Gellius invokes the spirits of
performance and evaluation, and gathers them closer and closer around the intimate
functions of the mind. When someone speaks, he seems to say, consider how well they
have spoken, and imagine why they spoke as they did: hear the thoughts behind the
speech. When you read, observe your reader’s mind at work, and consider your reactions
to the text as you will perform them later in speech or writing. Consider other authors,
too, and observe their performances on the page as closely as you would a fellow guest
at dinner.
The Noctes this thesis examines is literature, insofar as I will credit the text and its
author with the same capacity for sophistication as we would any other. I will trace the
10See generally Whitmarsh 2001: 257-65, Whitmarsh 2005.
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course and terms of Gellius’s discussions and scenes, but I will also read figuratively,
asking what Gellius’s stories are about. Through these readings, I seek to answer two
questions: how, and why? What are the narrative techniques Gellius uses to represent
reading, learning, thinking about and knowing things? And: to what end? What is
the purpose of such a consistent programme of presenting himself and others in terms
of their intellectual activity? What relationship does it have to different aspects of
intellectual culture in which his various narratives are set? What can we understand
as the “programme” of this Gellian narration?
In the remainder of this Introduction, I will review recent scholarship on the text as
it relates to this study, and provide a reading of Gellius’s Preface to help illustrate my
approach. Then, a brief case study of a passage from the text will show this approach
in action. Finally, I will outline the structure of the thesis and the subdivision of the
Noctes ’s contents on which it is based. First, however, I will mention some modern
perspectives we might bring to bear on the text.
1.1.3 Relevant anachronisms
This thesis hardly aspires to apply media theory comprehensively to the Noctes, but
the cultural role of media will not be far from its readings. Modern media theory, born
as the naturally accelerating processes of post-Industrial technology birthed a genera-
tion of media (electronic and broadcast) fast enough for critics to observe the processes
of mediation in action, often concerns itself with the same essential phenomena as liter-
ary or rhetorical theory (although much of media theory is also concerned with societal
phenomena, the idea of communication is a central focus). While this thesis offers lit-
erary readings of the Noctes, its objective is to situate the text as a cultural product,
part of an active Imperial Roman system of creating and exchanging knowledge and
meta-knowledge; in this sense, it will be helpful occasionally to consider the Gellian
11
approach to miscellany as a medium.11 A media theorist might ask what the message
of “miscellany” is, considering the cognitive effect that reading a text presented as the
Noctes is might have, the involvement it demands, or generally how the chosen form
(and its various internal choices of device and style) affects its content. Indeed, the
idea that a medium’s “content” distracts its consumer from the medium itself reson-
ates significantly with a tradition of Gellius studies that has foregrounded the ostensible
content of a passage of the Noctes (a quotation of Ennius, for example) and downplayed
the peculiar way Gellius has of presenting such material (a story about hearing that
quotation read and disputed in a public venue, i.e. Noctes 18.5). The content of a me-
dium, in McLuhan’s description,12 can distract the attention of a viewer from the actual
message of the medium itself; by a similar token, scholars who have written incisively
on Gellius, such as Holford-Strevens and Henry, nevertheless have paid more attention
to what he chooses to discuss than to the peculiar frameworks for those discussions, or
what the miscellaneous form adds to their meaning.13 McLuhan’s classic formulation
distinguishes entire media by how much “definition” they provide their consumers and
thus how much involvement they demand. This has been variously extended and res-
isted; for example, Steven Johnson, treating media not (as McLuhan does) as extensions
of human sensory functions but as stimuli to human cognitive functions, focuses spe-
cifically on the “filling-in” demanded by particular instances of a medium.14 Johnson’s
argument is that new media like TV and video games have the potential to promote
more cognitive effort than a traditionally prejudicial comparison to e.g. reading would
11See Rust 2009: 28-32 on using the term “miscellany” in modern discussion. The Noctes is self-
conscious in its affiliation to miscellaneous literature, looking back at generations worth of prior com-
piled and miscellaneous writing (Vardi 2004). For commentarii, Riggsby 2006: 133-50. For modern
examples of self-conscious miscellany, Hodgman 2005 and Hodgman 2008, which riff on classic miscel-
laneous forms with fictional articles, many of which often have a meaningful subtext. On miscellany
in the information age, Weinberger 2007.
12McLuhan 1964.
13Holford-Strevens 2003, Henry 1994.
14S. Johnson 2005.
12
admit. My interest is not cognitive, but I do find it fruitful to examine the effect of the
Noctes ’s mediating devices on its reader’s experience of the text.15 This is, in a way,
the essential question scholars are increasingly asking of other Imperial “miscellaneous”
texts; Plutarch’s Sympotic Questions and Athenaeus’s Deipnosophistae are just two ex-
amples of texts whose arrangement and shuﬄing of material, embedding it in larger,
structuring narratives of socially significant discourse.16 Gellius’s larger structure is
more obscure and fractured, and less amenable to being understood in terms of, e.g.,
the symposium, but the questions are no less important.
The idea of media will also give us a helpful insight into the Noctes ’s insistent
and overt self-awareness and reflexive qualities. Gellius does not articulate a theory of
mediation, but I will show that the concerns he demonstrates about knowledge in the
Empire orbit around the various mediating phenomena of which he is uniquely critical.
Mine is far from a “theoretical” thesis; but where others might take the commonplace
book, the encyclopaedia, or the postmodern novel as a comparative touchstone for a
work of Imperial literature, I will from time to time invoke modern media. And where
other studies have treated the Noctes as an achievement, or an archive, or assertion of
authority,17 I will consider it as a communication between Gellius and his contemporary
readership. Both the idea of communication, with its necessary implication of reception,
and the focus on a medium’s effect on its audience, resonate in the world of literary
theory with the approaches of literary reader-response and reception theory, in terms of
the active role the reader is given in constructing the meaning of the text, and the way
its form — and the work that form demands of the reader — guides the construction
of meaning (on which see more below).
15Begun by Rust 2009, although within a narrow scope of how and why the Noctes would be read.
On 18th and 19th century miscellany as medium, Benedict 1990.
16On the former, see discussions and bibliography below, p34; on Athenaeus see studies in Braund
and Wilkins 2000, and Ko¨nig 2008.
17Holford-Strevens 2003, Gunderson 2009, Keulen 2009, respectively.
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1.2 Prior approaches: scholar to satirist
1.2.1 Gellius (as) scholarship
Underlying the continuing uncertainty over the Noctes ’s form and genre is a struggle
to identify its place and role in a literary culture: not just what it is, but what it is
meant to do. Where did it fit into readers’ lifestyles and intellectual lives? I will now
briefly trace the various positions modern readers have taken on the work’s goals and
discuss recent developments in Gellian scholarship to help situate this thesis as a new
examination of the text and its place in, and perspective on, ancient culture.
Modern Gellian scholarship, which proceeded largely piecemeal for most of the twen-
tieth century in spite of a few attempts at wholesale discussion,18 was reinvigorated in
1988 by Holford-Strevens’s Aulus Gellius: An Antonine Scholar and his Achievement,
since revised and republished in 2003. Holford-Strevens argues forcefully that the text
represents a scholarly achievement, and sees it as intended to serve as a sort of bluffer’s
guide to the elite literary culture of constant scrutiny that is generally understood as
the dominant cultural mode of the second and third centuries CE — a curated shortcut
to an impossibly large body of possible knowledge.19 This is a static kind of learning:
the Noctes is an artefact of learning, and offers its reader either the reality or appear-
ance of learnedness. The Gellius described in this study claims more authority than
he has and is concerned with commemorating favoured teachers, exposing frauds, and,
having gleaned the tokens of erudition from his own reading, offering them freely for
his readers to pass off as their own. Sophisticated and hardworking, this Gellius is a
conduit, taking in vast amounts of knowledge and offering its distilled essence for any
takers.
Three studies in a 1994 ANRW (II.34.2) on Imperial literature complicate this
18E.g. Nettleship 1883, Marache 1952, Whiteley 1978. See also Astarita 1993.
19Holford-Strevens 2003: 8.
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picture. Partially in response to Holford-Strevens, Anderson examines the “miscellanist
and his world”; to him, Gellius is a “dilettante” and enthusiastic archaist.20 That study
emphasises very particular miscellaneous aesthetics; rather than bringing out Gellius’s
uniqueness, it condemns his work on terms that are, probably, irrelevant in its ancient
context.21 Somewhat closer to an understanding of Gellius as one exponent of a thriving
and textured ancient culture is D. W. T. Vessey’s careful examination of the exact
nature and implications of “archaism”;22 the focus there on Gellian verbal style as key
to his treatment of a topic, and a careful eye for attitudes toward subject matter in
both Gellius and Fronto, make this a study of second-century intellectuals’ relationship
with the past. As in other studies, this Noctes is largely a work of self-presentation and
commemoration; but its interests and how it pursues them are increasingly complex.
Finally, the idiosyncracy of the work is pointedly drawn out by Henry, who, seeking
to allow the “randomness” of the work to emerge more clearly, proceeds through each
of its twenty books and indicates key themes. This Noctes is a farrago;23 and Henry’s
idiosyncratic selection of what is important or interesting serves as a cautionary example
of how the Noctes ’s unpredictability seems to exacerbate, or perhaps simply reveal, the
inherent subjectivity of reading.
The work of Vardi has systematically and helpfully examined thematic phenomena
in the Noctes. Vardi’s Gellius is an opinionated intellectual skeptical of educational
authority24 and a careful literary critic,25 who carefully and self-consciously uses the
miscellaneous form to express his ideas.26 In the volume Vardi co-edited with Holford-
Strevens, a wide array of specialist perspectives were brought to bear on particular
20Anderson 1994: 1853.
21Anderson 1994: 1852, 1858.
22Vessey 1994.
23Henry 1994: 1920.
24Vardi 2001.
25Vardi 1996.
26Vardi 2004.
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aspects of the text and its author. Anderson offers some initial guideposts for this
thesis with his helpful synthesis of different dimensions of “storytelling” in the work,
but it is the lucubratory encounters (Gellius’s accounts of his research), on which he
spends the least time, that are the most significant to my own study.27 Stevenson
does much to scrutinise the oft-repeated characterisation of Gellius as “antiquarian”,
identifying the qualities that unite him with that ambiguous group.28 Beall’s reappraisal
of Gellius as “humanist” — much needed, given the long history of uncritically seeing
in Gellius a kindred spirit, itself discussed in the volume’s latter chapters — identifies
the Noctes ’s effectiveness at communicating the psychological experience of learning,
though without asking what the purpose of that effect might be.29 Beall’s piece builds
on themes explored in a series of previous articles, each of which explored carefully
different characteristic phenomena in many passages of the Noctes.30 A didactic Noctes
appears in Morgan’s examination of the text’s capacity to teach ethics and skill sets,
a study that offers substantial guidance to this one.31 Notably, Morgan identifies the
disorder of the text as somehow productive of learning and facilitating the acquisition
of not only knowledge but knowledge-values.32 These themes are picked up in a chapter
on miscellany in a subsequent volume.33
Focused on the later impact of Gellius, Grafton 2004’s argument for the important
role of the Noctes in stimulating the development and use of Renaissance commonplace
books makes a critical point. The decidedly post-antique phenomenon of the common-
place book has long dominated approaches to the Noctes, either explicitly or implicitly,
27Anderson 2004.
28Stevenson 2004, reiterating and compressing the conclusions of his 1994 thesis.
29Beall 2004.
30Beall 1997 on translation, Beall 1999 on composition, and Beall 2001 on Favorinus.
31Morgan 2004.
32We might speak of “meta-knowledge”, i.e., the ethics of learning and knowing that Gellius dis-
cusses: value judgments that specifically qualify the use of another piece of knowledge, or a more
general lesson about knowledge or authority.
33Morgan 2007: 257-273.
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but its role as an inspiration for their creation should remind us that it decidedly is not
— cannot be — one, being at best an ancient precursor to one and at most something
entirely different. This is the role Holford-Strevens risks giving it when he declares it
was intended to “help [its] readers shine at cultured tables”34 — never mind, of course,
that the commonplace book’s benefits to a reader come from the reader having kept it
himself or herself, a practice that depends as much on note-taking (and all it entails)
as it does on miscellaneous reading and recall. It is a truism of the study of media
(see above) that attempts to understand new media are prejudiced, and so doomed to
failure, by attempts to understand them in the same terms as existing media;35 the
analogous argument is often made in classical scholarship against anachronistic genre
identifications.36 Similarly, only by examining the Noctes on its own merits, in its an-
cient context, and in terms of its demands of and relationship with its ancient reader
can we come to a better understanding of what it actually is. McLuhan’s distinction
between media as high- and low-definition, the one obviating reader involvement and
the other demanding it, might be helpful. The miscellany imagined as commonplace
book is thus high-definition, providing all the information the reader needs: facts to
learn and recite.
But modern studies of ancient miscellany increasingly suggest that they are, in
these terms, lower-definition than they seem, using internal inconsistency and creative
juxtaposition in such a way as to demand more active forms of reading and filling-in from
their readers.37 This filling-in may not be only work, but exercise, training, and indeed
a relocating of the epiphanic moment of learning from entirely within the text to the
space created by the reader’s engagement with the text.38 It is here that reader-response
34Holford-Strevens 2003: 8.
35A foundational claim in McLuhan 1964 and S. Johnson 2005’s authority for defending video games
from being criticised for not being books.
36Most recently, Doody 2009 on Pliny the Elder and modern encyclopaedias.
37See generally Ko¨nig and Whitmarsh 2007.
38Rossignol 2008 emphasises that the content of collaborative online video games exists only as long
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theory also offers guidance; Wolfgang Iser has drawn attention to this space between text
and reader in which the text’s meaning actually exists, and the role of “concretisation”
in that process — the very same filling-in of ideas, guesses and assumptions demanded
by the gaps the author leaves in his linear arrangement of the text.39 Gellius exploits
this phenomenon not just to guide the reader’s construction of meaning from his work
but to jump-start discrete, involved learning processes that sometimes veer tangentially
away from the Noctes : processes by which new meaning and knowledge are to be found
beyond the text. Leaving questions unanswered, discussions sparsely contextualised,
and his own assertions contradicted, he pushes the bounds of what can be implied and
suggested on this cognitively microscopic scale. As an intellectual resource, then, the
Noctes is characterised not by the stasis of the commonplace book but the dynamism
of something else entirely.
1.2.2 Satire, sophistication and society
Also in Holford-Strevens and Vardi 2004, Wytse Keulen considers Gellius as a satirist
of other intellectuals, seeking resonances with the rest of the “Second Sophistic”, in a
precursor to his 2009 volume on Gellius the Satirist.40 Keulen’s Noctes is a more
complex, highly politicised version of Holford-Strevens’s: his Gellius is a wry, often
subtle satirist of his contemporaries, his depictions of teachers and other high-profile
figures seeded with allusions to their careers and events in their life that postdate
the event of the text, and his Noctes is a training programme in cultural values and
intellectual skills, not just the ornamentation of learnedness. To Keulen, the Noctes
as the game is being played. The insight is not new to literary theory, but Rossignol’s framing of it
— given the general resistance to considering the Noctes as literature — is a helpful way of thinking
about its interactivity.
39Iser 2006: 64-5, Eagleton 1983: 64-5, Schmitz 2007: 89-91.
40Keulen 2004, Keulen 2009. Another recent study is Rust 2009, contributing a lucid exploration of
the implications of reading miscellaneously.
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negotiates the problem of cultural authority — who gets to dictate values and control
the judgment and memory of cultural material. It is here that we differ as readers:
I am much more concerned with Gellius’s intent focus on how knowledge is accessed
and encountered than in his attempts to lay claim to authority. Keulen’s political
readings are close, pointed, and imagine a contemporary ancient reader with a thorough
knowledge of the minutiae of many characters’ lives; his intertextual readings with the
letters of Fronto likewise imagine an ancient reader with a good command of those
uncertain texts.This thesis will depend in part on Keulen’s attention to the text’s close
relationship to its ancient cultural context, although I will depart substantially from his
interpretations of the political import of particular passages and the role of the emperor
in the text: Keulen, largely (I would argue) through implication and hypothesis, sees
Imperial power as the dominant theme in much of the work, and “symbouleuctics” —
advice to and relationships with the powerful — as its main concern, while I would
prefer to argue from the concerns more explicitly identified and discussed by Gellius
himself, concerns which explicitly exclude Imperial power. In some cases, such as the
place of Greek knowledge in the Noctes, I will generally agree with Keulen’s conclusions,
but I will seek to examine more closely the specific mechanisms of Gellius’s illustration
and advocacy of particular intellectual values.
Almost simultaneously published was Erik Gunderson’s Nox Philologiae, which like-
wise made substantial progress in advancing the sophistication with which modern
readers approach the text, but in a different direction.41 Stylistically and substantively,
Gunderson engages closely with the Noctes ’s discussion and provocation of complic-
ated reading experiences. Gunderson starts from the point of examining the Noctes as a
piece of “antiquarian literature”, seeking to explore both the implications of antiquarian
writing, and its literary properties. The highly literary, theoretical and self-conscious
41Gunderson 2009.
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readings of this study present a Noctes almost out of time, an exponent of universal
phenomena of literature. I share Gunderson’s attention to Gellius’s fascination with
relating the experience of readerly encounter, and he insightfully unpacks the complex
processes and implied narratives in Gellius’s seemingly offhand allusions to his own
compositional practice, such as how observations that something will be helpful to have
read suggests a larger suite of activities, values and concerns in the reading process.
In a sense, though, Nox Philologiae is a study of the act of reading Roman authors;
Gellius, for those purposes, is simply the most productive focus because of his innate
self-awareness and engagement with the same issues. In this thesis I try to build on
these insights to set that self-aware reader and observer of his own intellectual activity
more precisely in his ancient cultural context. Gunderson’s examination of how modern
scholars and readers, including himself, reinvent/become Gellius in their reading is a
valuable and well-argued one, but is less interested than I in what purpose the qualities
of the text that invite that reinvention have in the Imperial Roman context. His Noctes
has much to teach modern readers; I hope to examine more closely what it taught
ancient ones.
The most recent work on Gellius has been that of William Johnson. In a 2010 book
(previewed by a brief 2009 article), he explores closely the full range of depictions in
Imperial literature of the social phenomena around reading and literary activity. I join
Johnson in many of his approaches to and conclusions about reading the Noctes : his
clear elucidation of how it should be read as self-consciously fictional (and provocative
of the reader in those terms) is helpful, he deftly identifies many of Gellius’s conceptual
concerns, and is rightly skeptical of the bluffer’s-guide reading of the text.42 But his
primary interest is not mine: Johnson, in pursuit of his productive understanding
of reading as a social system43, seeks to isolate and identify in the scenes of Gellius
42W. A. Johnson 2010: 99, 109, 118 (inter al).
43W. A. Johnson 2009: 329.
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and others the sociological dimensions of literary activity. Though his approach is
carefully sensitive to the problem of fictionality and selective detail in the traditionally
enticing Gellian vignettes, its emphasis on the constitution and operation of social
groups sometimes neglects the full narrative course of those scenes.44 We also disagree
on the ultimate significance of Gellius’s use of the lucubratory motif: where he sees it as
exclusive and defensive, I hope to show that Gellius’s sense of privacy and intimacy is
more disingenuous, intended instead to make public and performative what is otherwise
private and personal.45 In short, my approach shares much with Johnson’s in terms of
how it approaches its material, but differs greatly in the ultimate questions we each ask.
Johnson finds literary society in the building-blocks of Gellius’s interpersonal exchanges;
in this thesis, I seek to identify a broader intellectual system in not just those vignettes
but all Gellius’s other various reflections on mental activity.
1.3 Structure of the text
1.3.1 Preface: models of learning from text
“Much of a reader’s approach to Gellius is likely to be conditioned by interpreta-
tion of Gellius’ own preface.”46 The Preface will be discussed in greater detail later
(p97), but it is worth noting here the way it raises the questions this thesis asks of the
remainder of the Noctes. The two main topics of what remains to us of the Preface
are how the Noctes was written and how it should be read, and each is discussed ex-
plicitly as the activity of an active, engaged mind. So he explains that the text has its
origins in a personal aide-memoire, notes jotted down with with an eye towards their
44E.g. Noctes 19.10, where Johnson finds the societal parameters but is less interested in the process
of inquiry being modelled, or its more suggestive and ironic elements. W. A. Johnson 2009: 321-2 on
19.10; my discussion below, p54.
45W. A. Johnson 2010: 116ff.
46Anderson 1994: 1835.
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future relevance (Pr.2). The activities of other miscellaneous authors he derides as in-
discriminate (Pr.5: nam quia variam et miscellam et quasi confusaneam doctrinam
conquisiverant ;47 cf Pr.11), and even the titling of a work is made into an active pro-
cess.48 His own researches, by contrast, are filtered through editorial judgment guided
by a specific principle he had taken to heart.49 As compositional rhetoric goes, this is
heavily focused on his author’s minds: physical descriptions are sparse, not to mention
secondary in importance to mental acuity and care. And that care’s goal was to create
something with specific beneficial effects intended for the reader.50 This has the dual
effect of casting all texts as the product of mental activity, and of alerting the reader to
the complex didactic programme that underlies the Noctes.51 Equally focused on men-
tal effort is Gellius’s prescription for reading the Noctes, in which, anticipating various
possible negative reactions he suggests a constructive alternatives. So, he writes, the
difficulty of learning something does not obviate its worth: quod erunt autem in his
commentariis pauca quaedam scrupulosa et anxia [. . . ] non oportet ea defugere, quasi
aut cognitu non utilia aut perceptu difficilia (Pr.13). Rather than criticise novelties the
reader should stop and consider whether they have the stimulating qualities that Gel-
lius himself sought.52 Incompleteness, he says, should be seen as an invitation to follow
up independently (Pr.17: . . . quasi demonstratione uestigiorum contenti, persequantur
ea post . . . ); and if the reader wishes to play the critic’s game, Gellius dares him or
her to seek his sources and criticise them instead: quae vero putauerint reprehendenda,
47Rust 2009: 10.
48Pr.6: namque alii Musarum inscripserunt, alii Silvarum . . . . Cf Pliny the Elder Pr. 24-5 for
whom titles are a noun rather than a verb (inscriptiones). On titles see Rust 2009: 234f.
49Pr.12: ego vero, cum illud Ephesii uiri summe nobilis uerbum cordi haberem . . . .
50Pr.12: . . . sed modica ex his eaque sola accepi, quae aut ingenia prompta expeditaque ad honestae
eruditionis cupidinem utiliumque artium contemplationem celeri facilique compendio ducerent aut
homines aliis iam uitae negotiis occupatos a turpi certe agrestique rerum atque uerborum imperitia
uindicarent.
51W. A. Johnson 2010: 99.
52Pr.16: quae porro nova sibi ignotaque offenderint, aequum esse puto ut sine uano obtrectatu
considerent [. . . ].
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his, si audebunt, succenseant, unde ea nos accepimus (Pr.18). Those who do not enjoy
working hard at study or are too busy with negotia (Pr.19) should read something else
(Pr.19: . . . abeant a “Noctibus” his procul, atque alia sibi oblectamenta quaerant). He
then invokes a banishment of the uninitiated from Aristophanes’s Frogs — not giving
the title, but quoting the lines, in an early test of the programme he has just outlined
— to underscore the seriousness of his banishment of the incurious.
1.3.2 Table of contents: Seek and find
Acts of reading are thus rendered complicated and subjective, conditional on the
reader’s preparation and skill, and not all performances of reading are created equal.
This caution, this elevation of stakes around responding to text, seeps into even the most
practical elements of the work: so in introducing his table of contents, he complicates
this paratextual device, casting its use a matter of both seeking and finding (Pr.25: quid
quo in libro quaeri invenirique possit). I will suggest later that the distinction is one
he exploits by providing, in many articles, something other than what he promised in
their corresponding capitula, demanding that the reader reflect on what he or she was
looking for, and why, and how it differs from what was found.53 Even in the unrolling of
its scrolls the Noctes ’s reader will be tested.54 Reading, thinking and writing intertwine
as complex processes with discrete stages in the Preface. The Preface prepares us to
expect a work with equally close attention not just to learnedness but to the very
process of learning, and how it should and should not happen. Internal mental activity,
53Mused on: Gunderson 2009: 46-7. But cf Gellius on the subtle distinctions in apparent pleonasms,
13.25 (below p79).
54Cf Rust 2009: 121-6 who explores the potential effects of Gellius’s TOC, but trusts too much
in the difficulty of ancient bookrolls, following Small 1997: 19-25; ancient readers surely developed
strategies, paratextual and mental, to more quickly navigate texts, especially “miscellaneous” ones;
Morgan 2007: 257-273. See also Parker 2009: 191 on the tendency (in a slightly different context) to
“exoticize ancient reading, to make the ancients as different from us as they can.”
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in the world of the Noctes, will be externalised;55 intellectual faculty performed in word
and deed.
1.3.3 Articles: a typology of Gellian intellectual narrative
This thesis will argue that, across different forms and on different subjects, Gellius
examines the activities of the mind in consistent ways and to serve certain programmatic
goals. Further, Gellius encourages his reader to understand authority as negotiable, re-
ceived knowledge as worthy of scrutiny, and erudition generally as a matter of (a)
critical self-awareness in the acquisition of knowledge and (b) dynamic independence in
its application.56 These priorities will be seen to emerge from the different intellectual
environments within which Gellius himself lived, and to bear the hallmarks of both
Roman and Greek rhetorical and philosophical traditions. The Noctes is a work inten-
ded to guide its Roman reader through his or her cultural canon and civic and social
lives, and one that uses a range of diverse but consistent narrative forms and protreptic
devices to engage the reader in a course of adult learning and teach certain skills and
values related to the place of knowledge in an elite Roman’s civic and social life.
The almost 400 articles of the Noctes I have divided into three general types based
on the role that narrative plays in their structure. These are:
1. dialogic narratives — or articles based around conversations between individuals,
including social scenes of reading
2. reading narratives — articles that narrate Gellius’s solitary encounters with text
and his mental responses thereto
3. essays and notes — articles structured around an exploration or explication rather
than a narrative; or, collections of fragments with no apparent structure
55The terms map poorly onto antiquity; McMahon 2008.
56On interior scrutiny of the self see Edwards 1997, on Seneca and Foucault.
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Although the distinctions are mine, not Gellius’s, and the lines between them sometime
blur, each may nevertheless be identified with particular ancient genres and activities.
I examine each type in turn. In Chapter Two, the conversational or dialogic scenes
will provide the most accessible starting point for establishing a methodology of reading
intellectual narrative. I will examine several different passages centred around dialogues,
and show how Gellius exploits the conventions of ancient dialogic literature to direct
the reader’s attention to mental activity both within and without the scene at hand.
Reading narratives will be the focus of Chapter Three. Gellius is unique among
surviving ancient authors for the systematic and detailed way in which he engages in
a particular kind of writing: writing about reading. In Chapter Four, I will discuss
the essays and notes in the Noctes that, despite having no explicit narrative structure,
similarly represent the process of seeking and evaluating authorities and knowledge.
Gellius’s Prefatory instructions, discussed above, set the tone for the Noctes, and
establish the relationship between author, text and reader: the very presence of such
specific expectations turns the reader into a performer. The reading of the text is now a
performative space, with certain expectations to which the reader may or may not live
up. The text is a challenge which must be responded to. Elite Imperial Rome was thick
with challenges, texts and ideas which had to be responded to with agility and creativity,
from classroom rhetorical exercises (and the high-profile competitive rhetoric displays
they led to) to specialist arenas in which experts were tested on their recognition of
and response to books and concepts — not to mention the more practical demands
of response to law and legal thinking.57 I will argue in this thesis that a key part of
Gellius’s programme is to transfer the obvious performativity of social conversation
57Seneca the Elder and Philostratus leaves us biographies of orators as on-the-spot thinkers. Ex-
perts might find their authority tested in various settings by situations and books (White 2009). See
Strohmaier 1976 for a suggestion of what Lucian’s persona as a μισαλάζων might have involved, in
the tradition of e.g. Heraclides and Dionysius (Diogenes Laertius Lives 5.92-3) (Grafton 1990: 3-4).
Bartsch 1994 on stakes of response in Neronian Rome.
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(whether symposium or classroom), by way of the more negotiable scrutiny of social
reading, thoroughly into the self-focused moment of solitary encounter with texts and
knowledge in the course of private reading. His prescriptions of reading in the Preface
are thus not only clear instructions for “using” the text: they are also the first step in
encouraging the reader to become more self-aware and critical.
Though it is the sense of verism that attracts many readers to Gellius, the closer we
get to the worlds he offers glimpses of, the more imaginary they seem to be. They are
imaginary worlds of libraries, studies, learning, and — not least — the city of Rome
itself.58 We then must ask why and to what end he so carefully crafts such imaginary
worlds. The Noctes, this thesis will show, offers through its emphasis on processes
and activities of the mind not just knowledge but meta-knowledge — not things for
Romans to learn, but reflections on, and guidelines for, the experiences of Imperial
Roman learning and living.
58Woolf 2003 on the last.
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Chapter 2
Scenes of learning and learnedness
2.1 Introduction: Understanding dialogue, interpret-
ing speech
2.1.1 Dialogic scenes in the Noctes Atticae
Roughly a quarter of the articles in the Noctes Atticae are vignettes of conversation:
scenes in which one or more people speak. They are generally brief, unpredictable in
structure, and scattered throughout the work, not to mention largely unique in Latin
literature.1 It has long been apparent to modern readers that these scenes depict various
intellectual values and anxieties of either the author or his larger intellectual milieu.2
In this chapter, I will argue that their most important feature to understanding their
relationship to the Noctes as a whole is the way they are narrated: their consistent
representation of intellectual processes of inquiry and evaluation. This emphasis on
Gellius’s depiction of intellectual processes as played out in interpersonal discourse will
set the stage for a later examination of how he represents similar processes in different
1Marache 1953: 1.
2E.g. Vardi 2001.
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kinds of narrative.
Understanding Gellius’s scenes of conversation as a kind of dialogic literature will
allow us to place them in a literary tradition.3 These dialogic scenes are all, on several
levels simultaneously, exercises in the scrutiny of authoritative speech.4 Each dialogic
scene presents a substantive question — the meaning of a word, perhaps — but its
narrative structure represents the process of identifying and evaluating the authorities
needed to answer that question. The dialogic scenes consistently represent, by how
they are narrated, processes of evaluation.
The process of scrutiny depends on the idea, central to Gellius’s programme, that
distinguishes between the surface characteristics and the deeper, innate qualities of
both people and texts. It is on the basis of this that those who claim expertise must be
scrutinised. Such a distinction has a long pedigree in antiquity: the exposure of false
claims to authority is an essential part of Plato’s dialogues.5 But the distinction takes
two interesting forms in Gellius. The first is his emphasis on the private intellectual
lifestyle, embodied in the imagery of lucubration, which he sees as directly and causally
related to someone’s public intellectual persona. One goal of his dialogic scenes is
thus to practice scrutinising someone’s speech for evidence of their private mental life.6
The second form the distinction takes is a conceptual model for both narratives and
conversation that recognises both the superficial allure that attracts a listener’s mind
(inlecebra) and the deeper values that actually make them worth hearing (res); in a
sense, between the effects of mediation that entice the audience, and the ideas being
mediated.7
The processes of scrutiny that Gellius represents in his dialogic scenes occur on
3Other assumptions are possible; e.g., to Keulen 2009: 38, they are chreiai.
4I count just under 90 scenes in which a living character speaks.
5Young 2006: 60.
6Contra W. A. Johnson 2010: 115-116 on the lucubratory motif. See below, Ch. 3. For Gellius on
speech, 1.15.
7Noctes 11.13, 17.20 (cf 13.29) for style vs. substance. For inlecebra, see below p46.
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three levels. On the first, they are the literal action that any given scene depicts, as
Gellius and his friends explore a question. On the second, they provide the story arc
that joins Gellius’s various experiences in the intellectual autobiography that is the
premise of the Noctes, as he becomes more learned and critical. And on the third,
they are the processes to which his reader is expected to subject the text itself. The
dialogic scenes are persistently self-conscious in their narration, and some of them are
carefully calibrated to destabilise their own narratives. Because each dialogic scene
has a substantive inquiry as well as an intellectual moral — that is, a question being
answered, as well as a lesson to learn about that answering — Gellius requires his reader
to constantly ensure he or she has extract the proper moral from each encounter. When
I say that the dialogic scenes represent processes of scrutiny, then, I mean both that
such scrutiny occurs in the narrative, and that the narrative as a whole subjects itself
to such scrutiny by the reader.8
Gellius’s use of dialogue, contributes much to our understanding of the development
of that genre, particularly in the Imperial period. He stands at an important point in
the miniaturisation and ornamentation of dialogue: the writing of increasingly short,
fragmented dialogues that change their setting more rapidly, and of dialogues in which
the non-speech elements of the narrative (like scene-setting, offstage action, and the
narrator’s private reflection) play an increasingly important role. He also fits clearly
into dialogue’s development as a medium for transmitting disciplinary or antiquarian
concepts, and for scrutinising and satirising specific individuals or intellectual types.
In the next section, I will provide a brief survey of these trends in several authors in
order to indicate where we should understand Gellius as a second-century Latin dialogic
narrator.
8See Gill 2002: 146-7 on Platonic dialogue.
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2.1.2 Trends in Imperial dialogue
Points of origin in classical long-form dialogue
For the authors of the later dialogues in which I am interested here, the works of
Plato seem to constitute a common point of reference and ancestry. The dialogue form
is inseparable from Plato’s project: the narrative structure of a conversation enacts the
key Platonic principle of elenchus, the scrutiny of claims to authority (and so the ideas
those claims are based on) for their true nature by way of a dialectic process.9 Plato
uses the dialogue to great effect in various ways; in the widely popular Symposium, for
example, the venue of a sympotic gathering provides a democratising but also compet-
itive narrative context in which rival theories and ideas can be aired and articulated,
each by a suitable character.10 Narrative events affect the course of the dialectic: the
intrusion of Alcibiades, disrupting the flow of conversation and prompting a new ap-
proach to the topic, later becomes a hallmark of the dialogue form, leading readers and
critics to see, in any subsequent sympotic literature, a disruptive intruder as a kind of
Alcibiades. Plato’s lengthy prose style — many dialogues consist of long passages of
speech only briefly punctuated by agreement or questions — befits the seriousness of
the subjects and the thoroughness with which Plato seeks to explore them. In some
dialogues, such as the Phaedrus (a popular locus for assessing Plato’s own attitude to-
ward the dialogue form), the narrative premise of a conversation illustrates the concept
being examined. The layers of persuasive role-play as the interlocutors swap speeches
force an inquiry into the sincerity and legitimacy of each persuasive approach; narrative
elements in which characters recant their opinions or engage in dramatic flourishes add
an essential focus to their speech.11 The flow of the conversation shifts unexpectedly
9Frede 1992.
10For a full accounting of how the dialogue form advances the arguments and ideas of the works in
which it is used, McCabe 2006.
11See most recently Giannopoulou 2010: 157-9.
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but aptly to a discussion of writing and the merits, for communication, of text and
orality.12 The use of a conversation, which may change its focus organically, offers a
different approach to exploring a concept than would a linear, structured treatise. As
originator of the genre, then, Plato contributes to dialogue an approach in which form
is integral to function. It is a form of especial self-awareness about its fictionality; on
the one hand, it resembles closely a realistic activity — interpersonal conversation —
often explicitly cast as emerging naturally from daily encounters, while on the other, its
speech tends toward unrealistic length, and is carefully composed, involving the reader
in dialogue with text as much as the characters within the text are in dialogue with
each other.13 The dialogue form invites the reader with the accessible appearance of
discourse, but its fundamental concepts require effort to extract.
In his philosophical dialogues, Cicero offers a clear example of an author self-
consciously adapting the genre to his own purposes as he not only continues to make use
of its dialectic function, but also fine-tunes the use of narrative elements to accentuate
the dialogue’s argument. Setting becomes more precise and significant, yet all the more
closely integrated into the discussion. In his De Oratore and De Republica, setting —
both time and place — and characters are carefully chosen to lend weight to the discus-
sion.14 The former work, on the question of what qualities an orator needs to contribute
effectively to civic society, is set in 91 BCE on the eve of impending crisis (the Social
War), inviting obvious connection to the crisis in which the state was at the time of
the work’s publication. The historical figures who take part — L. Licinius Crassus, Q.
Mucius Scaevola, M. Antonius, etc. — are carefully chosen for the ideas to which they
give voice, and the dialogue form allows for reactions of either agreement, to underline
points, or consternation, to offer sympathy with the reader’s possible reaction.15 The
12Long 2008.
13Gill 2002.
14“The dramatic setting is not the frame — it is part of the picture.” (Zetzel 1995: 6)
15May and Wisse 2001: 13-16.
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ideas the work aims generally to advance are staged, in the narrative, as the product
of different disciplines in dialogue, through the use of experts in different fields. The
course of the conversation also illustrates key values: so Antonius’s surprising reactions
at the end of the Book One are revealed, in Book Two, as an example of controver-
sial exercise, an important element of the Ciceronian programme.16 The De Republica
shares many of these elements, also set at a crisis point, and indeed also on the eve of
a character’s death (P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilius Africanus). Such dramatically loaded
specificity emphasises not only the significance of the conversation’s contents, but loc-
ates its ideas in a tradition of knowledge that connects their fictional past exploration
directly to the present context in which Cicero wished to see them applied.17
Cicero’s sophisticated attitude toward dialogue is further illustrated by some dis-
cussions in his correspondence of his authorial process, from which it emerges that
although he sees his dialogic characters sometimes as vessels for his own ideas, he is
primarily concerned that the part they play in the conversation be suitable and credible
to the reader: that the fictional illusion, by which ideas are conveyed, not be broken.
Plato is identified clearly as his touchstone here, offering an antecedent for the decorous
departure of Scaevola from the De Oratore.18 The dramatic setting of the De Republica
was a matter of uncertainty throughout its composition, with a friend arguing that
setting it too far in the past would, by appearing too fictional, blunt Cicero’s inherent
authority on the subject at hand.19 A tension thus exists, to which Cicero is closely
attuned, between the conceptually productive dialectic form (and the added value of
a carefully chosen setting), and the overt fictionality of the form. On other occasions
he seems to allude to his characters as mere ciphers, which should remind us of the
16De Or. 1.262, 2.40; discussed May and Wisse 2001: 16-7.
17Zetzel 1995: 5-6.
18ad Att. 4.16.3: . . . sed feci idem quod in piολιτείᾳ deus ille noster Plato.
19ad Q. fr. 3.5.1: . . . quae tam antiquis hominibus attribuerem, ea visum iri ficta esse; . . . .
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sophisticated attitude his readers would also have had toward dialogue:20 “But you
know how it is with dialogues,” he tells Varro.21 One moment in the De Republica ac-
centuates this self-awareness, looking back to Plato as well as forward to more playful
imperial approaches: Cicero makes Scipio, at the beginning of the conversation, explain
to Tubero that Plato, in his dialogues, blended Socratic style and wit with Pythagorean
wisdom, effectively using the character of Socrates as a medium for his (Plato’s) own
ideas (De Republica 1.16).22 In other words, the dialogic character is made to articulate
the way in which authors of dialogues create and use their characters. The moment is
existentially peculiar, highlighting the fictionality of the whole account and reminding
the reader that an authorial argument lies behind the text.23 The point is underlined by
the immediately subsequent arrival of Rutilius (1.17), whom Cicero credits with report-
ing the rest of the dialogue to him. That Rutilius, the source of the conversation, was
absent for the first few paragraphs of speech that Cicero reports is left as an amusing
reminder to the reader of the fictional nature of the text.
Varro, did, of course, know how it was with dialogues, having composed not only
his own satirical works, but also a tripartite antiquarian dialogue that set abstruse
discussions of agricultural practice in heated moments of Roman civic and military life.24
Later, Tacitus would likewise set his own dialogic exploration of oratorical theory as an
aside from the very tensions of social and political life with which the work grapples.25
But this phenomenon by which the narrative paraphernalia of a dialogue — its setting,
cast, and plot — contribute more closely to the course of its dialectic exploration begins,
at Rome, with Cicero. As narratives become more significant, intellectual process comes
20ad Fam. 7.32.2.
21ad Fam. 9.8.1: Sed nosti morem dialogorum.
22Cf Noctes 17.5.1.
23Cf Plato Phaedo 59B10, discussed McCabe 2006: 41.
24De Re Rustica the interlocutors of Book 1 await a companion who, it is revealed at the Book’s
end, has been killed (1.69). See Green 1997 for a full political reading of the interplay between Book
3’s setting, characters and content.
25Dialogus de Oratoribus.
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more strongly to the fore.
Imperial innovation: Plutarch and Lucian
One of the most likely points of reference for Gellius’s own use of dialogic literature
is the Quaestiones Conviviales (QC ) of Plutarch, an author himself part of a major
revival in Greek dialogue in the Imperial period.26 Gellius makes reference to the
QC, and both by making him the first word of the Noctes and by way of his teacher
Taurus puts Plutarch at the head of his own Greek intellectual lineage.27 The QC
contributes much to Gellius’s own dialogic strategy: each of its nine books contains a
series of miniaturised sympotic dialogues that flow organically from one topic to another,
featuring named interlocutors who each represent a discipline or intellectual lifestyle as
they explore various lines of inquiry. The narrative emphasises the ad-hoc nature of it
all: the point is how the characters engage in discourse off the cuff.28 Each topic is dealt
with swiftly, but firm conclusions are rarely reached. The narration is strongly veristic
in its depiction of a friendly sympotic gathering: transitions between speakers and
topics are carefully narrated, with characters laughing, pausing, or growing angry; this
carefully described flow to the conversations directs the reader’s attention to the way in
which each answer offered might be evaluated. The flow and tone of the conversation
— along with the persistently democratic tone of the sympotic context — offer frequent
opportunities for the reader to participate, either by evaluating an answer for himself or
herself, or by adding one to the debate.29 Several brief examples from Book 9 of the QC
will show the different ways that Plutarch’s miniaturised, carefully narrated dialogues
emphasise an evaluative process; we will also see the tendency toward reflexiveness
26On the QC, inter al. Ko¨nig 2007, Klotz 2007, Klotz and Oikonomopoulou forthcoming.
271.1.1: Plutarchus. . . (Whiteley 1978: 101). 1.26.3: “. . . Plutarchus noster . . . ”. Rust 2009: 65-8
and Klotz and Oikonomopoulou forthcoming: Conclusion. Cf 2.8, 2.9.
28Ko¨nig 2008: 88.
29Ko¨nig 2008: 88-90.
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and a concern with authority figures that become important to Gellius’s own dialogic
scenes.30
Book 9’s interest in disciplinary authority is signalled by the kind of symposium it
relates: a party hosted by Plutarch’s teacher Ammonius, where the guests of honour
are other teachers whose students have just competed at the festival of the Muses
(736c). Ammonius has to keep close control on the conversation, given as teachers are
to quarrelling (736e). The first topic of discussion is the apt use of quotation, followed
by the inopportune use of quotation (736e-737c). The first gives the experts a chance
to show off their knowledge by recalling stories about times other people showed off
their knowledge; the second raises the spectre of showing off at the wrong time and
so offending the powerful. The game they play is one the reader can infinitely add
to: imagine any situation and any quotation which would be apt or not to it. And
the flow of the conversation is humorously ironic, as the teachers first revel in and then
encounter the risks of their particular kind of expertise: in the first story of inopportune
quotation, it is a teacher who inappropriately displays his erudition.31
Ammonius takes a strong hand in guiding the conversation, enforcing interdiscip-
linary exchanges that show off the tendencies of experts. So, when he has ordered
the geometers and grammarians to interrogate one another (737D-E), a grammarian
is asked why alpha is the first letter in the alphabet, and provides what is identified
as a stock response (737E).32 Ammonius then puts Plutarch on the spot, and the ex-
change between the two shows not only how an amateur might engage in such dialogue,
but also how an individual negotiates his intellectual allegiances: Ammonius suggests
Plutarch respond in one way, appealing to his place of origin, but Plutarch prefers to
30Oikonomopoulou forthcoming on the significance of Plutarch’s use of dialogic form.
31οἷον Πομpiηίῳ Μάγνῳ φασὶν ἀpiὸ τῆς μεγάλης ἐpiανήκοντι στρατείας τὸν διδάσκαλον τῆς θυγατρὸς
ἀpiόδειξιν διδόντα βιβλίου κομισθέντος ἐνδοῦναι τῇ piαιδὶ τοιαύτην ‘ἤλυθες ἐκ piολέμου· ὡς ὤφελες αὐτόθ΄
ὀλέσθαι.’ (737B)
32ὁ δὲ τὴν ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς λεγομένην ἀpiέδωκε.
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cite his own grandfather (738A-B).33 A similar pattern occurs later: when the question
arises of why there are nine Muses, Herodes the rhetor offers some basic numerology,
and Ammonius pokes fun at their conventional quality (744B).34 Herodes laughs, but
has nothing to add: after a silence that invites the reader to do better, Herodes invites
his other guests to do the same. Plutarch’s brother steps in, unbidden, and makes
his own attempt (744C-F). The course of this conversation underscores the nature of
the activity pursued in the QC and thus modelled for its reader: the interlocutors are
not out to identify a correct explanation, but rather to sort through a large corpus of
possible answers — some of them known to all participants — and, having identified a
good one, to present it well, and so contribute something to the conversation.
Not only do the social dimensions of the symposium provide a formally balanced
competitive space for such pursuits, in which the reader is invited to participate, but
the role of the host as close controller of the course of conversation begins to reflect that
of the work’s author. So Ammonius explores a possible answer to a question, and then
demands immediate response from everyone (746B). And the narrative, scene-setting
trappings of the dialogue provide guidance and reflection to its interlocutors. When the
dancing begins, the learned guests speak at length on the topic of dance (747B f). The
Book concludes with Ammonius lamenting that the learned no longer watch dance as
they used to: although of course that is exactly what is happening (748B).
The speech of Plutarch’s interlocutors is rich in quotation, but the value of any
given interlocutor’s response is equal parts what he says and how he says it (with what
authority, in what context, etc.). The richness of quotation looks ahead perhaps to the
form of Athenaeus, who pursues a similar form but far more densely, with far longer
quotation and thus far more slippage from the dialogic mode into the bibliographical
33Ko¨nig forthcoming on Plutarch’s self-presentation in the QC.
34ἀνδρικῶς ταυτὶ διεμνημόνευσας· καὶ piρόσθες αὐτοῖς ἔτι τοσοῦτον . . . . Note the nod to the civilised-
combat of the symposium. On this quaestio (9.14), Klotz 2007: 660-666.
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one.35 We might then understand Gellius — who breaks up his own rapid-fire dialogic
scenes with specifically un-dialogic scenes of different bibliographical character — as
pursuing an alternate path to that followed by Athenaeus.
More roughly contemporaneous with Gellius, Lucian was exploring the potential
of a short dialogue to satirise an individual or mindset through the way that person’s
character is revealed or changes over the course of the dialogue, often playfully engaging
with the piece’s own fictionality.36 His short dialogue The Lie-lover is a satire on the
desire to hear fabulous tales. It is a telescoping series of embedded narratives, over the
course of which Tychiades, the author’s alter ego, witnesses but also becomes corrupted
by the infectious nature of a fondness for fantasy which is the piece’s ultimate defining
image (40). Lucian uses the dialogue form to illustrate this creeping infectiousness, as
characters encourage each other in their storytelling. The satire is brought to its full
effect by Tychiades and his friend Philocles being no less subject to the infection than
the others — and the reader realising that he or she has also been exposed. Tychiades
begins the piece by complaining to Philocles about “those men who put sheer useless
lying far ahead of truth, liking the thing and whiling away their time at it without any
valid excuse” (1).37 He explains, disgustedly, that he heard a respected man spinning
many tall tales, at which Philocles eagerly demands to hear the tales himself (5). The
eagerness of his response — “What were they, Tychiades, in the name of Hestia?” —
reveals that he is not free of the fondness for lies.
This opens a new narrative frame; Tychiades’s account of his visit to the liar Eu-
crates forms the bulk of the dialogue (6-29). The other guests at Eucrates’s house are
philosophers and doctors, sharpening Lucian’s critique of their gullibility. The conver-
35See on this Ko¨nig 2008: 90-92’s discussion of Bakhtinian heteroglossia in this context. Cf Gunder-
son 2009: 169: “All the scholars who have ever lived become characters who are available for walk-on
roles in the Noctes.”
36On Lucian as an heir to Plato, Branham 1989: 67, and on Lucianic dialogue generally pp 61-123.
37All trans Harmon 1936.
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sation circles around a pattern: someone tells a tall tale, Tychiades mocks it, and then
another guest supports it with his own corroborating account of a similar experience.
At the height of Eucrates’s story about a pit opened up into Hades by a monstrous
Gorgon-woman, all save Tychiades are enraptured (23). The philosopher Ion goads
Eucrates on by asking what he saw in the pit, supplying his own details: “. . . But did
you not see Socrates himself and Plato among the dead?” Eucrates replies that he saw
the former, but admits he did not see the latter — he wouldn’t lie to his friends about
that (24)!38 Even one of his servants corroborates the tale. Tychiades is relieved by
the arrival of a Pythagorean, thinking this man will stand up for reason, but the new
arrival immediately reveals that he is enticed by the subject at hand: “As I came in,
I overheard you, and it seemed to me that you were on the point of giving a fine turn
to the conversation!” He, too, spins tall tales, and quickly offers verifying details to
Eucrates’s version of the tale of the sorceror’s apprentice (34).
Tychiades is exhausted. Finally fleeing, he seems to have escaped, unconvinced
by the various lie-lovers. But, like the final, ominous shot in a horror film, the brief
return to the dialogue’s outer narrative frame before it concludes reveals that he has
carried the contagion with him. He complains that he feels full of the lies as if they
were sweet wine (39), an unpleasant experience — but Philocles, who has been the
audience of Tychiades’s own tale, seems to misunderstand Tychiades’s state of mind.
“Your story has had the same enjoyable effect upon me, Tychiades”, he says (40),
and expounds a theory of the transmissibility of lies as rabies: “It is likely, therefore,
that having been bitten yourself by a multitude of lies in the house of Eucrates, you
have passed the bite on to me; you have filled my soul so full of spirits!” Tychiades
makes a final parting appeal to the immunising power of reason against such infection,
but the joke is on him. His faithful reportage of the internal dialogue (which itself
38τὸν Πλάτωνα δὲ οὐκ ἐγνώρισα· χρὴ γάρ, οἶμαι, piρὸς φίλους ἄνδρας τἀληθῆ λέγειν. Alluding, pre-
sumably, to the elusiveness of the authorial Plato behind the literary sophistication of his dialogues.
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contained further internal accounts and tales) demonstrates his engagement with its
content, and his commission of the sin he identified at the dialogue’s opening: relating
lies. Such ironic and self-destabilising narratives are a hallmark of Lucian’s work; see,
for example, the slow decay of credibility in his Alexander, or the punchy, humorous
Amber or the Swans, in which he makes claims to support an attack on people who
make just such claims. Here, though, where the target is a particular mental stance and
the people who find themselves susceptible to it, the dialogue form allows him to enact
— on several levels — the decay of reason in the face of seductive fantasy. It is not
Eucrates, or Tychiades, or Lucian who is left in the role of lie-lover — it is the reader.
This narratively complex approach to representing the development of mental states,
particularly with an eye toward satirising purportedly authoritative intellectual figures,
shares much with Gellius’s own use of dialogue in both priorities and execution.39
2.1.3 Reading minds in Gellius
Several themes have thus emerged in the development of dialogue in the Imperial
period. We can see the increasing importance, particularly in Plutarch, of the way the
course of a conversation contributes a critical deliberative layer: the narrative of the
discourse is an essential part of what the text has to offer. That deliberation is also
increasingly veristic, modelled on “real” or gently idealised modes of conversation as
a way of including the reader. The sympotic context adds a democratic cast to that
discourse, inviting and allowing readerly participation and contribution. We can also
see, for dialogic authors concerned about the societal context of the ideas they discuss,
how narrative contexts such as political crisis points or even just the rhythms of civic
life can add an important dimension to what occurs in a dialogue. Finally, we can
39Cf Branham 1989: 90 on other capacities of Lucianic dialogue, and 103 on how insight emerges
from conversation.
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see the tightening of dialogic narrators’ focus on individual characters’ embodiment of
particular intellectual qualities or approaches.40 And as the focus becomes narrower,
shorter narrative forms become more effective: Plutarch especially indicates a trend
toward episode narrative in dialogue, where brief encounters are strung together into a
larger work.
I will now very briefly look at a dialogic passage in which Gellius closely guides the
reader in evaluating interlocutors’ authority by way of their speech. Noctes 5.21 relates
an argument over whether the obscure archaism pluria is acceptable Latin.41 Gellius
is a silent observer to the conversation, in which an anonymous good friend has used
the word and is challenged on it by a bystander. Although the passage is advertised in
the Table of Contents as containing evidence for the word’s validity, the narrative that
plays out — the deeper value Gellius offers to a careful reader who was enticed by the
surface appeal of that evidence — is a case study in scrutinising authority figures.42
The narrative of this scene depends entirely on Gellius guiding his reader’s opinions
of the interlocutors. We learn that the amicus was very learned (adprime doctus,
5.21.1), and that he happened to say pluria in conversation.43 Gellius tells us it was
not in the man’s character to be ostentatious with archaisms, but surmises — modelling
for us an interpretive lens for speech — that the man’s fondness for reading ancient
literature had put the word into the man’s mind.
sed, opinor, assidua ueterum scriptorum tractatione inoleverat linguae illius uox,
quam in libris saepe offenderat.
But, I think, from thorough handling of ancient writers, the manner of their
speech, which he had often come across in their books, had grown on his tongue.
(5.21.3)
40This is the function of the emphasis on non-visual characterisation identified by Holford-Strevens
1997.
41On this passage Springer 1958: 123, Holford-Strevens 2003: 179, Gunderson 2009: 123-5, Rust
2009: 51-5. Cf 7.15, 15.9.
42cap.5.21: “Pluria” qui dicat et “compluria” et “compluriens”, non barbare dicere, sed Latine. Cf
Henry 1994: 1926.
43Keulen 2009: 52n44 on the characterisation.
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By contrast, the other person present had read very little, and poorly.
aderat, cum ille hoc dicit, reprehensor audaculus verborum, qui perpauca eadem-
que a uolgo protrita legerat habebatque nonnullas disciplinae grammaticae inaudi-
tiunculas partim rudes inchoatasque partim non probas easque quasi puluerem ob
oculos, cum adortus quemque fuerat, adspergebat.
There was there, when he said that, an impudent censurer of words, who had
read very little and commonplace things at that, and who had some brief little
lessons in the grammatical arts, some of them rough and sketchy, some of them
untested, and these he scattered before people’s eyes when he had accosted them.
(5.21.4)
This is not especially sophisticated dialogic narrative, but it is effective. Before the
interlocutors have even opened their mouths, the narrator has prepared us with know-
ledge of each one’s intellectual character, as well as having given immediate, tangible
force to the manners of their speech. The reader is thus primed to make a connection
between private reading habits and general disposition, and how each man conducts
himself in conversation.
The two spar: the reprehensor boldly accuses the amicus of having no authorities for
his usage (5.21.5), and the friend, remaining civil in tone yet confident in his superior
knowledge, smiles and cites a handful of such authorities (5.21.6). The reprehensor
retorts that the authorities are antiquated, and cites a doctrine of verbal formation
(5.21.9), only to have the amicus direct him to various primary texts in a library that
could prove the rule wrong (5.21.10).44 This exchange plays out distinguishing values
that are critical throughout Gellius’s encounters with problematic exponents of the
grammatical discipline: over-reliance on doctrine, incivility, and not being sufficiently
widely read (more on which below).
Several elements are typical of Gellius’s dialogues. For one, its narrative framework
is heavily Roman, with its constant nods to the amicus ’s busy civic life, and to the
infrastructure of the city. The question that triggers it — whether pluria is good Latin
44See Gunderson 2009: 101-2 on ratio and auctoritas.
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— arises by accident, and the subsequent struggle over who has the authority to allow
or reject its usage is played out so as to understand each interlocutor’s speech in the
context of his private mental life and character.45 Gellius as narrator guides us with a
heavy hand to approve of the overworked amateur (reminiscent of the text’s imagined
reader in Pr.22) and to reject the reprehensor. The course of the dialogue is far from
complex, but its rendering as a dialogue has no possible alternatives: for Gellius to
illustrate the passage’s deeper point about the nature of expert claims to authority,
and the standards to which they should be held, no form but the dialogue would do.
Gellius, as silent viewer and narrator, implies his learning from the encounter by
including it in the Noctes at all. This is one model for the reader’s response: silently
observe and make your own judgment. Above, we saw how the evenness of the sympotic
form, even with a forceful agonistic undertone, allows for the reader’s participation.
Gellius’s dialogues, by and large, lack this safe quality (indeed, that sort of sympotic
encounter is rare, and mostly located in his student days at Athens). Instead, they are
aggressive and confrontational in how they are conducted, not to mention unpredictable
and emergent in how they come to pass. The reader is not so much invited to participate
in a Gellian dialogue as challenged to be ready. The roving eye of intellectual scrutiny
may fall on anyone: the reader is equally prompted to defend himself or herself against
it, or redirect it against another. 5.21 thus shows the key elements of the Gellian dialogic
scene that contribute to a larger programme by modelling the scrutiny of superficial
qualities for clues to deeper value, whether it is people and their speech, or texts and
their stories.
Sometimes very little at all has to be said for a Gellian dialogue to illustrate colour-
fully an encounter of intellects. 11.16 is an encounter related to illustrate a phenomenon
Gellius has “frequently observed” (adiecimus saepe animum, 11.16.1): the difficulty of
45For characters enacting their intellects, 11.7.3, 18.9, 7.15.
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rendering certain Greek words effectively into Latin. When a Greekless Roman asks
him what the Plutarchan title piερί piολυpiραγμοσύνης means, the drama that follows
plays out as much silently in Gellius’s mind, as he grapples with the difficulties of the
translation, as it does in the brief verbal exchange that follows, as the man persists in
his Greekless ignorance. The point of the scene is the cognitive limitations suffered by
those who lack Greek knowledge:46 the narrator’s silent internal reflection demonstrates
one aspect of the problem, and the dialogic exchange, another. On other occasions, such
as 1.2, the text’s first dialogic scene, Gellius does not participate at all, instead serving
only as (Platonic) reporter: he “reads” the scene as he would a literary dialogue. The
blurring of lines between narrator and interlocutor, a clear point of contact with Plut-
arch’s approach in the QC, blurs, for the reader, the twin ideas of reading a dialogue
and listening to a conversation. To understand the implications of this phenomenon,
we must briefly examine Gellius’s understanding of the cognitive aspects of didactic
fiction.
2.1.4 Fable and communication
It is in a discussion of how fables (fabulae) function that we find Gellius most clearly
articulating the principle of fictional communication, of morals embedded in narratives,
that underlies his use of dialogic scenes. Rhetorical theory had long recognised the
cognitive effects of brief anecdotes or fables, both as devices with which to capture
an audience’s attention in a speech, and as an exercise for students, who would be
challenged to extract a tale’s “moral” (τὸ ἐpiιμῦθιον).47 Gellius’s own account of fable
offers us a glimpse of the interrelated dynamics he sees of education and rhetoric.
Aesopus ille e Phrygia fabulator haut inmerito sapiens existimatus est, cum,
quae utilia monitu suasuque erant, non seuere neque imperiose praecepit et cen-
46Gellius’s ironic parting apology (11.16.8) amounts to, “I’m sorry you don’t know Greek”.
47For use in speeches, Rhet. ad Herr. 1.10, Cicero de Inv. 1.25. For fable as educational tool,
Morgan 2007: 58.
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suit, ut philosophis mos est, sed festiuos delectabilesque apologos commentus res
salubriter ac prospicienter animadversas in mentes animosque hominum cum
audiendi quadam inlecebra induit.
Aesop, that storyteller from Phrygia, has not unjustly been thought wise, since
he taught and recommended what was useful to be advised and persuaded of, not
severely or imperiously, as is the way with philosophers; rather having conceived
of lively and enjoyable tales, considered wholesomely and with foresight, immersed
them in the minds and souls of men with a certain enticement to their attention.
(2.29.1)
This concept — that worthwhile ideas may be more easily conveyed to an audience’s
mind if an enticing form is crafted around them to attract the audience’s attention —
is hardly exclusive to Gellius, but is important to his project, as he is a regular crafter
of anecdotes and a student of philosophy.
Equally important is his explicit articulation of it in this context, before relating
the fable and referring his reader to another version of it: 2.29 thus communicates not
the fable but a sort of fable-literacy, explaining how a fable works and then allowing
the reader to practice observing that dynamic at work.
Gellius regularly indicates his understanding that the transmission of important
knowledge is aided by verbal phenomena that attract the attention of the mind. So
Taurus, shaming a student for not having drawn the proper moral lessons from the
rhetorical genre he so prefers, quotes Demosthenes to him, observing that if nothing
else, the sing-song like rhythm of the saying’s wording should have lodged its moral
payload in his mind.48 This engages with a serious antiquarian view of old literature
and the language that can be extracted from it: at 3.2.16, having determined where
in the night the Romans of old delineated between one day and the next, Gellius cites
Vergil, imagining Vergil hiding this fact in his verse, communicating facts indirectly
4810.19.2: “homo” inquit “stulte et nihili, si te a malis exemplis auctoritates et rationes philosophiae
non abducunt, ne illius quidem Demosthenis uestri sententiae tibi in mentem uenit, quae, quia lepidis
et uenustis uocum modis uincta est, quasi quaedam cantilena rhetorica facilius adhaerere memoriae
tuae potuit?” On Gellius’s in mentem venit, below p160.
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(oblique) to future readers.49 And a lesson imparted by an anecdote might be amplified
in its effect, as in 13.21, when Gellius hears an anecdote from a friend about the
earlier grammarian Probus. The vivid account (13.21.1-8) so convinces Gellius of the
importance of euphony that he goes off and assembles his own notes on the theme
(.9-25).50
Just as the lack of ancient verbal stability around what moderns term “fable” can
be an impediment to codifying it, many key words in Gellius’s understanding of the
process of composing-stories-that-teach have a range of meanings and positive and
negative implications.51 A brief survey will indicate the way that this craft, though
impressive and powerful, also flirts repeatedly with unsavoury associations. Fabula is a
common word for a comic play (hence Gellius’s clarification apologus in 2.29), but it also
connotes negatively simple stories told to children (5.18), and Gellius’s characterisation
of Herodotos as fabulator (3.10.11) seems meant to cast doubt on his credibility. Fabulae
as “tales” have a deeply ambiguous status, in several passages that will be discussed
in more detail in Chapter 3.52 But, as befits its etymological origins (for, “to speak”),
the verb derived from it (fabulor) suggests a significant kind of speech in the Noctes : it
is with this verb that Gellius has Herodes Atticus support his opinion on Stoicism by
telling a story (19.12.6), that Favorinus discourses on astrologers (12.1.4), and Fronto,
Festus Postumius, and Sulpicius Apollinaris carry on a conversation Gellius is eager
to overhear (19.13.1).53 Derivatives are likewise significant: confabularem is Varro’s
word at 13.11.5 for convivial conversation, and Gellius admires Julianus’s adfabiliter
explanation at 18.5.12 — though it is immediately revealed that the words may not
be Julianus’s own.54 Fabulae are lies and wonder-stories, but also learned tales and
49His enim uersibus oblique, sicuti dixi, admonere uoluit [. . . ] Cf 5.12.13-14, 10.11.6.
50Rust 2009: 68-71.
51Morgan 2007: 57-8.
529.4, 10.12, 16.11.
53Cf Gellius on Favorinus: homo fandi dulcissimis (16.3.1).
54Gunderson 2009: 235-6, 258, and below p67.
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discourse, pregnant with knowledge and meaning.
Likewise the act of creative invention by which Aesop crafts his tales sits halfway
between deception and erudition. The composed story (commentum, comminiscor) is
both a shameless lie and a brilliant invention (10.12.8, .9), a mendacious deception
(14.1.2), and an ingenious code (17.9.11). But it is also a sympotic question carefully
prepared for after-dinner conversation at the house of the philosopher Taurus (7.13.2),
a sophistic captio vigorously defended by the host for its capacity to prompt fruitful
inquiry. Two related words highlight this ambiguity of invention versus falsehood: com-
mentarii are, of course, learned works of scholarly exegesis and elaboration, including
the Noctes itself, while commenticii are the things that are uncomfortably new or un-
convincing (e.g. 2.22.25, 3.19.4) — excesses of invention.55 The particular inventive
mental synthesis of (re)collection and creation described by comminiscor is an act of
learned communication that also has the capacity for unsavoury deception. So too,
finally, is inlecebra, the quality that entices the audience’s mind to the story, a term of
ambiguous associations. It is the shameful seduction that prompts Arcesilaus’s rebuke
at 3.5.2, the beguiling untruth that seduces Pliny the Elder at 10.12.4, and the effect
of the misleading title of a learned book in 18.6.3. Democritus blinds himself to escape
the inlecebra of sight (10.17.1). But just as questions for Taurus’s table are fashioned,
commenti, Gellius approvingly cites Varro’s prescription for dinner conversation that
has a certain inlecebra et voluptate (13.11.4; the same qualities rebuked on the effemin-
ate man’s person in 3.5). And when visiting a gravely ill friend has left Taurus gloomy
and morose (in what is surely a joke on his Stoicism), one student’s timely question
that distracts Taurus by necessitating a lengthy sermo has an inlecebra that cheers the
philosopher (12.5.5).
55For more on commentarii, Boemer 1953, Vardi 2004, Chapter 4 below. For Gellius on ambiguity,
11.12, 12.9.
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The Noctes may, ambiguously, be a commentarius, but within its pages, that concept
is permeated by anxieties of fictionality and deception. Gellius’s assessment of Aesop’s
brilliance in these terms makes it clear that the cognitive processes he attaches to the
fable are equally relevant across other media: specifically, speech, and specifically within
that, the speech of the learned. And if media other than fables can have these properties,
then such media also pose challenges for their audiences to test those qualities and,
conscious of the inlecebra even as it attracts their attention, seek the res being conveyed
to them. The teaching of lessons through stories is a key Gellian device. The perception
of those lessons, and the simultaneous, self-aware appreciation of both the lesson and
the story, is a key skill he expects his reader to develop.
2.1.5 The uses of discourse
One of Gellius’s dialogues’ strongest links with that genre is the important function
of aporeia. Though many scenes reach a conclusion, many also do not; as in some
dialogues of Plato, and many stretches of the QC, no clear answer is found, but the
process of seeking it is made no less important by that fact. 12.5, for example, cuts off
even though Taurus had more to say.56 In 19.10, the group disbands without an answer
to its question, but having successfully exposed in the course of seeking to answer it
the worthlessness of the resident grammaticus.57
Gellius’s interest in questions-that-stimulate is programmatic and well-documented.58
He delights in riddles, recalls a teacher’s vigorous defense of sophisms, and proudly re-
ports another teacher’s praise of the kind of question he asked on one occasion.59 Good
56Cum haec Taurus dixisset uidereturque in eandem rem plura etiam dicturus, peruentum est ad
uehicula, et conscendimus (12.5.15).
57Atque ita omnes relicta ibi quaestione verbi consurreximus (19.10.14).
58Keulen 2009: 158f.
5912.6; 7.13.7; 9.1.3. Cf 18.1. For literary delight in riddling, see Plutarch, Dinner of the Seven
Sages.
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questions are thus to be treasured, while other questions of uncertain quality must be
tested by attempting to answer them; the best have a beneficial value far beyond their
factual answers. This is the animating spirit of problematic literature with which Gel-
lius is acquainted — as he is with its didactic potential, observed in 20.4 when Taurus
sends a selection of Aristotelian problemata for a student to reflect on (and so, it is
hoped, mend his ways). It is noteworthy, in this context, that the Noctes is set up
as one enormous question-and-answer session, with many of the entries in its table of
contents presenting the passages they refer to in terms of questions.60 Sometimes, then,
a listener/reader might be attracted to a conversation/account of a conversation by the
question under discussion, while the value with which they are rewarded will have an
uncertain relationship to the ostensible topic. Question and answer may not match.
Another attractive quality of speech or discourse might be the authority or titles
of those involved. So in 19.13 Gellius is part of a separate party when he sees several
learned men talking together and is moved to listen in on their sermones :
stabant forte una in uestibulo Palatii fabulantes Fronto Cornelius et Festus Pos-
tumius et Apollinaris Sulpicius, atque ego ibi adsistens cum quibusdam aliis ser-
mones eorum, quos de litterarum disciplinis habebant, curiosius captabam.
They happened to be standing together in the fore-court of the Palatine, chatting,
Cornelius Fronto and Postumius Festus and Sulpicius Apollinaris, and I (standing
nearby with some others), sought to eavesdrop on their conversations that they
were having about the discipline of letters. (19.13.1)
The scene that follows is a complex and careful role-play, in which respected authorities
carefully negotiate their relationships to each other and courteously discuss a question
of usage. Gellius, attracted by the authority of the participants, clearly comes away not
just with witty quotations from them but having observed a model of the conversation
of learned gentlemen.61 Although the conversation of learned men is occasionally a
60Cf Riggsby 2007.
61Kaster 1997: 60 discusses Gellius’s concern that grammatici should behave like “gentlemen”. Cf
13.5.
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static source of information to be used later, it seems more valuable to observe their
minds in action, responding to each other and various prompts.62 It is a medium of
learning every bit as important as classroom lessons and lectures, a complementary
relationship Gellius notes at 19.8.1.
This sort of learned discourse that attracts an audience may be prompted in a
variety of ways. Sometimes characters confront each other aggressively; other times
questions arise from things seen, like inscriptions, or — importantly — from passages
that come up in social reading. Whether read or spoken, any bit of language can prompt
a productive conversation that illustrates not just facts about the text in question
but values of learnedness. This potential of discourse is represented by Gellius as a
latent phenomenon to be drawn out by a keen teacher (in the tradition of Plato’s
Socrates), a learned participant, or — in the case of a fictional conversation — the
narrator himself. In 4.1, after Favorinus has turned a grammaticus ’s boasts into a
philosophically inflected (and juristically informed) lesson on the nature of language
and definition, Gellius explicitly credits Favorinus with this Socratic ability to guide
conversation for educational benefit:63
sic Favorinus sermones id genus communes a rebus paruis et frigidis abducebat
ad ea, quae magis utile esset audire ac discere, non allata extrinsecus, non per
ostentationem, sed indidem nata acceptaque.
In this way Favorinus would lead ordinary conversations of that sort from cold
and trivial matters to those which it would be more useful to hear or learn, not
things brought in from outside the subject (and not to show off), but rather
things native to and discovered in the same place.(4.1.19)
The qualities of Favorine sermo are the very ones that cause Gellius to include things
in the Noctes. Indeed, the idea of a conversation that is useful to hear or learn from
underlies the Gellian approach to narrating discourse I have outlined above; Gellius,
62In 5.13 and 15.4 facts are attributed to anonymous old learned men, who are in complete agreement
with each other.
63Favorinus on Socrates: 2.1
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as narrator, has the same responsibility as Favorinus. So at 14.5 he represents a con-
versation between two famous grammatici which he explicitly identifies as not worth
listening to further (14.5.4); it is only with his careful narrator’s guidance that we can
be exposed to just enough of the conversation to understand why we would not wish
to be exposed to it again.
It is of course to Plato that the ideas of both carefully guided discourse and use-
ful fiction can be traced, but Gellius’s use of the strategies and engagement with its
anxieties is distinctively Imperial. Where Plato’s lengthy dialogues examine professions
and characters one by one, Gellius offers a constantly rotating cast of urban characters,
ever-shifting, emerging unexpectedly and surrounded by reputation or sectatores, more
attuned to the rhythms of Imperial Rome, serving needs less philosophical than social.
Some scenes are set on the edge of legal or court space, or intersect with ever-shifting
social orbits. Most interestingly, though we might identify the fictionalised-scene-for-
teaching-purposes with Socrates’s “well-born lie” for the populace of his Republic (Re-
public 414B-C), Gellius’s Imperial perspective fully embraces the anxieties that sur-
round that fiction. The noble lie depends, unsettlingly, on its being accepted wholesale
by most of the population, whereas Gellius seems to want his stories to be seen through,
as it makes them all the more instructive. He is hardly alone in this approach to fic-
tion.64 The anxiety of the noble lie is at the core of the dialogue, of course: to convey
its message, does dialogue need to be accepted as literal truth by its reader? Clearly
not, nor does the Aesopic fable’s power come from the reader’s actual belief in speaking
animals, but rather from his or her attention being held by that image.
Dialogue must necessarily function on both levels simultaneously to be effective:
the reader must accept the fiction of the scene insofar as it allows him or her to follow
64And see Gill 1993 for the problems generally of truth/falsehood/fiction discussion in antiquity. For
a different perspective, on myth in Plutarch generally, see Hardie 1992. For the metaphor of eating cf
Cicero De Inv 1.25. In the Roman political context, fiction can have social implications; see Feldherr
1998: 74-5, Sailor 2006: 342.
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the course of the internal dialectic, but must also be aware of the text’s fictionality
enough to scrutinise that course. This is the quality with which Gellius imbues his
dialogic episodes: he is participant enough to contribute, but his silent, internal re-
flections represent a distanced, objective observer. Gellius’s narrated scenes give the
reader a perspective that can see through the frauds and fake-outs of various unsavoury
intellectual types; similarly, he challenges the reader to see through the stories, even
while his or her attention is held by the inlecebra of its dramatic narrative or pressing
question, to the more significant lesson it is illustrating. Critical to Gellius’s didactic
programme, played out in various forms over the Noctes ’s nearly-400 articles, is that
the reader come to observe its dynamics at work. Critical reading and sensitivity to
both the deceptions of surface presentation and the significance of deeper text thus
scale in the Noctes from individual texts and people up to the Noctes itself.
2.1.6 Educational autobiography
The educational experience is also the backbone of Gellius’s own narrative: the en-
tire text is premised on a key stage of education, Attic study, but Gellius’s scenes recall
his own self at nearly every stage of his education: grammar, rhetoric and philosophy.65
Scattered into miscellany, into fractured autobiography, they demand to be reconstruc-
ted. Often coy about chronological setting, Gellius foregrounds his recollected self
even as he prompts the reader to determine at which stage in his life a given scene is
set.66 From the individual episodes of teachers and fellow-students, and the overarching
narrative of a student’s journey to maturity, emerge two interlinked themes. Gellius
represents students with varying levels of awareness of their own limits, variously sub-
65Morgan 1998: 33. Gellius on education: 1.9, 7.10.
66Contra Keulen, who sees only two Gellian personae in the text (youthful sectator, older wiser
author) (Keulen 2009: 68), Like Gunderson 2009: 171, I see a range of ambiguously located moments
and personae throughout the work. Cf Klotz 2007: 655 on the issue in Plutarch.
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ject to the pugilistic impulses of youth, learning or failing to learn from their teachers;
he also represents himself, as a student, learning to distinguish between bad and good
teachers, and the limits of teachers at each stage of education. Gellius does not just
declare those limits: he shows himself finding them. They are emergent, demonstrated
by attempting to put learning into action: just as the sophismata do not reveal their
value until the attempt is made to solve them, the authority and relevance of someone
who claims expertise is only determined by seeking and testing the wisdom they offer.67
By obscuring and withholding details about his autobiography, Gellius is not just being
coy; he is provoking his reader to respond actively and creatively.68
Each dialogic scene has a distinct story that illustrates an important lesson. We will
see, in various settings, the way moments of learning are constructed: both the answers
that are found for questions (if they are found), and what Gellius learns from the process
of seeking them. These lessons will be relatively simple: that disciplinary authority is
limiting, so that teachers approached simply for their discipline must be scrutinised. On
the other hand, the occasional positive example of a given disciplinary teacher — and
these always appear as named characters — is often defined, in terms of his excellence,
by some sort of interdisciplinary interest. But even these good experts’ authority will
ultimately be limited by their disciplinary mindset; it will often take the intellectual
nimbleness of the amateur, who can relate different spheres of knowledge, to get to the
bottom of a matter. An important moment in these educationally autobiographical
scenes of dialogue, then, will be the moment Gellius exceeds the bounds of his teacher’s
authority. And at the apex of his educational career, under the charistmatic sophist
Favorinus, exceeding those bounds will also mean piercing the veil of fictionality that
defines the dialogic scenes: concerned that the reader should critically examine the
fictionality of his dialogues, Gellius draws attention to that fictionality by showing
67For emergent inquiry (e.g. 15.4, 17.3), Klotz and Oikonomopoulou forthcoming: Introduction.
68Cf Rust 2009: 79-91.
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Favorinus, the most colourful character in the text, to also be clearly a product of
his own authorial invention. Many of these values of disciplinary skepticism and self-
awareness are not new ideas about Gellius; my goal in this chapter is instead to show
the systematic way that they are enacted by dialogic narrative, and the relationship
Gellius encourages with those narratives. Gellius’s accounts of conversation are stories;
but, like Aesop’s fable, though only stories, they are no less worthwhile for Gellius to
tell, or for us to read.
2.2 The grammarian’s reading: adolescent poses &
the questioning of authority
2.2.1 Grammatici on hand in elite learning
It is grammatici who are subject to the most forceful disciplinary scrutiny in Gel-
lius’s dialogic scenes. In this section I will show that when Gellius narrates encounters
with them, the narratives focus specifically on the mental capacity and character of the
teachers as well as the students. Grammatici, Gellius makes clear, suffer from an occu-
pational hazard: though the authority they claim is important in Imperial society, the
narrowness of their professional remit begets a narrowness of intellectual perspective (I
am concerned here not with the actual profession of grammatici, but with how Gellius
represents them as a discipline and disciplinary authority to be consulted — or not).69
That they nevertheless acquire impressive reputations and boast arrogantly of their
expertise only adds to the burden on the student to be active, critical and independent
in consulting grammaticus and applying what they learn. Imperial elite society respon-
ded to these tensions with alternating concern and dismissal, as Plutarch’s references
69For grammatici (first encountered at 2.6), Kaster 1997, Rawson 1988: 66-76, Atherton 1996.
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to grammatici suggest.70 Their own efforts at literary production are marginalised in
extant elite sources such as Suetonius’s de Grammaticis, which focuses on their role as
teachers, and does not hesitate to remind us of individuals’ freedman status or depend-
ence on elite patronage. While Gellius’s attitude toward them is largely dismissive, it
is important to note that his expose´s of them are concerned not simply with criticising
their authority to enhance his own.71 These scenes are, more significantly, about the
processes by which their flaws may be found, and the alternative authorities that exist,
an effect achieved by Gellius’s incorporating the revelation of the grammaticus ’s failings
into a larger narrative framework of inquiry and discovery.
In narrating encounters with grammatici, Gellius shows the way that the need for
their expertise emerges, and focuses the reader’s attention on whether and why they
satisfy those needs. 19.10 is one scene in which grammatical questions emerge spon-
taneously from speech, and the grammarian’s inability to answer them is extensively
satirised.72 Gellius builds into the scene a warped mirror of erudite discourse with
which to satirise the professionalism of the grammaticus who is the focus of the scene.
We hear how Gellius accompanied a friend to visit Fronto when he was ill, and that
they found him sitting with a large group of learned men (19.10.1).73 While the learned
sit, around Fronto stands a group of builders (fabri) with whom he is consulting about
new baths (19.10.2-3). It is Fronto’s curiosity about Latin that leads to an educational
conversation: a friend, skeptical of the stated cost of the building project, uses the word
praeterpropter, and Fronto demands an explanation of the word’s exact meaning. The
man says that the responsibility for defining words should fall to the grammaticus —
for indeed, one of “no little celebrity at Rome” is there with them (19.10.7). But he
70Horster 2008. Cf Plutarch’s treatment of Theon the grammarian, QC 1.9 (626E-627F).
71Contra Keulen 2009: 28-35.
72For W. A. Johnson 2009: 321-322, this scene is about a reading-group “specifically constituted”
with a grammarian presen.
73Gellius accompanies Taurus on such a visit (12.5), and receives one in turn (18.10).
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does not know, and chastises the rest of the group for asking him about a “plebeian”
word from the speech of builders (in opificum sermonibus [. . . ] notius, 19.10.9). At
this Fronto and Celsinus take turns confronting the grammarian with usages of the
word in classical literature, with Celsinus going so far as to summon a copy of Ennius’s
Iphigenia to read from (statim proferri Iphigeniam Q. Enni iubet, 19.10.12). The pas-
sage in question is a complaint about the mental frailty of those who do not properly
use their leisure time, the primary venue for self-education;74 Fronto draws out this
resonance between the content of the text and the grammaticus ’s apparent failure, and
the grammarian, blushing under the laughter of the crowd, retreats with a final appeal
to the professional exclusivity of his supposed expertise (19.10.14).
The scene illustrates a clear process: the group (under Fronto’s direction) has a
question, identifies the grammaticus as the best authority for an answer, only to learn
that he has no answers. The grammarian’s own excuses highlight the satire on profes-
sionalism: pleading that the word is from the speech of opifices rather than doctores
ignores the fact that Fronto had just interrupted a conversation (dilatis sermonibus,
19.10.5) with some professional opifices who, with their expertise and texts (depictas in
membranulis varias species balnearum, 19.10.2), seem just as worthy of Fronto’s time;
and that it was the use of the word by one of the seated learned men that they were
concerned with. The grammarian is the obvious authority because of his professional
reputation, but professionalism (narrowly-defined, by his own admission) on its own
is meaningless. A purported expert in language, he is less widely-read than Fronto
and Celsinus; despite his reputation as a teacher, he is evasive and rude; in short, he
has neither the knowledge nor the professional bearing that his position demands, and
Gellius, a silent member of the group, watches as these failings are acted out before the
scrutiny of Fronto’s guests. Fronto does not get his answer about what praeterpropter
74Noctes Pr.1.
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means — unless he is satisifed with the grammarian’s demonstration of Ennius’s idea
— but the group disperses anyway, dissolving the scene and surrendering their learned
seats (consurreximus), having learned at least a lesson about grammatici.
2.2.2 Learning about grammarians firsthand (6.17)
Because of the importance to Gellius’s programme of the idea that grammatici often
know less than they should, Gellius sets that lesson in recurring, forceful narratives of
epiphanic disillusionment.75 So, at one point in his adolescence he recalls learning
apparently for the first time that this discipline’s authority has its limits. More so
than 18.4, 6.17 represents the active process of attempting to answer a question, with
Gellius and the grammaticus enacting their different approaches to learning; the scene
illustrates ultimately both why the grammaticus fails as an authority, and Gellius’s
personal discovery of this fact.
The scene opens with an acknowledgement, from the perspective of the adult nar-
rator, that grammarians regularly attract confrontation and challenge, assuring the
reader that, on this occasion, Gellius was not looking for a fight:76
percontabar Romae quempiam grammaticum primae in docendo celebritatis non
hercle experiundi uel temptandi gratia, sed discendi magis studio et cupidine, quid
significaret “obnoxius” quaeque eius vocabuli origo ac ratio esset.
I inquired at Rome of a certain grammaticus of first-rate reputation in teaching
(not — by Hercules — for the sake of testing or trying him, but rather out of
eagerness and desire for learning) what obnoxius meant, and what was the origin
and explanation of that word. (6.17.1)77
We will see later that earnest, uncomplicated desire for learning has lead many a scholar
astray.78 As in 19.10, the need for a grammarian’s expert knowledge is presented as a
75Keulen 2009: 76, W. A. Johnson 2010: 101-2 on “typicizing” repetition.
76As in e.g. 13.31.
77Cf Keulen 2009: 77, but Keulen 2009: 78-9 for the implications of the conversation’s subject.
78See below, p139, on 10.12.4.
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natural emergent event in Gellius’s life, even absent a specific literary or civic context.
Gellius has chosen to ask this grammarian because of his reputation as a teacher. As
Vardi notes, the didactic responsibilities of the grammarian impose specific expecta-
tions for civility and willingness to engage with a student, at which the grammarian
immediately disappoints.79 He mocks the quality of Gellius’s question (inludens leuit-
atem quaestionis prauitatemque (6.17.2)) and its implications for Gellius’s intellect (quis
adeo tam linguae Latinae ignarus est. . . (6.17.3)). He is thus ignorant, for his inability
to understand the question, and rude. Perhaps the tests his profession invites have
made him defensive; perhaps too he knows inquirers of Gellius’s age to be especially
belligerent. Gellius has assured us he did not set out for a confrontation, but he now
relates how the grammarian’s response was so patently uninformed that he was moved
to adopt a quasi-Socratic role.
tum uero ego permotus agendum iam oblique ut cum homine stulto existimaui
[. . . ]
Then indeed I was agitated, and thought I should proceed indirectly as with an
idiot [. . . ] (6.17.4)
Gellius here shifts from a naive inquiring pose to one of careful, strategic speech
meant to expose the grammarian’s ignorance. We have already seen an example of
Gellius’s concept of oblique communication in 3.2.14; Gellius’s use of what we could
call Socratic irony here seems less intended to expose the grammarian to an audience
than to avoid direct confrontation and so trap the grammarian in his own ignorance.80
It also serves to remind us of his role as the scene’s fictional author.81 He pretends
to accept the grammarian’s facile answer, then offers as a stinging rebuke a litany of
usages that contradict it (6.17.7-10).
79Vardi 2001.
80For Socratic irony, 18.4.1 (dissimulatio), and the classic definition at Quintilian Inst 9.2.44. Cf
Beall 2004: 211.
81Keulen 2009: 80-1.
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at ille oscitans et alucinanti similis: “nunc” inquit “mihi operae non est. cum
otium erit, reuises ad me atque disces, quid in uerbo isto et Vergilius et Sallustius
et Plautus et Ennius senserint.”
And then he, agape and like someone in a dream, said, “I have no spare time
now. When I have leisure, come back to me and learn what Vergil and Sallust
and Plautus and Ennius meant by that word.” (6.17.11)
Not for the last time, a grammarian pleads that he has work to do, that professional
demands keep him from being able to answer a question. Fortunately, Gellius ensures
that neither he nor the reader are left ignorant, providing another citation as the basis
for further reflection (6.17.12) and explaining that although he was rude and ignorant
(a nebulo), the grammarian’s definition does fit one use of the word that Gellius can
recall (6.17.13). The answer to Gellius’s question, if there is one, can be extracted
from this material he has assembled; it will require some work from us, but the one
thing it will not require is a grammaticus.82 6.17 allows the reader to watch through
Gellius’s eyes, and indeed participate, as he learns about why a grammarian is not to be
approached uncritically, and how to go about a more indirect and skeptical consultation
of an expert.83 An important lesson (in addition to some illustrative usages) is thus to
be extracted from sermo habitus cum grammatico insolentiarum et inperitiarum pleno
de significatione uocabuli (cap.6.17).
2.2.3 Finding the (limits of the) right grammarian
Gellius learns how to expose bad grammarians from one of the few good ones he
knows. Sulpicius Apollinaris is cast as another of the figures Gellius encountered in
his adolescence, and in his various appearances reflects a suite of intellectual strengths
corresponding to the general weaknesses of other grammatici : his reading has been done
widely and well, and he is polite even to students who are in error (e.g. 13.20).84 He
82Keulen 2009: 84-5.
83Cf Keulen 2009: 86, 207.
84Baldwin 1975: 39-42. Gellius also learns from him to criticise Caesellius Vindex (2.16; cf p133).
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also conducts an exposure at 18.4 that closely follows the form of Gellius’s own in 6.17,
including the emergence of a question demanding grammatical authority, the Socratic
feigning of earnest inquiry (18.4.2), the grammaticus ’s mouth betraying that he is at a
loss (18.4.6), the plea of negotium as he flees (18.4.9), and the authoritative coda that
provides answers to the question that triggered the exposure (18.4.11).
But for all that Gellius learns much from Sulpicius, he also narrates the experience
of reaching the limits of Sulpicius’s authority.85 This narrative, too, follows the course
of an earnest inquiry in which the inquirer learns less from his chosen authority than
he had hoped. Gellius reports the rationale for choosing the authority he does, and
his ultimate dissatisfaction with the results.86 At 12.13, Gellius, puzzling over a key
word in the deadline of a judicial assignment, asks Sulpicius: does the period of time
intra Kalendas include the Kalends itself (12.13.1)? The grammarian is dubious of
Gellius’s choice of him over an advocate or jurist (12.13.2), but Gellius responds that
his question is not one of law but of language (12.13.4). Sulpicius agrees, with the
caveat that Gellius should only treat what he says as one expert’s view, and should
not act on it but rather compare it to generally accepted usage (12.13.5). His opinion
(.6-.16) is that intra is properly the same as in, but he concedes that usage has changed
that. Gellius observes both the quality and nature of Sulpicius’s response, praising it as
“extremely ingenious and clear” (scite perquam atque enucleate, 12.13.17), but punning
on enucleo (to explain clearly, but literally to remove the kernel from something) to
observe that Sulpicius has isolated in within intra and removed it as the operative
component of the word.87
He has also come prepared with counter-examples from Cicero, though, and Sulpi-
cius appreciates the gentlemanly spirit in which they pursue the problem together (tunc
85Cf Keulen 2009: 75.
86Holford-Strevens 2003: 85.
87Cf Whiteley 1978: 103.
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Sulpicius Apollinaris renidens: “non me hercule inargute” inquit “nec incallide oppo-
suisti hoc Tullianum. . . ”, 12.13.19), reconciling the example with his own argument.
Gellius is impressed (12.13.21) and the conversation seems to end, but the story does
not: Gellius continues searching for other examples, finding several in Cicero and ulti-
mately concluding that he could make his ruling before or on the Kalends. The learned
discourse of the grammarian here is given relevance and context by the inquirer’s own
independent research. Sulpicius is learned, but is ultimately still a grammaticus, and
Gellius learns by asking him this question that there are limits to how far beyond the
sphere of grammar his expertise is relevant.88 Gellius will learn the lesson again with
other disciplines and experts. But only with grammatici will the stakes be so high
for performing well the role of the independent and critical student, and for the gram-
maticus to prove himself well-read and civil. By narrating his encounters with this
range of grammatici, Gellius presents grammatical authority not as a static matter of
reputation or title, but as something regularly required, and so to be tested repeatedly
— through experience and encounter — for its innate quality and further relevance.
2.3 The rhetorician’s speech: interests and know-
ledge on display
2.3.1 What makes a rhetor
If Gellius’s dialogic scenes, as I suggest, are training for the reader in examining
individuals’ minds by way of their speech, then rhetoricians — professional speakers —
have an important role to play in that process. We have seen how grammatici figure as
resources to consult for factual and linguistic queries. The role of rhetores in Gellius’s
88Cf Holford-Strevens 2003: 300.
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intellectual lifestyle is more complex. Teachers of rhetoric have the dual responsibility,
to their students, both to accurately and correctly elucidate the rhetorical texts under
study, and to provide a good model by speaking well themselves. Where the speech
of grammarians was seen to reveal their private reading habits, and was held to the
relatively loose standard of basic civility, expectations are higher of rhetoricians. The
most important stage in a rhetorical performance is the mental one that comes before
the speaker opens his mouth: hence Porcius Latro’s brilliant and flamboyant expose
of his own mental preparation, in which, before rising to speak on the supplied topic,
he would list aloud its various implications and possible treatments.89 Built into the
evaluation of rhetorical speech is thus that crucial activity of “seeing” the mind behind
it. In this section I will show that rhetoricians, as participants in dialogic scenes, are
less aggressively challenged but no less carefully observed for the course they take the
conversation in, and the manner in which they participate.
Where the dialogic scenes involving grammarians represented processes of trying to
get questions answered, and pivoted on the realisation that the grammarian’s author-
ity was meaningless, scenes with rhetoricians are less dramatic, and depend more on
Gellius, in his role as silent reporter, modelling for us how to listen to and evaluate in-
terlocutors. They are also more positive than negative; he spends more time exploring
the authority of his preferred rhetorician, Antonius Julianus, than he does exploring
frauds. We will see that his authority stems as much from his ability to speak tactfully
and charmingly as it does from his command of literature well beyond the rhetorical
curriculum.
Gellius does offer one negative example of an inadequate rhetor. In a little-discussed
scene of group reading, 17.5, he reports first the reading of a passage, then the response
of a rhetorical expert of high repute who was present, and finally passes judgment, si-
89Seneca the Elder, Controversiae (1.pr.21). The usually implied mental labour is made explicit.
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lently, on the expert’s evaluation.90 This form is familiar from the pacing of Plutarch’s
QC, in which a series of ideas are put forth and the reader is allowed time to form his
or her own opinion in response. The structure Gellius gives the narrative illustrates the
way an expert might reveal his own authoritative failings without the sort of exposure
scene that dominates the treatment of grammarians. Gellius begins the scene by care-
fully framing the context for us: summarising the Ciceronian passage under discussion,
and telling us the standards of the reading group (learned: in coetu [. . . ] hominum
doctorum, 17.5.3) then quoting it. Then he introduces an interlocutor in terms that
establish expectations for his authority, before reporting what he says.
[. . . ] rhetoricus quidam sophista utriusque linguae callens, haut sane ignobilis
ex istis acutulis et minutis doctoribus, qui τεχνικοί appellantur, atque in disser-
endo tamen non impiger, usum esse existimabat argumento M. Tullium non probo
neque apodictico, sed eiusdem quaestionis, cuius esset ea ipsa res, de qua quaer-
eretur; uerbisque id uitium Graecis appellat, quod accepisset ἀμφισβητούμενον ἀντὶ
ὁμολογουμένον.
[. . . ] a certain rhetorical sophist, experienced in both languages — truly, hardly
unknown among those clever precise teachers who the Greeks call “technicians”,
or unlazy in speaking — thought that Cicero had used an argument that was
neither honest nor Demonstrative, but that raised the same point of dispute that
was the very question under discussion; and he identified this vice with Greek
terms, saying that Cicero had admitted The Disputed Instead Of The Accepted.
(17.5.3) 91
This technical rhetorician, also a skilled declaimer, invokes technical language and cri-
ticises Cicero at length (.4-.8). The criticism centres primarily on Cicero’s use of the
words beneficum et liberalem. But Gellius sees that this rhetorician is nothing but a
sophist, disguising ignorance behind the appearance of knowledgeable authority.
haec ille rhetoricus artifex dicere quibusdam uidebatur perite et scienter, sed
uidelicet eum vocabula rerum uera ignorauisse. nam “beneficum et liberalem”
Cicero appellat, ita ut philosophi appellandum esse censent [. . . ]
90Holford-Strevens 2003: 293.
91The perplexing triple-negative haut... non impiger may be parody of sophistic word-spinning. It
is typical to introduce the target of a critique with praise in double-negatives. Note too the way Greek
technical language creeps even into the indirect speech. On sophistae, 5.3.7.
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This rhetorical artisan seemed to some to speak skillfully and knowingly, but it’s
clear that he was ignorant of the true terms for things. For Cicero uses beneficum
et liberalem in the way philosophers believe it should be used [. . . ] (17.5.9-.10)
Just as the opifices of 19.10 sent up the professionalism of that scene’s grammaticus,
this fellow is too much of a rhetoricus artifex — and too ignorant of language and
philosophy — to be of actual authority about rhetoric. Here, it is specifically the
setting of a group reading experience, with its spectrum of experts, that draws out one
of those experts’ weaknesses. The narrative here is not one of an authority consulted,
but merely of one speaking his mind, and Gellius’s correction of the sophista in silence
models for the reader a less confrontational way of scrutinising authority, but one no
less revealing, than the grammatical exposure.
By comparison, Titus Castricius is the model of an ideal rhetor. This comes in part
from his full-spectrum authority, which encompasses practical rhetoric, pedagogical
ability, and ethics: Gellius tells us he was rhetoricae disciplinae doctor, qui habuit
Romae locum principem declamandi ac docendi, summa uir auctoritate grauitateque
et a diuo Hadriano in mores atque litteras spectatus (13.22.11).92 The sternness with
which he chastises students for their footwear in that passage he also brings to the
ethics of listening in 11.13. And of specific import for the teaching of rhetoric, when
he discusses a speech, it is with a veneration for the Roman past, and — befitting his
reputation in declamation as well as teaching — an emphasis on the actual context
of a speech, challenging critics of Metellus Numidicus ad matrimonia capessenda in
a reading group by reminding them of the historical and political context, Metellus’s
obligations and position as a censor rather than an advocate (1.6.4: “aliter [. . . ] censor
loqui debet, aliter rhetor.”).93 On each of Castricius’s appearances, Gellius is a silent
92The scene that follows is to Holford-Strevens 2003: 44 “probably a fiction”, but Castricius clearly
“leaves an indelible impression” (Holford-Strevens 2003: 88). See Morgan 2004: 193 for more on the
nature of Castricius’s educational authority.
93The rhetoric instructor should contextualise readings (Quintilian Inst 2.5.1-12).
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observer as he was with the artifex, drawing positive lessons from his teacher’s speech.
2.3.2 Julianus and the adulescens (9.15)
It is through various scenes involving Antonius Julianus that Gellius explores what
makes for authoritative speech. Where Gellius’s relationship with Castricius is repres-
ented as formally between teacher and student, he is more of a companion to Julianus,
showing us an enthusiastic attachment but more ambiguous and varied contexts for
their interactions.94 That variety coincides with the idiosyncratic and interdisciplinary
interests Julianus demonstrates: so they discuss Quadrigarius’s Annales enthusiastic-
ally (9.1), once while observing a fire in the city (15.1). Julianus offers elucidation and
criticism (enodabat diiudicabatque) of the classical literature his students read (1.4), but
the scene in which Gellius most explicitly describes Julianus’s career as a rhetorician
is also the one in which he acts most peculiar (19.9): when some Greeks mock Juli-
anus’s “Spanish mouth” (19.9.2) and the poverty of Latin elegy, Julianus reasserts his
Latinity by quoting some obscure Latin poets, but first covers his head like Socrates in
the Phaedrus (19.9.9) in anticipation of the erotic content of what he is about to say.95
What Gellius gets from Julianus is then far more than formal instruction in rhetoric:
instead, he sees the rhetor sharing his learning in charming and interesting ways.
While much of Julianus’s authority is illustrated by fairly static passages of reported
speech, he plays his share of parts in narratively complex dialogic scenes. In 9.15,
Gellius watches Julianus negotiate a tricky social situation, drawing lessons from both
the teacher’s conduct and that of the boastful adulescens that embarrasses him.96 The
94Baldwin 1975: 44-45.
95. . . permitte mihi, quaso, operire pallio caput, quod in quadam parum pudica oratione Socraten
fecisse aiunt, et audite et discite. . . . Swain 2004: 36, Holford-Strevens 2003: 266. Cf Vessey 1994:
1941. Keulen 2004: 224, Holford-Strevens 2003: 22 on the Quellenforschung implications of what he
goes on to quote. Also Holford-Strevens 2003: 219, Keulen 2009: 5; on the stylistic standards in play,
Vardi 2000.
96A lesson in “how to watch” Julianus (Gunderson 2009: 173-4).
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passage relates a holiday in which Gellius is part of a group that has accompanied
Julianus to the Bay of Naples.97 When a wealthy youth invites Julianus to hear him
declaim, another member of the group seeks to expose him, while Julianus struggles to
avoid offending anyone. Adulescentes are consistently problematic in the Noctes ; the
word refers not so much to a specific age as to a level of maturity. Adulescentes are
very literally still in the process of growing:98 they often need advice or teaching,99
often have formative experiences,100 and are occasionally prodigious101 but more often
need to be put in line.102 The adulescens has thus the potential of adulthood and
ability, but also the necessity of education: his ability is unclear to both himself and
others, leading frequently to the arrogant failure which will transpire in 9.15. Here, he
is also the beneficiary of education that raises expectations both for the quality of his
rhetorical speech and its relevance to the civic demands of rhetoric.
atque ibi erat adulescens tunc quispiam ex ditioribus cum utriusque linguae ma-
gistris meditans et exercens ad causas Romae orandas eloquentiae Latinae fac-
ultatem; atque is rogat Iulianum, uti sese audiat declamantem.
And there was there at that time this young man from the wealthier classes,
studying with teachers of both languages and cultivating his ability at Latin so as
to plead cases at Rome; and he invited Julianus to hear him declaim. (9.15.2)103
When Julianus and his followers arrive, the youth begins his performance with
inappropriate pomposity. We saw in the last section of this chapter the way that
grammatici attract challenges, and that Gellius identifies with a certain age a ready
willingness to make such challenge — a reluctance to suffer fools, and to prove oneself.
97Cf Keulen 2009: 68, Gunderson 2009: 183-4.
98Cf Lucretius De Rerum Natura 3.49-50. Gellius focuses our attention on psychological maturity
rather than actual age with the ostentatiously unhelpful 10.28. See also 10.11, 13.2.
991.4, 1.9, 6.11, 7.8, 7.9, 7.10, 8.3, 10.17, 10.19, 11.18, 12.2, 13.22, 14.1, 14.2, 15.11, 20.4.
1003.13, 13.18, 16.1, 18.4, 20.6, 20.10, 19.11.
1015.3, 9.11, 15.28.
1021.2, 9.13, 13.20, 18.5.
103For ex ditioribus, and the youth’s arrogance as in praecipiti stare, perhaps cf the figurative senses of
9.1.5-6, where Gellius and Julianus, discuss Quadrigarius on siege warfare: attacks from above (subject
to praecipitantia, 9.1.5) and below (directed at the editioria, 9.1.6).
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Such a one is the loyal follower of Julianus who, offended on behalf of his teacher, issues
a challenge:
exponit igitur temptamenti gratia controversiam parum consistentem, quod genus
Graeci ἄpiορον vocant, Latine autem id non nimis incommode “inexplicabile” dici
potest.
Then he set out, for the sake of testing him, an untenable controversia, of the
kind the Greeks call Impassable, but which could in Latin be called, not too
incorrectly, Unsolvable. (9.15.6)104
The test is a basic one of technical ability — the Greek term suggests classical rhetorical
knowledge. But it also has bearings on the student’s ambition to plead cases: Gellius’s
ostentatious uncertainty in translation focuses our attention on inexplicabilis, recalling
other arguments he describes as having the same quality, which are all vexing legal
dilemmas.105 And the student’s response, in addition to the usual adolescent boasting,
reveals that what learning he has had has not only failed to prepare him for this trap,
but has been disappointingly static.106
hac ille audita nec considerata neque aliis, ut proponerentur, exspectatis incipit
statim mira celeritate in eandem hanc controuersiam principia nescio quae dicere
et inuolucra sensuum uerborumque uolumina uocumque turbas fundere ceteris om-
nibus ex cohorte eius, qui audire eum soliti erant, clamore magno exsultantibus,
Iuliano autem male ac misere rubente et sudante.
Having heard this, but not considered it (nor waited for others to be proposed),
he began immediately with astonishing speed to speak to the controversia with
all kinds of passages, and to pour forth empty wrappers of ideas, whole volumes
of words, and multitudes of speech, to the praise of all the others of his crowd,
who were accustomed to listening to him, but also to the awful and wretched
reddening and sweating of Julianus. (9.15.9)
The adulescens, failing at that crucial first step of evaluating properly the controversia
he is given, proceeds to regurgitate his books.107 His speech here is thus evidence both
104For temptamenti gratia, cf 6.17.1, discussed above p56. For exponit [. . . ] controversiam, cf Pet-
ronius Sat. 48.6.
105At 5.10.15, Euathlus’s response makes the case dubiosum inexplicabileque; the inexplicab-
ilis. . . ambiguitas of a case sends Gellius to the ultimately unhelpful Favorinus (below, p77).
106On adolescent attitudes, Keulen 2009: 68n3.
107On memorising too many words, below p156.
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for his reading and his innate intellectual ability. Gellius shows us how to see this. He
also observes the way this bad speaker (with his arrogant ineptness) and the sheltered
audience (with its poor judgment) have reinforced one another. The righteous iuvenis
has only succeeded in exposing the adulescens to Julianus’s crowd, who by association
with him have acquired superior judgment. The narrative of the scene thus reveals the
social dynamics around intellectual ability.
We might say Julianus’s social situation is inexplicabile — how to be authoritative
but not polite? He is only moved to voice an opinion after he and his fellows have left:108
“adulescens hic sine controversia disertus est” (9.15.11). Although the anecdote is just
one part of the larger construction of Julianus as a character, we know everything we
need to about adulescens in this scene: his study habits and mental abilities, all the
worse for his social status, have been put on display for everyone to see. The episode is
excluded from normal space, curiously interstitial, a holiday for Julianus and friends, a
prelude to adulthood for the adulescens, again the improvised and imaginary classroom
somehow far more powerful than the real thing for illustrating students and teach-
ers alike. The setting in the Bay of Naples also underscores the youth’s problematic
wealth.109 But as Gellius found the limits even of his favorite grammaticus, so too he
shows himself discovering, by way of Julianus’s learned commentary on all manner of
literature and speech, the uneasy relationship between commentary and teaching. In
18.5, we see Gellius’s unique spin on the dialogic scene in full effect.110 Julianus has
taken his floating reading-group to a holiday reading of Ennius’s Annales, and after
they listen for a while, fixates on a misreading he says the “Ennianist” has committed
(18.5.5). The scene contains many reflections of other Gellian anxieties about special-
ised authority: the “Ennianist” is gently mocked, and Julianus observes that such a
108Keulen 2009: 211n49 for the cohors around Julianus.
109For Julianus’s emotional state, Keulen 2009: 77n28.
110Holford-Strevens 2003: 87n22.
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misreading must be evidence of his having had a bad teacher (18.5.6-7; some of the
others present note that their own grammatici had taught them the same erroneous
reading). Julianus asserts that, not content with examples, he sought out at great ex-
pense and effort, a manuscript to validate his preferred reading (18.5.11).111 This is
Julianus at his finest, helping his students and followers understand another’s failure
and putting it in context of intellectual lifestyle, gilding his rhetor’s authority with
grammatical learning better than the average grammaticus ’s. Which would be fine if
Gellius had not later, by chance, learned the truth:
hoc tum nobis Iulianus et multa alia erudite simul et adfabiliter dixit. sed eadem
ipsa post etiam in peruulgatis commentariis scripta offendimus.
So Julianus spoke, then, to us, with much other learning besides, and very con-
versationally. But these very things I also found later written in very well-known
commentarii.(18.5.12)
There is no reason Julianus’s authority should not come from his reading.112 But Gel-
lius’s unease is clear:113 these comments, learned and affable as only Julianus can be,
are not Julianus’s, and we might wonder why, if we can read such things in books, we
need teachers like Julianus at all. Is even the claim to extensive manuscript research
cribbed from the commentarii? In the final estimate, there is no one quite like Julianus,
and his speech is regularly charming and fruitful: but there is a textual foundation to
it that not even critical listening can reveal, one that only emerges by chance from the
sort of self-directed reading that one must engage in if one wants to be like Julianus.114
The dramatic action of this dialogic scene continues in time and space well beyond the
conversation: Gellius continues the mental action of drawing lessons from the speech
later, when he encounters its contents in another context. This addition of private read-
ing to the dialogic learning offers the ultimate lesson: authoritative knowledge comes
111Claims to manuscript research are no guarantee: 1.21.
112Gunderson 2009: 258. For later textual confirmation of the teacher’s speech, cf 13.20.17.
113Gunderson 2009: 235-6, contra (rightly) Riggsby 2006: 147, who takes it that the commentarii
are Julianus’s. Cf Parker 2009: 211n97.
114Rust 2009: 93-104 on how learning emerges by chance in the Noctes.
68
not only from listening to others’ charming and learned speech, but from independently
and privately evaluating it. The rhetor as dialogic interlocutor may attract less inter-
personal aggression than the grammaticus, but demands no less careful scrutiny from
those who hear (or read about) his speech.
2.4 The philosopher’s thought: discursive modes in
Athens and Rome
2.4.1 Episodic dialogue and the fractured narrative of learning
Gellius’s interactions with philosophers rarely relate to philosophy qua philosophy.
Much of that is dealt with elsewhere, in the essays and notes that make up the bulk
of the Noctes. Instead, in his interactions with philosophi — principally, Taurus and
Favorinus115 — he observes the habits of thought and discourse that define those ex-
perts, and relates them to his own priorities and life.116 Where the encounters with
grammatici and rhetores largely stand on their own, Gellius’s relationships with both
philosophi play out over the “arc” of many scenes, another example of his innovation
with the dialogic mode. Each arc represents, for the reader who reconstructs it, tra-
jectories of development in Gellius’s relationship with the teacher and his mastery of
what each has to teach.
Taurus is the focus for Gellius’s study abroad at Athens, where he shows himself
learning particularly Greek modes of inquiry and lifestyle, and integrating them into
his Roman (self-)educational programme, through the relationship he develops with
Taurus and the study abroad community of other Roman students.117 Favorinus, a
115Whiteley 1978: 104.
116E.g. 4.1.
117On the Athens chronology, Rust 2009: 86-8.
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radically different kind of personality, is encountered in and around Rome, and while
what he teaches Gellius is much closer to the author’s own interests (a philosophically
and rhetorically inflected interest in language and literature), it is also much more
dangerous;118 in this relationship, Gellius shows himself captivated by and learning
from the dynamic sophist, but ultimately declaring his independence.119 I argue here
that each relationship is carefully represented episodically, with its details scattered
around the Noctes in diverse scenes of inquiry and learning, each representing a different
kind of interrogative process;120 I also argue that when reconstructed, each offers clear
lessons not for relating to philosophi as authority figures, but for selecting their positive
qualities and applying them to questions and problems.121 Gellius examined other
authorities for their ability to read or speak, but when observing philosophi, he is
concerned with how they analyse questions and pursue answers.
2.4.2 Philosophy at Athens
Gellius’s study abroad at Athens is represented in 21 articles, a sizable portion of
his dialogic scenes as a whole, and the only period of his life identified at all clearly.122
The tag Athenis, or the introduction of a character like Taurus, clearly places a scene
in that time and place.123 While the Platonic philosopher Taurus (whose name Gellius
uncomfortably gets wrong)124 is the focus for this experience, Gellius also shows him-
118Baldwin 1975: 39 also notices the way each philosophus is confined to a distinct locale.
119Cf Keulen 2009: 67. For Gellius on captivation by a teacher, cf 3.13.5.
120Cf Keulen 2009: 68 and Gunderson 2009: 171.
121Beall 2001.
122We may separate these by their main characters. Herodes Atticus stars in 1.2, 9.2, and 19.12. The
philosophers Taurus and Peregrinus teach in 1.26, 2.2, 7.10, 7.13, 8.3, 10.19, 12.5, 17.8, 17.20, 18.10,
19.6, and 20.4. Gellius socialises with fellow expatriates at 2.21, 8.10, 10.1, 15.2, 18.2, and 18.13. He
also recounts three episodes on his journey home: 9.4, 16.6, 19.1. On the Athens stay, Ameling 1984
(with reservations).
123Scenes Athenis: 1.2, 7.10, 7.13, 10.1, 12.11, 15.2, 17.8, 18.2, 18.10, 18.13, 19.6, 19.12.
124Holford-Strevens 2003: 317
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self at Athens in the absence of his teacher.125 Synchronically, we get a relatively full
picture of Roman study abroad life.126 But Gellius also gives his personal Athenian
experience a diachronic element by signalling, with scenes that bookend his time there,
his own maturation. Noctes 1.2, a heavily stylised dialogic scene at the house of Herodes
Atticus, has Gellius as a silent observer as Herodes reads from Epictetus to chastise a
boastful youth; Gellius dutifully appends the Greek to his account of the scene (1.2.7ff).
In 19.1, on his way home from Athens, his studies completed, Gellius asks a question of
a Stoic philosopher, and the teacher hands him the text of Epictetus, telling him to read
it for himself;127 Gellius then renders what he reads in Latin (19.1.15-20).128 With these
two brushstrokes, he outlines an overall arc of progress, a journey by which he becomes
mature enough to engage with authority figures directly, and initiated into Greek philo-
sophy well enough to internalise and re-articulate its literature. A systematic study of
Athens reveals several strands to this developmental experience: Gellius’s relationship
with Taurus, his command of the skills of problematic and sympotic discourse, and
his ability to distinguish between the intellectual merits of his peers.129 Gellius shows
himself moving from one of the common herd of Taurus’s sectatores into a closer rela-
tionship. Taurus appears early in the Noctes as the hidden authority behind a discourse
on Pythagoras, emerging into the middle of 1.9 as noster Taurus, alerting the reader
of the intimacy to come. Only one appearance places Gellius explicitly in the ranks of
Taurus’s formal classroom: Plato is being read apud philosophum Taurum (17.20.1),
and Taurus’s followup question seems intended by Gellius to indicate the conventional
context for Roman study in Athens:130
125Baldwin 1975: 34-39.
126For a major study of this phenomenon in an earlier period, Daly 1950.
127“vel potius” inquit “lege; nam et facilius credideris, si legas, et memineris magis.” (19.1.13)
128On 1.2 and 19.1 see Rust 2009: 45-6.
129Despite Taurus’s title, what he has to teach is a blend of philosophy and rhetoric no doubt char-
acteristic of the Roman study abroad curriculum. See e.g. the rebuke of 10.19. Gunderson 2009:
171.
130Beall 2001: 215.
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haec uerba ubi lecta sunt, atque ibi Taurus mihi “heus” inquit “tu, rhetorisce,”
— sic enim me in principio recens in diatribam acceptum appellitabat existimans
eloquentiae unius extundendae gratia Athenas uenisse — “uidesne” inquit “ ἐν-
θύμημα crebrum et coruscum et conuexum breuibusque et rotundis numeris cum
quadam aequabili circumactione deuinctum?”
When these words were read, then Taurus said to me, “Ho there, little rhetorician”
— for so he called me at first in the beginning, when I had just been admitted into
his classroom, thinking I had just come to Athens for the sake only of beating
my eloquence into shape — “do you see,” he said, “that rich, shining, well-
rounded enthymeme, bound together with brief and round measures with a certain
equitable rounding-off?” (17.20.4)
The Roman is put in his place: he has, the Greek teacher assumes, come to Athens to
improve his speaking, one of the two roles Greek study held in Roman education since
the Late Republic.131As such, Taurus assumes, the student will be concerned only with
the surface of the passage, the verbal style, and not the conceptual content. Even as he
alludes, by Taurus’s initial ignorance of him, to the fact that he aspired to something
more; the end result of the encounter is that Gellius both memorised the passage of
Plato and, in spite of his teacher, attempts to translate it (17.20.7-8).132 If there is
irony in this representation of his younger self, there is also an important assertion of
independence. In 2.2, Gellius makes his status as a student of Taurus more ambiguous
(the sectatores had just been dismissed, but “we” stood around in discourse with the
teacher (2.2.2)), lingering after class to see what happens when a Roman official and
his father come to visit the philosopher: the encounter is productive of edifying sermo,
as Taurus expounds a solution to the problem of who should get the only chair in
the room. Taurus uses (Greek) philosophy (2.2.9-11), but Gellius privately consults
Roman exemplary history and reaches the same conclusion (2.2.12-13).133 Although
these dialogic scenes are largely monologues, Gellius’s silent, private response plays out
131Cf Keulen 2009: 64, 68.
132Holford-Strevens 2003: 68 would read “na¨ıve self-revelation” in this, arguing Gellius “would not
make up a story to show himself what his teacher thought he was.” But a self-aware narrative pose
seems more likely (Keulen 2004: 243.
133Cf 2.7, 2.28.
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the process of learning their lessons and integrating them into his own mindset.134
The two grow more intimate. On one occasion, Gellius accompanies Taurus on a
trip to visit a sick friend (12.5). Here, he observes the positive power of inlecebra,
as an interesting question distracts Taurus from his worry over the friend.135 But
Gellius abrogates Taurus’s affection for the sick man: later, it is Gellius who is ill, and
Taurus again visits accompanied by sectatores (18.10). In that scene, Gellius watches
Taurus diplomatically defuse what could become an exposure scene as a doctor makes
an embarrassing slip of the tongue (18.10.5).136 The growing intimacy has more direct
educational force over the course of two dinner invitations. At 7.13, Gellius is invited
to dinner at Taurus’s, where he learns the value of the captio.137 He shows the progress
he has made when, invited again at 17.8, he is put on the spot in impromptu sympotic
discourse and performs to his teacher’s satisfaction.138 Each dialogic encounter with
Taurus teaches a lesson, but is also part of a larger story of learning.
The chief benefit of Gellius’s developing intimacy with Taurus is learning and parti-
cipating in sympotic discourse. The community of other students abroad gives Gellius
an attempt to develop and practice that skill. We hear of a regular student symposium
in 15.2, which is interrupted by a pseudo-philosopher from Crete (15.2.1-3). The in-
truder cites Plato’s Laws as his excuse for being a drunkard. The irony of this mistake
(Crete being the setting for that dialogue), and the general idea of a false claim to
authority being exposed in a sympotic context, leaves us with the impression not only
of Gellius the student experimenting in sympotic culture, but of Gellius the author
experimenting in the dialogic tradition. But the story of the Roman student learning
134They are similar, in this way, to the encounters with rhetoricians in 17.5 and 18.5. Keulen 2009:
71 observes the way teacher and student evaluate each other in turn.
135Ad ea Taurus uultu iam propemodum laetiore — delectatus enim uidebatur inlecebra quaestionis
— . . . . (12.5.5)
136Polite response to error becomes maturity more than does the aggression of the adulescens. The
scene also moves Gellius to greater medical autodidactic efforts.
137The guests are those qui erant philosopho Tauro iunctiores (7.13.1).
138Varro offers Gellius a serious discourse on the conduct of table-talk: 13.11.
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to “do” the symposium reaches its climax at the expatriate Saturnalia, celebrated in
parties modelled after Taurus’s sympotic potluck of 7.13:
Saturnalia Athenis agitabamus hilare prorsum ac modeste, non, ut dicitur, remit-
tentes animum — nam “remittere” inquit Musonius “animum quasi amittere est”
—, sed demulcentes eum paulum atque laxantes iucundis honestisque sermonum
inlectationibus. conueniebamus autem ad eandem cenam conplusculi, qui Romani
in Graeciam ueneramus quique easdem auditiones eosdemque doctores colebamus.
We observed the Saturnalia at Athens by all means joyously and modestly, not,
as they say, relaxing our minds away — for “to relax the mind”, says Musonius
is to lose it — but soothing them a bit and loosening them with the pleasant and
honest charms of conversation. So several of us came together for the same meal,
we who Romans who had come to Greece and who attended the same classes and
teachers. (18.2.1-2)139
The learned festivities continue at the baths:
Saturnalibus Athenis alea quadam festiua et honesta lusitabamus huiuscemodi: ubi
conueneramus complusculi eiusdem studii homines ad lauandi tempus, captiones,
quae sophismata appellantur, mente agitabamus easque quasi talos aut tesserulas
in medium uice sua quisque iaciebamus.
We amused ourselves in the Saturnalia at Athens with certain festive and honest
games of this sort: when several of us folks studying the same things came together
at the hour of bathing, we tossed around in our minds captiones, which are called
“sophisms”, and cast them as if they were dice or game-pieces in the midst of our
group, each one in his turn. (18.13.1-2)
The Saturnalia captiones are reported, though largely without answers, thus inviting
the reader to offer his or her own answers;140 and the summary of their subjects is
an obvious microcosm of the Noctes ’s own interests.141 In this climactic episode of
the arc of Gellius’s learning the arts of sympotic discourse, then, Gellius has learned
something essential and programmatic for his own literary project.142 The questioning
139Holford-Strevens 2003: 17 concludes from the imperfect agitabamus that several years’ worth of
Saturnalias are meant. Keulen 2009: 278 identifies the key programmatic implications of relaxing but
not being frivolous.
140Cf Gunderson 2009: 135ff on this and the scenes generally.
14118.2.6. Holford-Strevens 2003: 42-3. Keulen 2009: 70n11 for the basic metaliterary implications.
This gives Gunderson 2009: 137-8 the impression the entire Noctes is a “protracted” dinner party.
Gunderson 2009: 244 also notes that 18.2.6 describes exactly Noctes 17.7.
142Keulen 2009: 157-9 finds the sophismata to be marginal, youthful activities, along with the sym-
potic competition. But it was the adult Taurus who defended their potential, and the competition
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is made a game: potentially risky if over-indulged, by simile with the shameful practice
of alea, but also symbolic of something more significant.144 The skill, when mastered,
becomes a private, solitary activity.145 Romans, we see, have journeyed into the heart
of Athenian intellectual territory, and mastered its arts, but have also turned them
toward their own Roman priorities.
That the Saturnalia-symposia are attended only by Romans alludes to the final arc in
the Athenian episodes: that of scrutinising his fellow students’ intellectual interests and
drawing distinctions between them. His first arrival in Taurus’s classroom had suggested
an undifferentiated mass of Roman students with a shallow interest in rhetoric. Equally
of concern, though, are those students with exclusively Greek interests. In one properly
and fully dialogic scene of back-and-forth challenges that also shows Gellius’s ability to
give a scene a complex narrative setting when he wants to, he invites us to watch as
the various students reveal, by responding to a common point of stimulus to inquiry,
their intellects and interests.
ab Aegina in Piraeum complusculi earundem disciplinarum sectatores Graeci Ro-
manique homines eadem in naui tramittebamus. nox fuit et clemens mare et
anni aestas caelumque liquide serenum. sedebamus ergo in puppi simul uniuersi
et lucentia sidera considerabamus. tum, qui eodem in numero Graecas res eru-
diti erant, quid ἅμαξα esset, et quaenam maior et quae minor, cur ita appellata
et quam in partem procedentis noctis spatio moveretur et quamobrem Homerus
solam eam non occidere dicat, tum et quaedam alia, scite ista omnia ac perite
disserebant. hic ego ad nostros iuuenes conuertor et “quin” inquam “uos opici
dicitis mihi, quare, quod ἅμαξαν Graeci uocant, nos ‘septentriones’ uocamus?”
Several of us, students of the same topics, Greeks and Romans, were crossing in
the same boat from Aegina to the Piraeus. It was night and the sea was peaceful
we see in the Saturnalia is formalised, adult behaviour appropriate to a symposium.143 None of the
distinctions of class or similar that normally play out in Gellius’s dialogic scenes are to be seen here.
Gunderson 2009: 138-9 identifies the way one question (18.2.14: “scripserim”, “legerim”, “venerim”
cuius temporis verba sint, praeteriti an futuri an utriusque) gestures to Gellius’s more abstract theor-
etical concerns; and, generally, that each question has its “ironies”.
144On alea, Purcell 1995 (nb p8 on its reputation as distinctly Roman). The generally prejudicial
elite attitude toward dice-games is not enough to identify the simile as pejorative. Cf 10.27.5, where
Gellius seems to prefer a version of a story about symbolism in which the signa are represented by
simulacra on tesserulae.
14511.13.
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and the summer season and the sky was crystal-clear. So, we were sitting in the
stern and all looking up at the bright stars. Then, those of our number who were
particularly learned with respect to Greek matters, discussed what the ἅμαξα was,
and which was the greater one and which the lesser, and why it was called that
and into what part of the sky it moved in the space of a night and why Homer
says that it alone does not set, and other things then too, and all of them cleverly
and knowledgeably. Here I turned to my young companions and said, “Why
don’t you opici tell me why what the Greeks call ἅμαξα, we call septentriones?”
(2.21.1-4)146
The introduction of the characters and the scene’s setting level the playing field for
the interlocutors: national distinctions are elided by the fact that they pursue the
same studies, and the night sky serves as a common reference point for all.147 Just as
the teachers at Ammonius’s party in QC 9 all looked at the dancers and proceeded
to discuss dancing, here the students look at the stars and discuss constellations. But
Gellius finds that some students are interested only in classical Greek topics, forcing him
to take control and demand Latin conversation.148 In the final estimate, the plausibility
of an antiquarian explanation for the Latin name of the constellation can be subjected
to a peculiar empirical test, in which everyone is once again allowed to participate
(2.21.10-11).149 Having learned this lesson, Gellius is careful in his Athenian encounters
to scrutinise interlocutors’ interests; so, in 7.16, his group of Roman ambulatores mocks
and rejects a conceited grammarian as they walk in the Lyceum.150
Taurus’s philosophical teaching at Athens has its share of conventional moral im-
provement to offer; but taken together, Gellius’s scenes from this clearly delimited
period of his life show him observing, practicing, and excelling in a suite of discursive
146On opici see Baldwin 1975: 55; the same term of abuse is directed at the Greekless friend of
11.16.7, and Tiro in 13.9.
147Sympotic revelry is often compared to sailing. Slater 1976 Cf Gunderson’s use of the sea metaphor
to little ultimate effect: Gunderson 2009: 154.
148Here, Gellius is more interested in Latin than Greek, but we might rather say he wants Latin to
be discussed in equal measure to Greek. Comparative interlingual vocabulary is a regular theme in
the Noctes, e.g. 1.18, 1.25, 2.20, 4.15.6, 5.17, 5.20, 18.14.
149Gunderson 2009: 154-5.
150For the intercultural implications of which, see 20.5.
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modes and activities. Uniquely, Athenian philosophical study is not subjected to the
sort of experience grammar and rhetoric were, where Gellius found the limits of even the
best those disciplines had to offer. Such study has its risks, of course: the Homericists
of 2.21 make that much clear. But done properly, Athenian study is self-limiting, as
a Roman must eventually return. Gellius indicates the importance of this by alluding
three times to the voyage home from such study; we will see in the next Chapter how
Noctes 9.4, one such episode, is an important element of Gellius’s larger Roman in-
tellectual programme. Across the various dialogic scenes at Athens, Gellius represents
modes of inquiry and distinction developing and being put into practice in different
contexts: the episodic approach to dialogue, then, is especially effective at representing
the values it illustrates as a coherent system.
2.4.3 A philosopher at Rome
Favorinus embodies many Gellian ideals.151 His interest in and command of language
and literature — ἡ γραμματική — is informed in equal parts by philosophy and rhetoric.
But he is also the most dangerous of Gellius’s teachers. There are, of course, the various
scandals and character flaws to which Gellius archly alludes;152 but there is also the more
unsettling protean instability that is part of his career as a sophist as well as his overall
persona of ambiguity and paradox.153 In the scenes that feature him, then, Gellius’s
silent narration is of critical importance, as he shows us the ways in which Favorinus’s
authority impresses but also unsettles him. Athens was a secure, self-limiting and
authoritative venue in which to learn one suite of intellectual habits, and it had the
austere, reliable Taurus; Rome, on the other hand, is unpredictable and chaotic, and
151Beall 2001: 87 has him as the “star” of the work. Gunderson 2009: 171-3, Marache 1952: 255.
152Holford-Strevens 2003: 107, Keulen 2009: 97-11 (and passim 112-189, with caution).
153Beall 2001: 88, Philostratus VS 489. Baldwin 1975: 29-31. To Gunderson 2009: 172, Favorinus is
chronically out of place — his introduction into a social group will always have unpredictable results.
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so there, Gellius learns from the more engaging but less reliable sophist, seeing a wider
array of knowledge at work.154 The scenes with Favorinus, too, are episodic; in an
effort to understand the unstable identity of the sophist, we must glimpse him from as
many angles as possible. So Gellius shows us the different Skeptical poses he struck,
and the kinds of discourse they could provoke; he also shows us Favorinus as a reader,
illustrating over several scenes his passionate but focused relationship with language.
And finally he synthesizes those elements of role-play and linguistic passion in a series
of moments in which cracks emerge in Favorinus’s authority. Favorinus philosophus
will not be undone by the elenchus of one sustained dialogic encounter; but caught in
enough contexts, responding to and provoking enough different media and concepts, he
will show his true form.
Favorinus explicitly identifies himself as given, by sectarian allegiance, to take cer-
tain positions for the sake of argument, and this willingness to confront ideas in different
ways has clear appeal to Gellius.155 In 20.1, he faults the obscurity of the XII Tables,
arguing criticisms he could not possibly believe but using his Skeptical pose and his
extensive command of antique Roman law to draw out of Caecilius a convincing elu-
cidation of juristic principles that reconcile law and history that meets total approval
at the scene’s end (20.1.55).156 So too he insincerely argues with Fronto for the su-
periority of Greek over Latin, with the effect of drawing out of Fronto a rousing and
154This is a particular contribution on Gellius part to a certain elite ideal of the centrality of literature
and learning in urban culture. Woolf 2003. While Gellius learned sympotic discourse from Taurus, he
seems to learn group reading from Favorinus: 3.19. Cf 17.19 (Favorinus) vs. 17.20 (Taurus).
155Beall 2001: 88-89; Favorinus is so good at role-play that his real mind is unknowable, a source of
constant frustration for the trained dialogic reader. In this way Favorinus serves on occasion as the
Socrates of a dialogic scene (as, e.g., in 4.1, where this role is made explicit, on which see Keulen 2009:
87-96). More generally important though is his simple willingness to say whatever is needed to prompt
someone else to say something valuable. For Gellius on Skepticism cf 11.5.
156Beall 2001: 93 notes the placidity with which Favorinus engages in these disputes. The conversation
contains several allusions to earlier passages in the Noctes as if to underscore Gellius’s concern for
knowledge-in-action: 20.1.27 recalls 4.2, 20.1.28 recalls 13.25, and 20.1.40 recalls 5.13.157 His criticisms
are insincere given the understanding of language he indicates in 1.10. Cf Keulen 2009: 138-139n5’s
similar conclusion, on the grounds of 13.25 that Favorinus fakes ignorance in 18.7.
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pleasing defence of Latin (2.26). It is this discursive dynamism that makes him such an
effective arbiter of conversation, as when he commands an impromptu group exegesis
of a passage of Sallust in 3.1; Gellius fumbles his participation in this group, but the
deeper lesson he shows himself learning is one of interrogative modes, as the procedure
of reading, rereading and questioning through which Favorinus leads his interlocutors
is Gellius’s own preferred authorial strategy.
One effect of this dynamic unpredictability is to encourage the emergence of inter-
esting conversation: with enthusiastic, knowledgable Favorinus around, Favorinus who
is always game for a conversation, anything can stimulate sermo. 13.25 is a good ex-
ample. This dialogic scene is largely monologic, dominated by Favorinus’s charming
speech and display of Latin erudition.158 An inscription in Trajan’s forum prompts
Favorinus to ask the group about the meaning of one its words, manubiae (.1-2). In
response, another follower gives the obvious response, that it means the same as praeda
(.3). This redirects Favorinus’s interest as he challenges the apparently learned man
with a quotation in which Cicero used both words together, and asks whether Cicero
was needlessly repeating himself (.4-7). The rest of the passage is taken up by a lec-
ture from Favorinus on the use of repeated synonyms throughout Greek and Latin
literature.159 In each case, the use of repetition serves a different rhetorical purpose,
dependent in many cases on the fine differences between apparent synonyms. Illus-
trated by Favorinus’s speech are two concepts, one related to the composition of text
and the other to its consumption. In order to use repetition effectively, one needs to
know many words, and the precise differences between them. But in order to recognise
those devices being used, one needs to recall not only the instance of repetition but the
context in which it appears. In each case Favorinus cites, the repetitions quoted can be
158Swain 2004: 33 on Latin in this scene. Compare 2.22, where Favorinus chatters on and on (tum
Fauorinus ita fabulatus est (2.22.3) at length (2.22.3-26 — although he is, he admits at 2.22.25, drunk).
159Cf 16.14.
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interpreted only in light of the goal of the speech or text in which they are used. As
soon as he begins speaking, Favorinus himself starts to use repetitions, making his own
speech a text to be subjected to the same scrutiny he applies to others, revelling in the
risk anyone takes when expounding on values of critical response: that the audience will
turn those critical values on the exposition itself. Although the scene seems initially
to feature the exposure of apparent learnedness, Favorinus distorts the narrative with
his unpredictable discourse, to which Gellius, as narrator, shows himself paying close
attention.160 Our expectations of dialogic encounter thus subverted, we are all the more
on the lookout for the lesson the scene aims to teach.161
The fixation on language and literature revealed in 13.25 is typical of Favorinus.
In addition to his philosophical bona fides, he is a regular authority on not just what
words mean but how and why precision in word choice is important.162 This is not so
unreasonable a component of his philosophical authority; his attack on the grammaticus
in the penus encounter of Noctes 4.1, in which he challenges the boaster to actually
define the word he is discussing, rightly (for a philosopher) concerns “the τί ἐστι” of
words.163 It is also close to his authority as a declaimer; perhaps the best connection
between the Atticism of the so-called Second Sophistic and Gellius’s own concerns with
Latin “archaism” is Favorinus’s forceful condemnation of a Latin-speaker who takes
160Holford-Strevens 2003: 125 insists the speech could not truly be Favorinus’s own, as its Greek
citations match only Gellius’s own attested Greek reading. The point is immaterial; or, if relevant to
an ancient reader, may have bearing on my discussion below, p77, of Favorinus as a too-obvious cipher
for Gellius. Cf Keulen 2009: 244.
161Keulen 2009: 237-242 has a radically different reading of this scene, based on a statue of Trajan
known to be in the Forum. The use of a famous setting is a general indicator that the Noctes is “firmly
anchored in Rome as a centre of power”. The scene does demand scrutiny of speech (238) and provides
training in “fully switched on” comparative reading (254). As with the literary canon in general, just
because Gellius does not tell us he sees something does not mean he denies its existence. Note that
Favorinus in 13.25 is waiting for his friend the consul to finish hearing cases (13.25.2); we might say
rather that Imperial power is deliberately excluded. But both Keulen and I are avoiding another point:
the forceful decontextualisation of Favorinus’s/Gellius’s use of this monumental textual media.
162Favorinus seems more conventionally philosophus when writing and speaking on skepticism (11.5),
medicine (16.3, 12.1), and philosophical debate (18.1).
163Vardi 2001: 45.
80
the stylistic fad too far.164 The problem with too much archaism (as Gellius himself
articulates in his analysis of the opsimaths at 11.7) is that it hinders the primary goal
of speech: communication.165
Fauorinus philosophus adulescenti ueterum uerborum cupidissimo et plerasque
uoces nimis priscas et ignotas in cotidianis communibusque sermonibus expro-
menti: “Curius” inquit “et Fabricius et Coruncanius, antiquissimi uiri, et his
antiquiores Horatii illi trigemini plane ac dilucide cum suis fabulati sunt neque
Auruncorum aut Sicanorum aut Pelasgorum, qui primi coluisse Italiam dicuntur,
sed aetatis suae uerbis locuti sunt; tu autem, proinde quasi cum matre Euandri
nunc loquare, sermone abhinc multis annis iam desito uteris, quod scire atque
intellegere neminem uis, quae dicas.”
Favorinus the philosopher spoke thus to a youth too desirous of old words, who
displayed in most of his common and daily conversation speech that was too
antiquated and unknown: “Curius and Fabricius and Coruncianus, those most
antique men, and those even more antique triplets, the Horatii, spoke clearly and
lucidly with their companions, and spoke not with the language of the Aurunci
or Sicani or Pelasgi, who are said to have first dwelt in Italy, but rather with
the language of their own age; but you, exactly as if you were speaking with
Evander’s mother, use speech that has been abandoned for many years, because
you want no-one to understand what you say.” (1.10.1-2)166
Clarity of language is dependent on context; Favorinus himself comes close to articulat-
ing the central paradox of archaism identified by Vessey, that the harder a modern tries
to speak like an ancient, the less like an ancient he is - because the ancients did not
have to try at all.167 That interest in specific meaning extends to Greek as well, which
lets Favorinus’s exegetical ability trump Gellius’s grammatici at 3.16-17. The form of
this scene is by now familiar; though featuring the speech of a named character, it is
essentially a monologue; the teacher issuing moral instruction to his students recurs
164Gellius and Fronto have long been identified with second century archaising. Holford-Strevens
2003: 6, 8, 362-4; Wallace-Hadrill 1983: 203, and most helpfully Vessey 1994. Whitmarsh 2005: 43-9
on the Second Sophistic generally. Chapter 4 below for more on the meaning of archaism.
165Beall 2004: 218. Holford-Strevens 2003: 123, Holford-Strevens 1983.
166Learned and allusive Favorinus insults on several levels; Evander’s mother was either a divinity or
prophetess (Aeneid 8.336, Livy 1.7.8), whose temple Favorinus visits at 18.7. Holford-Strevens 2003:
100 notes the general similarity to Lucian, Lexiphanes 20 and Demonax 26. The complaint and its
formulation are obvious ones to make in any archaising context. Heath 2004: 306 for the afterlife of
1.10.4.
167Vessey 1994: 1873-6.
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across the disciplines (cf, e.g., Titus Castricius at 13.22, Taurus at 20.4), as does the
overeager adulescens (see on 9.15 above, p64). As a dialogue, this offers little to the
reader; but as a moment of learning, reported by Gellius, it invites us to explore the
merits and implications of its assertion.
This concern for speaking precisely is informed by Favorinus’s insatiable appetite
for reading. Books are read at his table (2.22, 3.19), and Gellius reads to him from
Hyginus’s commentary on Vergil (1.21). As a reader in these scenes he is quick with a
stylistic analysis or a contextual discourse: every time he speaks thus, we are invited
to reconsider the lesson of 4.1, that a philosophus may do grammar better than a
grammaticus. Favorinus is also intensely sensitive to the force of language: in 9.13,
Favorinus narrates to Gellius the effect that the description of a certain battle has on
his mind’s eye:
quem locum ex eo libro philosophus Fauorinus cum legeret, non minoribus quati
adficique animum suum motibus pulsibusque dicebat, quam si ipse coram depug-
nantes eos spectaret.
When Favorinus had read this passage from that book, he said that his mind
was shaken by and affected no less by the movements and blows than if he had
himself been watching them fight in person. (9.13.5-6)
Favorinus is commendably self-aware in his reading (a Gellian value I discuss below, in
Chapter 3), but he is also extremely susceptible to well-described imagery.168 Across
these several episodes of Favorine reading, a picture thus emerges of a reader who
satisfies many ideals but may be unstable.
It is that instability that is Favorinus’s undoing as an authority in Gellius’s eyes.
Their relationship starts from a point of devotion on the younger man’s part: Gellius
tells us he was enchanted by Favorinus’s erudition and eloquence.169 But just as epis-
odic dialogic encounters with Favorinus highlight his positive qualities as an authority,
168Holford-Strevens 2003: 125 finds his critical judgment “useless”.
16916.3.1: Cum Favorino Romae dies plerumque totos eramus, tenebatque animos nostros homo ille
fandi dulcissimus, atque eum, quoquo iret, quasi ex lingua prorsum eius apti prosequebamur; ita ser-
monibus usquequaque amoenissimis demulcebat. Keulen 2009: 68.
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another set of episodes show cracks in each of them. So, in 14.2, Gellius, appointed
a private judge in a challenging case, turns to Favorinus when juristic literature fails
him (14.2.1-3).170 But in a close parallel to the disappointment of Sulpicius Apol-
linaris at 12.13, Favorinus’s lengthy reflections on the moral aspects of the situation,
capped with a quotation from Cato, while it reflects his authoritative qualities — his
philosophical prowess, and his Latin erudition — is ultimately found, by Gellius, to
be of little practical application to his situation.171 In a more fraught confrontation,
Gellius tags along as Favorinus brings a translation question — is contiones a correct
translation into Latin of δημηγορίαι? — to the cranky grammarian Domitius Insanus
(18.7).172 Domitius lashes out with a rant about the state of the various disciplines, and
sends Favorinus packing (18.7.3) humorously.173 Favorinus reverts to a more traditional
philosophical mode, with a discourse on mental instability and genius (18.7.4).174 It
is ultimately Gellius who must answer Favorinus’s question, finding citations for the
teacher who previously had been happy to cite chapter and verse to all and sundry:
sed nos postea Fauorino desideranti harum omnium significationum monumenta
et apud Ciceronem, sicut supra scripsi, et apud elegantissimos ueterum reperta
exhibuimus.
But afterwards, I produced for Favorinus, who had asked for them, instances
found of all those usages in the works of Cicero, just as I have written above, and
in the works of the most elegant of the classics. (18.7.8)175
Gellius thus uses Domitius Insanus’s complaint as the occasion for a turning point
in his recollected relationship with Favorinus, observing as our marginal dialogic parti-
170Cf Whiteley 1978: 110-12.
171Cf Beall 2001: 90-1’s view of Favorinus as a model of “practical” polymathy. Keulen 2009: 169
finds a similar undermining of Favorinus’s philosophical authority in 20.1.9.
172To Keulen 2004: 227 it is Domitius Insanus who is “exposed” here.
173Or as Keulen 2009: 138 puts it, the scene “excellently illustrates Gellius’s pluriform use of antithesis
as part of a larger rhetoric of humour”.
174Holford-Strevens 2003: 151 cannot bear to think that Gellius would “gratuitously expose . . . his
beloved teacher to invented insult”, but also notes that Favorinus’s speech here is strongly reminiscent
of a technical treatise (cf Holford-Strevens 2003: 303: “a philosophical source is no less probable”).
Keulen 2009: 143 for the implications of making Favorinus discourse on medicine.
175Keulen 2009: 146-151.
83
cipant/narrator that even philosophically-informed grammar has its limits. The student
becomes the teacher.176 So much, then, for Favorine learnedness.
As for eloquence, the dynamic charm with which Favorinus can speak engagingly
on any subject, Gellius shows him as equally susceptible to the verbal riches his Skep-
tical poses unearth. Favorinus, who had played Socrates, the scrutiniser of authority,
is subjected to Gellius’s own silent scrutiny. We have already seen how Favorinus’s
charming command of language is informed by his passion for reading. But in 2.26,
after he has goaded Fronto into a defence of Latin’s wealth of colour-words, the response
he receives overwhelms him with a nearly sexual excitement: tum Fauorinus scientiam
rerum uberem uerborumque eius elegantiam exosculatus (2.26.20).177 More profound,
though, is Gellius’s assertion of control over Favorinus’s eloquence. Although he quotes
Favorinus’s writing in Greek, as if from the original, the philosopher’s speech is always
reported in Latin. And in doing so, under the guise of apologising that the speech does
not live up to Favorinus’s famous eloquence, Gellius regularly draws attention to the
fact that he himself is its true author. This reminder of the scenes’ fictionality coin-
cides with the other qualities that make Favorinus distinctive: so in 14.1, as Favorinus
argues, in an Academic manner, against fortune-tellers, Gellius reminds us that Fa-
vorinus’s true opinion and motives are impossible to divine (14.1.2).178 He claims then
176Holford-Strevens 2003: 119 notes 8.2 as another probable example of role-reversal in the relation-
ship. Keulen 2009: 154: Gellius “rehabilitates” but then “destabilises” Favorinus.
177The sense of exosculor is difficult to capture: the verb describes a passionate kiss (OLD), but
also comes to mean simply effusive praise (cf e.g. Noctes 1.23.13: senatus fidem atque ingenium pueri
exosculatur . . . (Vessey 1994: 1882). There is always reason to drag a marginal sexual sense into
the light when Favorinus is involved (Keulen 2009: 88; Gunderson 2009: 228); Holford-Strevens 2003:
99-130 highlights Favorinus’s voracious sexual appetite, observing that he seemed paradoxically an
aggressive penetrator prone to being penetrated himself. We might imagine some parallel concept at
work in Gellius’s representation of his mental persona: the appetites that make him verbally active
easily render him passive.
178exercendine aut ostentandi gratia ingenii, an quod ita serio iudicatoque existimaret, non habeo
dicere. Holford-Strevens 2003: 111-112 for the speech’s sectarian allegiance. Keulen 2009: 147 sets
Gellius presence in the audience in the context of Favorinus’s popularity as a declaimer, and thus
makes the scene part of his youthful version of Gellius.
84
to have only the bullet-points (14.1.2) of the speech;179 but soon, direct speech erupts
into his summary, as he tells us how Favorinus elaborated on each capitum (.8-.10,
.13-.18, .21-.22, .24-.26, .28-.30).180 He closes his report with a heavy-handed reminder
of who is the author of what:181
haec nos sicca et incondita et propemodum ieiuna oratione adtingimus. set Fauorinus,
ut hominis ingenium fuit utque est Graecae facundiae copia simul et uenustas, la-
tius ea et amoenius et splendidius et profluentius exsequebatur [. . . ]
I have touched upon these things with dry and crude and pretty well barren
speech. But Favorinus, such was his talent and so abundant and charming was his
Greek eloquence, that he pursued these points more extensively, more pleasantly
and more splendidly and more productively. (14.1.32)182
Favorinus, famous for his speech, speaks always in the Noctes with Gellius’s words.183
Gellius alerts his reader to this more jarringly in 2.22, the drunken free-association
declamation on the names of the winds that Favorinus delivers upon being asked about
a wind named in a poem being read at his table. I have already mentioned how this
scene shows Favorinus’s unstable wealth of erudition and speech, ready to pour forth
at the slightest provocation. But it also points to his instability as a character in the
dialogic narratives: after Favorinus has finished speaking, Gellius issues a correction
to one of his claims, speaking of the philosopher’s speech as it if were his own: quod
supra autem dixi [. . . ] (2.22.27). Opinions differ on the meaning of this;184 but its
effect is unquestionably to shatter the fictional illusion in a way reminiscent of Cicero’s
dialogic characters discoursing on their own fictionality (above, p33). From the various
179capita autem locorum argumentorumque [. . . ].
180Cf Holford-Strevens 2003: 108.
181The speech of Herodes Atticus is generally reported in the same way, e.g. at 1.2, a scene generally
overt in its fictionality: tum Herodes Graeca, uti plurimus ei mos fuit, oratione utens “permitte,” inquit
“philosophorum amplissime . . . ” (1.2.6). My thanks to Jamie McIntyre for comments on the on the
locus amoenus(Holford-Strevens 2003: 141n58). For Gellius’s translation of Greek style, 7.8, 8.9, 9.9
(but also 10.22.3).
182Gellius’s praise here echoes the quality it describes in its rich prolixity.
183Cf Gunderson 2009: 268-9 on 1.10. Cf Holford-Strevens 2003: 109. Swain 2004: 34 sees Gellius
“successfully Romaniz[ing] a Greek topic”. This authorial destabilisation of Favorine authority precedes
immediately 14.2’s depiction of Gellius finding the limits of Favorinus’s relevance.
184Baldwin 1975: 22: “. . . we have either a Freudian slip or a clumsy manifestation of hero worship.”
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dialogic episodes in which he appears, then, Gellius and the reader encounter both the
power and the hazards of a passionate relationship with language. Favorinus is not so
much a Gellian ideal as a Gellian mirror-image, possessed apparently of the right mix
of disciplinary interests and abilities, but undermined by various inherent paradoxes of
identity and thought. An object of fascination, he must be observed at great length
to learn fully from him, but the observer — and so the reader — must also assert
independence from that fascination, as Gellius does by finding not just the limits of his
authority as a teacher, but the limits of his reality as a character in the Noctes.185
2.5 Experts in dialogue
In Gellius’s dialogic scenes, what one learns from consulting an expert for the answer
to a factual question is often far more than the answer: it is a lesson about the value
of that expert. Indeed, when an answer is eventually found, it is just as likely not
to come from the expert at all — which is, of course, part of the lesson. Many of
these encounters are with educational authority figures, for the force that gives them
in reference to experiences of learning, and the direct engagement with disciplinary
boundaries that it allows. I will now briefly discuss one of the scenes (16.10) in which
non-educational experts are subjected to similar dialogic encounter.186
Gellius’s use of loaded scene-setting is in full effect here; we learn that the encounter
took place in the Forum, the heart of busy Rome, on a holiday, when everyone has
the day off (16.10.1).187 Also familiar to us is the process by which the dialogue’s
subject is encountered: a passage of Ennius is read out, quoted by Gellius to allow the
reader to identify any elements of it that might raise a question (16.10.1). And then a
185Whiteley 1978: 105. Cf Beall 2001: 104-5: “Perhaps, then, the most important lesson Gellius
learned from Favorinus was not to take his authorial persona too seriously.”
186Cf Gunderson 2009: 157-8.
187Otium erat quodam die Romae in foro a negotiis et laeta quaedam celebritas feriarum. . . .
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question is raised (16.10.2) about the meaning of one word in the passage (proletarius).
Gellius narrates for us his identification of an expert to answer the question: an unlikely
candidate emerges from the crowd.
atque ego, aspiciens quempiam in eo circulo ius civile callentem, familiarem
meum, rogabam, ut id uerbum nobis enarraret, et, cum illic se iuris, non rei
grammaticae peritum esse respondisset, “eo maxime” inquam te dicere hoc opor-
tet, quando, ut praedicas, peritus iuris es. nam Q. Ennius verbum hoc ex duodecim
tabulis uestris accepit, in quibus, si recte commemini, ita scriptum est: ‘adsiduo
uindex adsiduus esto. proletario ciui quis uolet uindex esto.’
And I, looking at a certain man in the group, experienced at the civil law, a friend
of mine, I asked him to explain that word to us and, when he responded that he
was skilled at legal and not grammatical matters, I said, “Since as you say you
are skilled at law, it is all the more fitting that you should tell us. For Q. Ennius
took this word from your XII Tables, in which, if I remember correctly, this is
written: ‘To a tributepayer let a tributepayer be guardian. To a proletarius let
whoever wishes be guardian.”’ (16.10.3-5) 188
The question has the formulation of a challenge, but is not unreasonable. Gellius is
attempting to force some productive dialogue between poetry and law. But the jurist
is having none of it:
“ego uero” inquit ille “dicere atque interpretari hoc deberem, si ius Faunorum
et Aboriginum didicissem. sed enim cum ‘proletarii’ et ‘adsidui’ et ‘sanates’ et
‘uades’ et ‘subuades’ et ‘uiginti quinque asses’ et ‘taliones’ furtorumque quaes-
tio ‘cum lance et licio’ euanuerint omnisque illa duodecim tabularum antiquitas
nisi in legis actionibus centumuiralium causarum lege Aebutia lata consopita sit,
studium scientiamque ego praestare debeo iuris et legum uocumque earum, quibus
utimur.”
“Indeed I would”, he said, “have to describe and interpret this, if I had studied
the Faunal and Aboriginal Laws; but indeed seeing as proletarii and adsidui and
sanates and uades and subuades and “uiginti quinque asses” and taliones and
the matter of thieves cum lance et licio have passed away, and all that antiquity
in the XII Tables was, except in cases before the centumuiri, put to sleep by the
Aebutian Law, I need only exhibit study and knowledge of the law and those
pieces of legislation and terms that we use.”(16.10.7-8)
We are by now attuned exactly to what is going on: the expert’s intellect is limited by
the narrow parameters of his definition of his discipline, behind which he retreats with
188The turn of the face as part of an intellectual challenge physically focuses the sense of confrontation
and impending evaluation: cf 2.21.4, 3.1.2, 4.1.2, 6.17.2, 19.10.5.
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scorn. His self-identification as iuris peritus (as opposed to Gellius’s generally preferred
term for a jurist, iureconsultus) brings the implications of Gellius’s description of him as
ius ciuile callens into focus: this is one of the practical kinds of jurists concerned only
with laws that are recent or on the books. Not for him the veneration of ancient law we
hear in 20.1 from Sextus Caecilius, who is described, by contrast, as in disciplina iuris
atque in legibus populi Romani noscendis interpretandisque scientia, usu auctoritateque
inlustri [. . . ] — that is the kind of jurist Gellius wants to learn from. In the process
of trying to get the word explained, then, Gellius has discovered the intellect that lies
behind his friend’s appearance of expert knowledge.
An answer is provided, ultimately, by a passing poet.189 Again the scene’s non-
dialogic narrative has a role to play, as the tumult of the city throws into their presence
another acquaintance of Gellius’s, underscoring the emergent nature of Gellian dialogic
encounters.
tum forte quadam Iulium Paulum, poetam memoriae nostrae doctissimum, praetereun-
tem conspeximus. is a nobis salutatur rogatusque, uti de sententia deque ratione
istius uocabuli nos doceret: “qui in plebe” inquit “Romana tenuissimi pauper-
rimique erant neque amplius quam mille quingentum aeris in censum deferebant,
‘proletarii’ appellati sunt. . . ”
Then by some chance, we saw Julius Paulus passing by. As soon as he was greeted
by us he was asked to teach us about the meaning and explanation of that word:
“Those of the Roman commoners,” he said, “who were least important and most
poor, and who registered in the census no more than 1,500 bronze, are called
proletarii...” (16.10.9-10)
Paulus’s answer is rich with antiquarian knowledge, unsurprising given his profile else-
where in the Noctes as a friend close to Gellius both in intimacy and interests. He is,
here at 16.10 and on two other occasions, “the most learned man/poet” in Gellius’s
memory (cf 1.22.9, 5.4.1), a tag that emphasises both his fulfillment of Gellian ideals
and Gellius’s relationship with him.190 He features significantly in 1.22’s collected re-
189Holford-Strevens 2003: 297-8.
190For another contemporary poet on less intimate terms, 6.7, 20.8.
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collections and notes on the word superesse, and his seems to be the authoritative aegis
under which a grammaticus is exposed in a bookstore in 5.4 (the text is damaged, but
it seems likely it is he who spoke up against the grammarian). When Gellius elaborates
most widely on Paulus’s virtues — vir bonus et rerum litterarumque veterum inpense
doctus (19.7.1) — it is in recalling how when Gellius and his friend Celsinus (who goes
on to his own star turn in 19.10, see above p54) left Paulus’s dinner party, they were
overflowing with the raw material (antique readings) for a diverting and improving
memory exercise on their way home (19.7.2). Paulus is the consummate learned gentle-
man, a man whose professional identification (such as it is) as poet demands nothing
in the way of specific expertise, but he is a reliable source of authoritative knowledge
to rival any of Gellius’s other acquaintances. His appearance in 16.10, and his thor-
ough supplanting of the blinkered iuris peritus, underscores the most important Gellian
lesson about expert and expert knowledge: not only do experts not have an exclusive
claim to expert knowledge, but indeed, sometimes professional expertise is specifically
antithetical to such knowledge.
Fittingly, Gellius learns the same lesson in 20.10 at the hands of a grammaticus, the
original disappointing authority figure.191 In a passage that underscores the message of
16.10 by reversing and distorting the roles, 20.10 features a grammaticus who asserts
that only the great Latin authors are within his purview, further limiting his respons-
ibility by asserting that for the meaning of legal phrases used by Ennius, Gellius should
instead consult jurists:192
usus consilio sum magistri, quod docere ipse debuerat, a quo discerem, praetermon-
strantis. itaque id, quod ex iureconsultis quodque ex libris eorum didici, inferen-
dum his commentariis existimavi, quoniam, in medio rerum et hominum vitam
qui colunt, ignorare non oportet verba actionum civilium celebriora.
I followed the advice of this teacher who redirected me to the one from whom I
might learn what he himself ought to have taught me. And what I learned from
191Gunderson 2009: 157.
192Cf Holford-Strevens 2003: 298.
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the jurists and their books, I thought I should import into these commentarii,
since it is not seemly for those who carry on their lives in the midst of affairs and
men to be ignorant of more well-known words for civil actions. (20.10.6)193
Bitterly, he learns from the teacher — utor being the usual verb for the student-
teacher relationship — that the teacher can teach him little, and that he must instead
go and learn for himself. The lesson is important, even critical: if you want a subject
taught right, sometimes you must teach it to yourself.194 Gellius comes away from
this disappointment proud not only of his greater knowledge of Ennius but his better
understanding of the branches of knowledge needed to interpret it.195 Involving ex-
perts in dialogue allows Gellius to stage this entire process of learning-about-learning:
identifying one whose reputation or title suggests authority, scrutinising the true value
of that authority, and, once disillusioned, seeking alternatives — which often include
self-teaching.
2.6 Conclusion: stakes and strategies of learning
and learnedness
As a dialogic author, Gellius draws heavily on the genre’s tradition, using classic
techniques and tropes, but also innovates distinctively, fracturing dialogic encounters,
scattering them between non-dialogic content, and asking various elements of his nar-
rative style — setting, characters, and his own internal reflections — to do more of the
discursive work. In this chapter, I have argued that in both adherence to and divergence
from those traditions, Gellius pursues a particular kind of intellectual scrutiny: not just
of the authority figures from which one might seek learning, but more fundamentally of
193Gellius’s use in this passage and 16.10.1 of words related to celebratus contributes to his skepticism
of reputation and celebrity. Gellius’s confrontational stance toward the grammaticus recalls e.g. the
challenge of 6.17 (cf Keulen 2009: 68n3). Here and elsewhere I have changed the OCT ’s conmentariis.
194Compare the sickbed epiphany of 18.10.8.
195Gunderson 2009: 174n17.
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the processes by which such figures are identified and selected. Even as those claiming
expertise are put to the test, so too is the inquirer, the one who was taken in by the
claim, under examination. The grammaticus fails, but so does the student who attacks
him too aggressively, or too passively credits his reputation. The rhetor speaks best
when not constrained by his disciplinary boundaries, but his students must keep careful
watch on the dynamics of their verbal engagements. And philosophi, if watched keenly
enough, will reveal in their approach to various topics and prompts (in various set-
tings) systems and methods of inquiry and thought that may offer substantial value to
the studious, but may also threaten to seduce or overwhelm. Ultimately, though good
experts have their place, the most reliable authority on any topic is oneself.196 In his
dialogic encounters, Gellius stages these processes of learning and discovery: and they
are staged, as students and teachers are equally put on display. Carefully calibrated
scene-setting and characterisation add significance to these moments, indicating the
stakes of an encounter as well as the larger system of thought into which it fits.
And in this programme of learning to look more closely at the consulting of experts,
textual and interpersonal media begin to blur together: the spoken and written word, in
both their effect on an audience and how the audience should respond to them, become
one. Sermo, in Gellius, literally describes both a conversation and a dialogic account of
conversation. The allure of an expert or an encounter hides its true quality or lesson, a
phenomenon within the dialogues that, once noticed, comes clearly to characterise the
dialogues themselves. The emphasis on speech as deeply and powerfully symptomatic
of intellect and character shares much with Gellius’s understanding of where literary
texts come from. And the idea of speech as carefully intentional, particularly for those
authority figures for whom speaking well is a positive quality, aligns closely with a
principle of authorial intent that is key to how a listener or reader responds to that
196But see Rust 2009: 183-184 for an interesting discussion of 16.8 as Gellius prescribing limits for
the self.
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speech or text.
Gellius’s dialogues seem to hint at deeper levels of anxiety about the intellectual
world of empire. He is at pains to “flatten” distinctions of local origin and focus identity
instead through language: so Julianus may be Spanish by birth, but he speaks Latin and
reads Latin poetry and defends Latin against Greek (19.9) and so he is an upstanding
Roman; but Favorinus of Arles, the Greek who (we will see in 3.16, below p214) knows
Latin better than the grammatici, is — like any great sophist — an object of fascination
for his refusal to conform. The author of the Noctes responds to the interconnectedness
and ambiguity of identity in the empire by applying a conservative Roman lens of
language and learning. But for the purposes of the present inquiry, Gellius’s episodic,
self-aware dialogues have less to tell us about the social dynamics of literate society
than they do about Gellius’s own understanding of the cognitive processes of acquiring,
evaluating and deploying knowledge. In these dialogues we should see a schematic for
a Gellian approach to representing processes of the mind. He is concerned with why
certain authorities have appeal, how the nature of their authority is best identified
and analysed, and what effect they should be allowed to have on those who consult
them. In the next chapter, we will explore how the very same concerns emerge from
his narratives of reading.
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Chapter 3
Tales of reading and textual
encounter
3.1 Introduction: writing about reading in Greece
and Rome
Few ancient writers so thoroughly, systematically and personally describes the act of
reading, and the mental responses it prompts, as does Aulus Gellius.1 In the foregoing
chapters of this thesis, I have examined the way Gellius’s narratives of social interactions
between people focus on the thought processes and knowledge that surround those
interactions. I have also shown the way he connects characters’ speech and performance
in various social settings to their habits and interests as readers, suggesting that the
quality of one’s private, ongoing reading can be put to the test in a moment of public
performance. But those scenes only make up one quarter of the Noctes. In roughly
another quarter of the text, Gellius narrates his own readings, and in this chapter I will
1Rust 2009: 204: “The structure of the Noctes Atticae lends itself to communicating an act of
reading in writing . . . .”
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explore his techniques for narrating and representing the activity of reading. Within
the scope of this thesis, I will be focusing not on the larger question of Roman literacy,
but — within the most elite and literate margin of Roman society — specifically on
the phenomenon of literary depictions of reading and its consequences.2 The Noctes
presents itself, after all, as the result of reading, and many of its articles seem to be
simple notes from reading.3 Between those remnants of reading and the scenes in
which characters’ actions perform their reading lie those scenes which will be the focus
of this chapter: scenes in which Gellius explores the ways knowledge is acquired in, and
meaning is constructed from, reading, as well as the afterlife that knowledge has in the
reader’s own mind.
Reading features in literary sources throughout history in a wide variety of ways,
from prescriptive treatises on how to read to narratives that mention or describe read-
ing only in passing. Would-be historians of reading must not only wrestle with the
particular generic conventions and rhetorical goals of each of these, but must face what
Simon Goldhill has identified as the “cultural politics of reading”: the way in which
every aspect of reading, and of reading’s depiction, reflects the peculiar values of the
time and place in which that reading is done and depicted.4 It is that sort of question
that I would like to ask of the Noctes ’s reading scenes. Gellius surely has his place in
the history of reading, a place which has been articulated variously elsewhere.5 For the
purposes of this thesis, however, it will be more productive to attempt, however briefly,
2Themselves a subset of W. A. Johnson 2000: 602’s “reading events”. On literacy at Rome most
recently, inter al, Habinek 2009.
3E.g. 16.15, which reads in its entirety: Theophrastus, philosophorum peritissimus, omnes in Paph-
lagonia perdices bina corda habere dicit, Theopompus in Bisaltia lepores bina iecora. Cf 1.14, 1.23,
1.24, 3.12, 5.2, 7.3, etc. In its ultimate form, 17.21.
4Goldhill 1999.
5Heath 2004 and especially Grafton 2004 explore Gellius’s emergence in the Renaissance as both
a source for study and, as Grafton argues, a model for study methods (i.e., the keeping of private
notebooks). This is based, in Grafton’s interpretation (2004: 326-7), on a perception of the Noctes as
sincerely representing Gellius’s note-taking techniques; and those who adopted or advocated “Gellian”
techniques seem to have responded to the intimate and attentive nature Gellius carefully represents in
his own reading.
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to situate him in the history of writing about reading.6 Writers may narrate reading as a
social act, a mental one or a physical one; its mental qualities, emotional or intellectual;
its social qualities, exclusive or inclusive. It may be safe or dangerous: good, bad, or
neutral. It may offer correspondents a moment of intimacy, or the spiritually aspirant
a moment of revelation.7 As suggested above, those authorial choices are influenced
partly by contextual cultural values about reading.
The goal of this chapter is to identify the unique way in which Gellius chooses to
write about reading, and attempt to draw some conclusions about the effects and goals
of that choice. This is an aspect of the Noctes that has been variously touched on, but
never explored in depth and in the context of ancient reading culture.8 First, I examine
his descriptions of his compositional method in his Preface, and identify the aspects of
reading we can expect him to focus on in his narration of reading elsewhere in the text.
Gellius’s depictions of reading, as we will see, focus on the point of encounter with read
material; around this point orbit three basic concerns:
• Gellius is interested in why readers read — the motivations and appetites which
cause them to open a given text.
6The counterpart — the history of writing about writing — would be another fruitful avenue of
study in the Noctes. On the general topic, see, among many others, Butler 2002 and Stroup 2010.
7Niccolo Machiavelli shares with a close friend the different kinds of reading he does during the
day, and the intense personal emotions they prompt in him (The letter is on 10 Dec 1513 to Vettori;
Atkinson and Sices 2005: 264. Also discussed in Grafton 1999). Augustine of Hippo famously has a
powerful revelation when, prompted by a voice from the air, he picks up a book and he finds meaning
in the first text he sees (and silently reads) (Confessions 8.28). Reading, as we will see, for those who
care about it, has a direct line to the soul. W. A. Johnson 2000 sums up the modern debate over
the import of these scenes, as does Parker 2009. Carruthers 1990: 170-1- offers one example of how
the Ambrose scene may be read, drawing the distinction between the meditatio in which Ambrose is
engaged (in which the reader is focused on the text) and the lectio Augustine expects (in which hearers
focus on the text).
8Holford-Strevens’s approach established the work’s reputation as collected material (rather than
a story of collecting). A few of the passages I will discuss in this chapter received attention in the
1994 ANRW that covered Gellius, but the implications of their narratives of mental activity were
largely disregarded. Anderson 2004 touches only briefly on such narratives (105, 113-117) and draws
no conclusions. Gunderson 2009 provides a far more exhaustive and theoretical investigation of the
phenomenon and practice of reading, but with a concern for modern readers, and implications for
reading ancient texts more generally, and spends little time on the ancient context.
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• Gellius is interested in how readers read — the attention readers have to text,
and the ethical and emotional responses they have to what they encounter.
• Gellius is interested in the effect reading has on readers — what they choose to
do with what they encounter, how and what they learn from reading, and the use
to which they put it.
Having established these as programmatic concerns in Gellius’ approach to reading,
I then seek comparative examples in other ancient writers, looking at how reading is
prescribed and discussed by Quintilian, Plutarch and Pliny the Elder. I argue that
Gellius stands out, certainly from his Latin peers, primarily by the way in which he
constructs reading as a mental act which occurs in its own critical, interpretive space.
I will then explore the various ways in which Gellius frequently and systematically nar-
rates the act of reading, something he does so often as to make him unique in antiquity.
First I will examine what it means to construct a narrative scene around a reading
encounter, and the way that the narrative — in ways familiar from the narratives of
dialogic scenes — focuses the reader’s attention on participants’ mental abilities and
strategies as readers. Then I will examine how these narratives, by incorporating sev-
eral texts, can become stories of further reading, or research. Finally, I will examine the
various scenes that show how texts linger in Gellius’s mind to explore how narratives
of reading can contribute to larger characterisation and self-construction in terms of
intellect and lifestyle.
Erik Gunderson has recently discussed the ways in which readers of Gellius, from
Macrobius to modern scholars, reinvent Gellius in their own images.9 Such an examin-
ation of my readings here might suggest that I have read Gellius as someone equivalent
to myself: a modern researcher inclined to closely and repeatedly read texts, with near-
instant access to much of the Classical canon and an interest in the priorities of mental
9Gunderson 2009: 252-286.
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activity. For this reason, I intend in this chapter to distinguish those qualities of Gel-
lius which make his reading very alien, as well as those qualities which are similar. In
familiar and alien ways, Gellius advocates the seeking out of comparisons, encourages
the exploration of multiple meanings, and demonstrates a general reflexivity about his
project.10 It will be clear in this Introduction that I have brought some modern per-
spectives on interpretive activity to bear on Gellius’s text, something I intend not as
an anachronistic refashioning of Gellius but simply as a way of asking new questions
about this ancient work.
3.1.1 Gellius on reading
In his Preface to the Noctes, Gellius describes the genesis of the work in his own
reading. He emphasizes the unique consilium (“plan” or “policy” – perhaps “strategy”
or “approach”) of his reading, characterised by critical attention, which he suggests is
superior to the authorial reading that produced other miscellaneous works. Finally, he
offers suggestions to his reader about how the Noctes itself should be read.
Gellius begins by emphasising the casual and intimate nature of his reading, describ-
ing habitual encounters with texts during which he was always observing his personal
reaction to what he read or heard, and imagining whether he might wish to recall it in
the future.
nam proinde ut librum quemque in manus ceperam seu Graecum seu Latinum
uel quid memoratu dignum audieram, ita quae libitum erat, cuius generis cumque
erant, indistincte atque promisce annotabam eaque mihi ad subsidium memoriae
10That Gellius may be reflexive in terms of inviting his own work to be judged by the standards to
which he holds others will, I hope, become self-evident. As for the question of what texts Gellius or
his readers would have had access to, no argument from Gellius’s silence will satisfy, but I find the
assumption that he is lying when he claims to have read a text, when not substantiated, unconvin-
cing. As for how easily they could have navigated them, although electronic texts and standardised,
numbered printed codex editions provide us with extremely easy access, we should not underestimate
ancient readers’ strategies for navigating and recalling such works. I will discuss below Gellius’s vari-
ous gestures to the navigability of, say, Pliny the Elder’s Naturalis Historia. Gellius banishes from his
work any reader without the willingness to invest time and energy in its reading (Pr. 19-20).
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quasi quoddam litterarum penus recondebam, ut, quando usus uenisset aut rei aut
uerbi, cuius me repens forte obliuio tenuisset, et libri, ex quibus ea sumpseram
non adessent, facile inde nobis inuentu atque depromptu foret.
For just as I would, whenever I had taken anything (either Greek or Latin) in
hand, or had heard anything worth remembering, which pleased me, of whatever
kind of thing it was, I made a note on it, indiscriminately and without distinction,
and put those things away in support of my memory as a sort of storeroom of
letters; so when the need had arisen for either a thing or a word which suddenly
by chance forgetfulness had taken from me, and the books from which I had taken
it were not present, it thus might be easy for me to find and produce it. (Pr. 2)
Though he speaks self-deprecatingly of his own researches as having been conducted
indistince atque promisce, Gellius goes on to implicate his rivals more fiercely in that
regard. Other authors engaged in an industrious search specifically for “learning” (Pr.
5).11 But the learning those authors sought was concerned only with quantity, without
(Gellius implies) an eye towards either pleasure or value (Pr 11). All the others (illi
omnes et eorum maxime Graeci) read in order to get learning, but Gellius was reading
anyway and keeping an eye out for learning when he encountered it. In spite of his
initial self-deprecation, Gellius ultimately elevates his own methodology by comparison
to others’.
Having thus laid out his goals and methods of reading, he again makes editorial dis-
cretion the theme as he compares his strategy (consilium) in excerpting and noting —
that is, what he decided to do with what he read. Other authors had no editorial discre-
tion, but were ciphers, mere copying machines lacking “the care of precision,” interested
only in hoarding material and so and copying “whatever they stumbled upon.”12 For
them, reading triggered no intellectual reaction. As a result, anyone who reads the res-
ulting works will find them stultifying and sickening.13 By contrast, Gellius describes
his reading as active.
11Nam quia variam et miscellam et quasi confusaneam doctrinam conquisiuerant[. . . ].
12Pr. 11: namque illi omnes et eorum maxime Graeci multa et varia lectitantes, in quas res cumque
inciderant, “alba” ut dicitur, “linea” sine cura discrimins solam copiam sectati conuerrebant. . . .
13Pr. 11 cont’d: . . . quibus in legendis ante animus senio ac taedio languebit. . . .
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ego vero, cum illud Ephesii viri summe nobilis verbum cordi haberem, quod pro-
fecto ita est piολυμαθίη νόον οὐ διδάσκει, ipse quidem uoluendis transeundisque
multis admodum uoluminibus per omnia semper negotiorum interualla, in quibus
furari otium potui, exercitus defessusque sum, sed modica ex his eaque sola accepi
quae aut ingenia prompta expeditaque ad honestae eruditionis cupidinem utili-
umque artium contemplationem celeri facilique compendio ducerent aut homines
aliis iam uitae negotiis occupatos a turpi certe agrestique rerum atque uerborum
imperitia uindicarent.
I, on the other hand, since I had at heart the words of the highly noble Eph-
esian (that is, “much learning does not teach the mind”), indeed exercised and
exhausted myself with the unrolling and going over of a great many scrolls during
every respite from business in which I could steal the leisure, but I took only a
few items from them, those which might either lead those of a willing and agile
mind to a desire for honest learning and reflection on the useful arts by way of a
quick and easy shortcut, or else liberate men occupied with all the other business
of life from truly shameful and uncivilised ignorance of words and things. (Pr.
12)
He read enthusiastically and widely, in other words, but the decision to excerpt some-
thing for his notes was always guided by a central precept.14 He evaluated everything
he read by certain criteria, only copying that which met his standards of having the
potential to stimulate similarly active minds. Two continua are established: texts writ-
ten by authors who read inattentively and greedily will dull their readers’ minds (Pr.
11); but the Noctes, written by a discerning reader, will stimulate its readers’ minds
and lead them to learning (Pr. 12). Gellius then elaborates on that stimulus with a
lengthy prescription of the openmindedness and attention to detail he expects from his
own readers (Pr. 13).
At this point Gellius lays out specific instructions for reading his work.15 He ima-
gines the various kinds of surprised or objecting responses a reader might have to it,
and for each one offers a thoughtful step the reader can take which might turn surprise
or shock into further learning or insight. First, he emphasizes that he expects a sub-
stantial investment of time from his reader (Pr. 14).16 If readers find material they
14A verbum, itself likely the product of reading.
15Vessey 1994: 1902.
16In Pr. 19-21, he banishes those who will not invest the time.
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already know, he invites them to reflect on the commonality of knowledge (Pr. 15). On
finding things new to them, readers should, Gellius suggests, not criticise them right
away, but contemplate (considerent) whether these novelties might have the ability to
stimulate readers’ minds (Pr. 16). If anything is unclear or not explained, Gellius asks
his readers to see it as an indication of how they might learn more for themselves (Pr.
17). And, finding errors or other things which might be criticized (reprehenda), readers
should consider the source of the error, reflect on how Gellius might have come to make
or repeat it, and consider both his authority and his sources’ (Pr. 18). Just as his own
reading was based on active response and evaluation, so too should his reader’s be.17
Gellius imagines his reader here as either curious or distracted, but also imagines a
range of success and failure for his programme. Ideally, the reader, as a result of read-
ing the Noctes will become desirous of learning and will think more about the useful
arts. The worst case, total ignorance, is both shameful and rustic (Pr. 12). The com-
bination of these two judgments reflect the dual concerns of both philosophical values
and rhetorical applicability that we will see characterise Gellius’s programme. Finally,
Gellius’s introduction to his Table of Contents (capita rerum, Pr. 25) and its intended
use draws a final emphatic line under the encouragement to active, intense reading. To
use the capita rerum to navigate the Noctes is to engage in two distinct activities: to
seek things, and also to find things (quid quo in libro quaeri invenirique possit, Pr. 25).
Thus reading of the Noctes is active, hard work; but it may also reveal surprises as the
thing found turns out to be distinct from the thing sought. Ultimately, the Preface
forcefully encourages the reader to be active, alert, and willing to invest contemplative
time and energy in the text.18
17Pr. 13-18, discussed in the Introduction to this thesis.
18There are of course many elements of the Preface to focus on (Holford-Strevens 2003: 27-47 takes
it as a source for Gellius’s composition and evaluates its claims along those lines; Vardi 2004: 159-161
examines its coordination in the miscellaneous (un)genre; Keulen 2009: 17-35 sees Gellius declaring
his authority). Gunderson 2009: 33-44 discusses these lines in detail but finds different elements
significant. Cf Anderson 1994: 1835.
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3.1.2 Quintilian’s uses and methods of reading
In the tenth book of his Institutio Oratoria, Quintilian (c35 CE – c95 CE) lays
out a prescription for reading with a focused goal in mind: his ideal orator’s improved
facility for forensic performance.19 To acquire this facility, the orator should be a self-
aware reader who can perceive the effect his reading has on him, and who can examine
what he reads in context.20 For Quintilian, the purpose of reading is to acquire the
raw material of oratory, such as words, styles and examples, and to do so in a way
that not only distinguishes good material from bad but is contextually sensitive to
where the material is being read and where it might best be used.21 Two principles
are fundamental to Quintilian’s reading programme: acquiring useful material (res and
verba), and acquiring it with careful judgment (iudicium).22
He begins the case for his reading programme with language of wealth that recalls
Gellius’s description of his Noctes as a penus :
num ergo dubium est quin ei uelut opes sint quaedam parandae, quibus uti ubic-
umque desideratum erit possit? eae constant copia rerum ac uerborum.
So, really, is there doubt that resources should be furnished for him [the orator],
which he will be able to draw on wherever something is needed? These [resources]
consist of a wealth of ideas and of words. (Inst. 10.1.15)23
19J. J. Murphy 2003: 257–8 challenges the usual English translation of Quintilian’s “ἑξις” as “facil-
ity,” suggesting facilitas or δύναμις; the point, anyway, is that Quintilian in Book 10 of the Institutio
is focused with informing the orator’s innate abilities and state of mind. Quintilian remains under-
studied, particularly as a thinker in his own right; there appears to have been particularly little done
on the aspects of his thought and style that I discuss here.
20For an orator, contextual awareness is a virtue (Muckelbauer 2003: 87).
21In this he has much in common in Gellius, but ultimately Quintilian’s focus is specifically on the
orator and formal oratorical performance. Quintilian’s approach to reading may well have informed
Gellius’s, particularly in their use of the language of wealth — but it is hard to say whether this reflects
a specific influence or a general commonality of conservative rhetorical values and idiom.
22Everything the orator needs, he can and will obtain from reading (Morgan 1998: 258). For more
on iudicium, Muckelbauer 2003: 68ff, Taekema 2003: 255. Contra Dominik 1997: 50, the reading
programme outlined by Quintilian is not intended for the child, but the adult, and seems to be thinking
of, as Gellius is, habits of reading that should be continued throughout life to inform one’s discursive
oratorical ability (J. J. Murphy 2003: 248, Celentano 2003: 120–1).
23I follow Russell 2002, in “ideas” for res. Quintilian goes on to say (10.1.16) that res are things
suitable to certain contexts or subjects.
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Quintilian’s positive use of copia, a word pejorative in Gellius’s description of other
miscellanists, raises a question to which I shall return — namely, what bearing the
ethics of wealth acquisition and management have on rhetorical knowledge by way of
this metaphor.24 For now it is important to note Quintilian’s formulation that words
and ideas are acquired from reading. The acquisition of words from reading should be
done not by drawing up vocabulary lists but by developing a sensitivity to nuance and
figurative idiom (10.1.13-14).25 Likewise, stylistic and rhetorical technique should be
examined closely in oratorical writing, and oratorical examples should be read and re-
read to understand fully the orator’s technique (10.1.20.26). Literature of various types
can provide other material, and each type is to be read and used in its own way:26
the orator will benefit from enjoying and appreciating the power of poetry (10.1.27)
and the stylistic virtues of history (10.1.31), and from the exercise in argument and
reasoning provided by philosophy (10.1.35), but in none of these cases are these positive
characteristics to be internalized and re-deployed in the orator’s own speech.27 Thus
poetry can be read to learn about emotional effect but not verbal style, history to learn
narrative technique (as well as facts and exempla) but not verbal style, and philosophy
to exercise thought and reasoning but not persuasive technique.28 Quintilian observes
and prescribes approaches to the cognitive benefits and hazards of each genre.29
Quintilian demands a sensitive and active involvement in the reading of literature, a
24Picked up at 10.1.13: quorum nobis ubertatem ac divitias dabit lectio. . . .
25(cont’d from prev.): . . . ut non solum quo modo occurrent sed etiam qu omodo oportet utamur.
non semper enim haec inter se idem faciunt. . . .
26Though “literature,” vague even today, is a difficult concept to map onto the ancient understanding.
Morgan 1995: 81-2.
2710.1.28: meminerimus tamen non per omnia poetas esse oratori sequendos. . . .. 10.1.31: uerum et
ipsa sic est legenda ut sciamus plerasque eius uirtutes oratori esse uitandas. 10.1.36: sed his quoqu
adhibendum est simile iudicium, ut etiam cum in rebus uersemur isdem, non tamen eandem esse
condicionem sciamus litium ac disputationum. . . .
28Contra Taekema 2003: 253, Quintilian’s prescriptions for reading are thus more than just “stylistic”
in motivation: reading these genres provides exercises in the cognitive processes underlying various
stylistic techniques.
29The hazards lie in failing to accurately distinguish between the qualities of a genre which are and
are not suitable for emulation in oratory. Muckelbauer 2003: 69.
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suite of standards by which the orator keeps in mind his purpose in reading and remains
alert for the effect his reading has on him. In his unique discussion of Seneca, he argues
that the popular writer should only be read by those who have mastered this kind of
self-aware discretion in reading:
uerum sic quoque iam robustis et seueriore genere satis firmatis legendus, uel
ideo quod exercere potest utrimque iudicium. multa enim, ut dixi, probanda in eo,
multa enim adiranda sunt, eligere modo curae sint; quod utinam ipse fecisset.
Even so, he ought to be read by those already mature and sufficiently firm in a
more severe mode, indeed because he can exercise their judgment on both sides.
As I said, there is much in him to approve of, much indeed to admire, if only care
is taken to be selective; if only he’d done so himself.(Inst. 10.1.131)30
Because Seneca failed to exercise good judgment in his own writing, his readers must
make an extra effort to do so in theirs.31 Quintilian fears for indiscriminate readers who
will take the wrong thing from a text.32 Having argued for contextual sensitivity in
acquiring vocabulary, styles and techniques, he finally reiterates the argument in his
conclusion about imitating earlier authors.
ideoque cum totum exprimere quem elegeris paene sit homini inconcessum, plurium
bona ponamus ante oculos, ut aliud ex alio haereat, et quo quidque loco conueniat
aptemus.
Therefore since it is nearly impossible to reproduce entirely a chosen author, let
us hold the good points of many before our eyes, so that something sticks with us
from each, and so we might adapt them in whatever place suits.(Inst. 10.2.26)33
Quintilian here argues for an awareness of the strengths or qualities (bona) of many
authors, but more importantly for an understanding of where they would be most
appropriately and effectively deployed.34 Ultimately, Quintilian articulates a state of
30Cf. Gellius Noctes 12.2.
31Dominik 1997: 54–5.
32For Muckelbauer 2003: 71, the danger is intriguingly deeper: that Seneca’s stylistic choices might
permanently damage the reader’s ability to discriminate in all future texts. Thus the mechanism of
iudicium is itself vulnerable to what goes into its hopper.
33Quintilian notes that bona can be both words and style (.27), and ultimately are useless if not
combined with the orator’s own original bona.
34Muckelbauer 2003: 69 discusses how this reading is not providing subjects for imitation but practice
in identifying what (and how and why) to imitate in any given text.
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mind for readers that has a clear purpose (to obtain uerba, res, and bona) but also
a rigorous methodology (judgment of quality, use and relevance) and corresponding
application (appropriate adaptation). The reader’s mind fills with words and ideas
examined in context and then carefully dissociated from that context, floating forever
in his mind as he contemplates new situations, ready to be used where needed. The
reader sees not just what he is reading, but what he has read before; moreover, the
reader watches himself reading, examining the effectiveness of his iudicium. Quintilian’s
theory of reading thus establishes a cognitive space for the act of reading, prescribing
goals, methods and uses for it, but this approach is targeted specifically at forensic
performance; with the exception of the problem of Seneca, Quintilian provides little in
the way of examples of this dynamic at work, or models of the negative consequences
of other approaches. Quintilian is thus more theoretical than Gellius in his treatment
of reading, with an eye towards its role in forming the ideal orator, and so also more
impersonal in that Gellius’s theory is followed by a life of practice.35
3.1.3 Pliny on his reading
Pliny the Elder (23/4CE - 79CE), whose monumental Naturalis Historia is the
product of a seemingly impossible amount of reading, offers a very different construction
of the role of reading in the creation of that work.36 His framing of reading is pragmatic,
with less emphasis on cognitive effects or actions around reading, and more on its
goals and uses: acquisition of material in service to the Emperor. Pliny is significant
35Morgan 1995: 175–6 sees the ancient texts which we identify as “educational” as more properly
identified as socio-political works which, in pursuit of the ideal state, begin with the ideal participant in
state affairs. She also notes that no ancient texts describing the educational process contain anything
like case studies of students or reflections on individual students’ progress and abilities. In this way too
Gellius is unique: though not concerned with youthful learners, his Noctes is stocked with characters
defined by their success or failure at self-education.
36T. Murphy 2004: 9, Sinclair 2003, Carey 2003: 2. This section is meant in part to anticipate this
chapter’s discussion of Gellius’s treatment of Pliny, which I argue is critical-verging-on-pejorative.
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for comparison to Gellius as an earlier author embarking on a similarly compilatory
endeavour; although their works are very different, we will see in this chapter that
Gellius situates his own authorial persona specifically in contrast to Pliny’s.37 Where
Gellius in writing his Noctes was stocking his storeroom (penus), Pliny describes his
own work as the acquisition of monetary wealth, conjuring treasuries (thesauri).38
He also uses the language of labour. He begins describing these efforts with a
narrated moment of reading Livy’s account of his own work, where he responds imme-
diately with a judgment of its quality. In this way he invokes one aspect of his own
reading as presented in the Preface: as a constant evaluation of worth.39 But after
gently chastising Livy for not loving labour enough, he explains what his own labours
have been:
uiginti milia rerum dignarum cura — quoniam, ut ait Domitius Piso, thesauros
oportet esse, non libros — lectione uoluminum circiter duorum milium, quorum
pauca admodum studiosi attingunt propter secretum materiae, ex exquisitis auct-
oribus centum inclusimus triginta sex uoluminibus [. . . ].
I have stored up 20,000 things worthy of attention (because, as Domitius Piso
says, we need treasuries, not books), by reading about 2,000 volumes (very few
of which students ever touch on account of the obscurity of their content) from
100 sought-out authors, in 36 volumes. . . . HN Pr. 17)40
The contents of his HN are described as res, substantial quantities of which Pliny
proclaims he has “stored away” or “shut up” in 36 volumes.41 Reading is the process by
37The works still have some conceptual similarities; Doody 2009: 17 discusses the way Pliny situates
his programme subsequent to a broader programme of study, just as Gellius seems to be speaking to
adults who have previously had the benefit of a basic educational curriculum.
38In this he is more like Quintilian, though the rhetorician warns against thesauri (cf perhaps Gellius
2.10). Pliny also uses the language of childbirth (Pr.1, .28) and labour (Pr. 16, .33). See also Sinclair
2003: 283-5 on this.
39Sinclair 2003: 291-4 discusses the close relationship, in reading a text, between evaluating the text
and evaluating its author. The blurring of this line sets Pliny apart from Gellius, who, through his
interest in how and why authors write a certain way, separates author from text.
40Gellius has one parodic eye on this passage in the lines examined above from his own Preface. See
discussion, inter al, of Rust 2009: 116-118.
41Includo can refer to incorporation of things into text, but “include” does not quite cover its strong
sense of things being inserted or installed.
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which he has achieved this feat of accumulative storage.42 Pliny emphasises instead the
breadth of that reading, which not only is numerically substantial but also supersedes
other scholars’ reading in terms of the abstruseness of material he was prepared to look
at.43 Where Gellius trumps his rivals in the “care of discrimination,” a description of
intellectual responses had while reading, Pliny boasts of his physical reach in obtaining
books, a more external description that focuses on books possessed rather than reacted
to. Reading is de-emphasized as simply one step in the accumulation of material worthy
of attention. The language of possession persists, mingled with that of law, in Pliny’s
criticism of previous authors who failed to indicate their sources, whom he claims to
have “caught” in the course of his collection of authorities having copied earlier authors
without naming them (HN Pr. 22). He sneers at the “guilty” spirit of someone who
would rather be caught in theft than repay a loan, especially since “interest makes
capital.”44 For these authors, too, the reading of earlier texts and the use of what
they find there is an act of wealth-transfer, in which both the material found and its
availability are of value.
Pliny’s construction of his and others’ reading thus is not interested in the cognit-
ive act of reading, but rather in the reader’s ability to identify value and obtain it.
Conceding that many things may have passed him by, Pliny makes his reading passive
(Pr. 18). He imagines his reader as even less interested in the act of reading but no
42Cf generally Rust 2009: 73-76 (with caution; nb eg claims that Gellius has produced a “cabinet of
curiosities” (73)).
43Editorial selectivity is more ambiguous here than in Gellius’s programmatic language: is the cura
of which the things are digna his or ours? I am indebted here and elsewhere in my discussion of Pliny
to the insights of Eugenia Lao.
44A peculiar phrase that can still puzzle modern readers. One possibility is that this is a sort
of aphoristic description of a general community of aristocratic moneylending, in which everyone’s
capital increases because everyone else pays their interest. The fiscal metaphor is thus a signifier of
community. In this I roughly follow T. Murphy 2004: 49-73, who reflects on knowledge as commodity
and specifically (at 64-65) the hazards in Roman fiscal ethics of acquiring a lot of money but not
investing or otherwise using it. T. Murphy 2003: 310-3 observes that for Romans, wealth should be
spent, and preferably on public works or entertainment, a value so important that going into debt
in pursuit of it was considered honourable. Eugenia Lao has offered her rendering as “interest comes
from use”, which ties more closely into an idea of knowledge to be used.
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less concerned with value. Pliny constructs and encourages a kind of reading in which
evaluation – or rather valuation – is inherent, but does not take any reflective capacity
or time. The reader considers each item’s worth and moves on. He invites others to
price his work not by its contents but by its dedicatee:45
haec fiducia operis, haec est indicatura: multa ualde pretiosa ideo uidentur quia
sunt templis dicata.
This is a guarantee of my work, this will reveal its value: many things indeed are
priced highly because they are dedicated to a temple. (HN Pr. 19)
Material thus evaluated, it is to be either excerpted verbatim and intact, or ignored.
Sinclair argues that the motto with which Pliny indicates the tirelessness of his work —
uita uigilia est — invites just this sort of approach from Pliny’s reader, who will spot
its value as a pithy turn of phrase and make a note of it.46
The Preface’s framing of critical concerns in terms of both monetary value and
superficial judgment contributes to Pliny’s characterisation of the work not as a literary
undertaking but as yet another labour in service to his imperial dedicatee.47 The HN
is literally to be given a value — a price — that is not based on its actual content.
Finally, in introducing his table of contents, Pliny explains that this textual mechanism
has been included literally to reduce the amount of the HN which needs to be read:
quia occupationibus tuis publico bono parcendum erat, quid singulis contineretur
libris huic epistulae subiunxi, summaque cura ne legendos eos haberes operam
dedi. tu per hoc et aliis praestabis ne perlegant, sed ut quisque desiderabit aliquid
id tentum quaerat, et sciat quo loco inveniat.
As it was my duty in the public interest to have consideration for the claims upon
your time, I have appended to this letter a table of contents of the several books,
and have taken very careful precautions to prevent your having to read them.
You by these means will secure for others that they will not need to read right
through them either, but only look for the particular point that each of them
wants, and will know where to find it. (HN Pr. 33)
45Carey 2003: 75 identifies this, and Pliny’s image of the thesaurus (not to mention includo), with
the use of Roman temples as deposit sites for things acquired in overseas foreign conquests. Cf Lao
2008: 42.
46Sinclair 2003: 297-8.
47Cf Keulen 2009: 197-198’s (implausible) suggestion of a missing imperial dedicatee for the Noctes,
contra which (rightly) Rust 2009: 16.
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Perhaps the most notable thing about this passage is the way Pliny frames the Table
of Contents as the next step in the process of reduction and distillation in which he
was engaged as he assembled the HN. Where Gellius suggested that the reading of his
Noctes could lead to a wide and curious reading of a sort that mirrored his own in
composing it, Pliny not only sees his reader having to read much less than he himself
read, but suggests the reader read less even than he has written.48 Pliny’s summarium,
his Table of Contents, exists so that the reader does not have to read the whole work
(unlike Gellius’s, which is presented as not so much a shortcut as an alternative to linear
navigation of the text).49 Whatever programmes and strategies of continuous reading
the text may sustain or promote internally, it is striking by comparison to Gellius that
Pliny describes the consultation of his texts as the desiring and finding of things (rather
than a process of reading); yet this treatment of reading as an as a material pursuit
and acquisition mirrors perfectly his characterisation of his own compositional process
as accumulation of reading — a style of reading he encourages his readers to bring to
his own text.50
3.1.4 Plutarch on how and why to read
Representations of reading and the reader by Plutarch (before 50CE–120CE) are
worth examining not only as a final comparison to Gellius’s but also as a probable
influence. Gellius frequently indicates his familiarity with Plutarch’s works, and seems
interested in establishing a certain ideological descent from him.51 The pedagogical re-
48Doody 2001: 1.
49See Stevenson 2004: 127-131 on “antiquarian” uses of textual indices, Riggsby 2007 on Latin tables
of contents, and Doody 2001 on Pliny’s summarium.
50There is unfortunately not space here to augment my analysis of theorization of the reading
process with a discussion of narratives of reading within the main text of the HN, nor, below, for one
on references to reading in Plutarch’s more narrative texts (e.g. the Sympotic Questions or Lives).
For Pliny, Sinclair 2003 provides some discussion; for Plutarch, Ko¨nig 2007.
51See above, p34.
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lationship is a relevant one for examining Plutarch’s doctrines concerning reading: they
are laid out most clearly in two works in the Moralia, How the young man should study
poetry (henceforth: Poetry) and On the right way of listening to lectures (henceforth:
Listening). As Ko¨nig has argued, taken together, these treatises offer a coherent theory
of interpretation;52 although the former discusses the reading of poetry, it acknowledges
the susceptibility of young minds to such texts whether consumed visually or aurally,
and it shares many values and themes with the latter treatise.53 Poetry advises someone
overseeing a student’s education, while Listening speaks directly to the one who will
listen; in other relevant treatises we should consider, such as On Curiosity and Progress
in virtue, Plutarch’s approach is often one of guided (self-)improvement. Being a good
“reader” is a skill that can be developed with pedagogical guidance. In this section,
I will examine the way he considers and represents the mental act of reading, and his
characterisation of the reader and his methods. Like Gellius, Plutarch indicates concern
for why one reads, how one reads, and the effect that reading has, and I discuss them
in this order.
Plutarch advocates a purpose in reading which he admits is in opposition to the
normal reasons people are drawn to texts. His central concern is for reading “philo-
sophically.”54 He envisions a reading whose purpose is to acquire beneficial ideas with
which to improve one’s mind; this ideal is at odds with the challenge posed by appetite,
which, unchecked leads the reader to consume bad texts or not to extract the most
meaningful ideas from them. Readers must be conditioned to seek in their reading “the
useful and salutary” (τὸ χρήσιμον [. . . ] καὶ τὸ σωτήριον, Poetry 14F) or more commonly
“the helpful and useful” (eg piολλὰ [. . . ] ὠφέλιμα καὶ χρήσιμα, Poetry 28E55), which is
52Ko¨nig 2007: 47-49.
53For reading at Rome as “aural”, Starr 1991.
54Ko¨nig 2007: 47. Zadorojnyi 2002: 303 observes that through this programme the student is
brought to the point of being able to perceive “the light of philosophy” independently.
55cf. Listening 42a: τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ ὠφέλιμον.
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often to be found only through careful reading. Opposed to this goal in reading are
various kinds of pleasure, which Plutarch acknowledges as facts of the young reader’s
life (Poetry 14F).56 Immoderate appetites for text are explored both in Poetry and,
elsewhere, in On Curiosity.57 That treatise, which mostly explores the social unseemli-
ness of the individual who always craves news and gossip, treats that behaviour as the
result of an intemperate and uncontrolled mind, and prescribes steps to learn mental
self-control. Poetry compares reckless satiation of readerly appetites to eating danger-
ous but tasty foods, which seems to acknowledge the inherent paradox of text: that
one cannot evaluate its content until one has consumed it.58 On Curiosity, on the other
hand, makes the curious mind more active and intrusive; there involving oneself with
the wrong sort of inquiry is compared to involving oneself sexually with the wrong sort
of woman (591E).59 At several points in the text, reading stands in for mental atten-
tion. The first stage of Plutarch’s programme for training oneself not to be so curious
is to not read monumental text or graffiti: the reader’s eye that searches out meaning
from written or engraved words is an extension of the mind that seeks to know things
hidden behind doors and windows. The meaning encoded in text is cast as “private,”
hidden away. It is the ultimate test of intellectual appetite to see text and not read it.60
Reading also tempts the reader with various pleasures. There is the pleasure of fictional
poetry, but there is also the pleasure of seeing a good argument laid out, or of learning
new things; at the conclusion of Listening, Plutarch expresses a hope that the reader
who keeps his discussion in mind will mould his tastes and attentions accordingly:
. . . ἵνα μὴ σοφιστικὴν ἕξιν μηδ᾿ ἱστορικὴν ἀλλ᾿ ἐνδιάθετον καὶ φιλόσοφον λαμβάνω-
56Cf. Whitmarsh 2001: 51, who discusses how the pleasure of poetry is natural but must be
controlled. Zadorojnyi 2002: 299 identifies the imagery of the polis, discussed again below in the
context of the governmental metaphor, as Platonic.
57Which Gellius indicates at 11.16 he has read.
58Poetry 15B, where Plutarch invokes a fish that tastes good but has bad effects once eaten.
59For a full and compelling discussion of On Curiosity as it relates to the reader of an ancient novel,
Hunter 2009.
60On Curiosity 520E.
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μεν. . .
. . . In order that we might develop a state of mind neither sophistic nor bent on
acquiring mere information but mentally internal and philosophical. . . (Listening
48D)61
The ἕξις — the reader’s habitual state of mind, which we might roughly compare to
Gellius’s readerly consilium — affects both what he wants from what he or she reads,
and how he or she goes about finding it.62 This raises the question of what methodology
for reading Plutarch prescribes for the “philosophic and ingrained” ἕξις.
If philosophy and not pleasure are the “why” of Plutarch’s reading, active, engaged
control is the “how.” This mental control of the reading process effects the interpret-
ative reactions that are critical to philosophical reading. Plutarch concludes Poetry
by reminding his reader of all the ways in which “the young man needs good steering
around reading.”63 More strikingly, he begins Listening with the language of govern-
ment to describe the way mature people are responsible for directing their intellectual
growth. Leaving behind the phase of education in which one has teachers is hazardous:
young men, who confuse anarchy with freedom, become subject to the despotism of
their desires (as discussed above).64 But Plutarch advocates a different mindset:
νόμιζε τὴν εἰς ἄνδρας ἐκ piαίδων ἀγωγὴν οὐκ ἀρχῆς εἶναι τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσιν ἀpiο-
βολήν, ἀλλὰ μεταβολὴν ἄρχοντος, ἀντὶ μισθωτοῦ τινος ἢ ἀργυρωνήτου θεῖον ἡγεμόνα
τοῦ βίου λαμβάνουσι τὸν λόγον, ᾧ τοὺς ἑpiομένους ἄξιόν ἐστι μόνους ἐλευθέρους
νομίζειν.
Believe then that leaving childhood is, for the sensible, not a throwing off of rule,
but a change in ruler since instead of some hired person or slave purchased with
money they now take as the divine guide of their life reason, whose followers alone
may deservedly be considered free. (37D-E)65
61I follow Babbitt 1927’s rendering of ἱστορικὴν here; Plutarch is clearly separating people who
like to read clever arguments or learn new facts from people who are self-aware and read to improve
themselves.
62Quintilian uses the same word for oratorical facility at Inst. 10.1.1.
6337B: ἀγαθῆς δεῖ τῷ νέῳ κυβερνήσεως piερὶ τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν. The image is common; LSJ s.v. κῦβερνάω.
6437C-D. Cf. On Curiosity 519E, where Bellerophon’s restraint at not opening his letter is equated
to his sexual self-control.
65Trans after Babbitt 1927.
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The rule of reason directs the reader’s mind to examine text on multiple levels and
coordinate their contents with other knowledge and reading.66 Plutarch’s reader reads
with a basic understanding of the difference between style and substance, and ulti-
mately by holding what they have read in their mind and comparing or juxtaposing
it to other things read and other things that they already know. The student should
be taught to distinguish between what poetry represents and the skill with which it
represents it (17F).67 Then he or she must learn that good lessons and values can be
drawn from representations of bad acts, through the use of creative re-examination in
which the reader contemplates the consequences of an action or story they read about.68
The reader who finds a troubling statement in a text should seek contradictions to it
elsewhere in that work or others by the same author; these will provide an opportun-
ity to determine which is the better sentiment (20D-E).69 In the absence of any such
contradictions, other authors should be examined (21D). In short, the reader who en-
counters troubling content should be concerned with how to learn a useful lesson from
it, even if that means reading more. Sometimes it is a question of reading on in context
to make sure a missed word or line does not change the sense of the troubling material
(22B-C). There follows from this a discussion of the use of vocabulary knowledge for
correct interpretation: the reader should know the ways in which words are used in
order to find the correct meaning (22B-C). This interpretative skill depends not only
on knowing words’ meanings, but on being able to shuﬄe and evaluate them in context.
Critically to the goal of philosophical reading, the reader should examine things read for
possible applicability in other situations, a kind of dynamic interpretation that requires
66Whitmarsh 2001: 51.
67Whitmarsh 2001: 51ff generally discusses Plutarch’s defense in these works of mimetic art – in the
context of proper interpretive training.
68ἀναθεώρησις (19E) on which see Ko¨nig 2007: 50.
69Still in Poetry, Plutarch uses the language of paedagogy, saying “we must direct” the student, a
directive role the student takes over for himself or herself in a later stage of life. Seeking contradiction
also seems important to remembering that not everything represented by art is to be considered equal.
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him or her not only to understand what the passage in question means but also what
it might mean in other circumstances (34B-C).
The directives for attentive interpretation in Listening continue this programme,
becoming even more concerned with isolating style and substance from one another
and responding to them differently.70 Plutarch directs the reader to imagine the text’s
creation: imagining how a successful text was composed offers examples to follow, while
imagining the composition of a failure offers lessons in the causes of error (40B).71
Plutarch’s assertion that speakers, whether they succeed or fail, “are of use to
listeners who are awake and attentive” (Listening 40C) recalls Quintilian’s observation
that any book, good or bad, is of value to the reader who uses iudicium to read critically.
The focus on the medium of speech and the mechanisms of formulating text in it
remains important, as Plutarch encourages the reader to ignore elements of rhetorical
performance that can distract (41B-C). The reader should pierce the haze of a text’s
artful presentation to try to find the meaning and sense and purpose which lies beneath
it, imagining a sort of pure communicative intent (42A). Style is to be appreciated,
but not until after substance has been identified (42C-D).72 Active reading/listening,
then, is about being aware of the text in two ways at once: what it is saying, and how
it is saying it. This is unsurprising in the context of rhetorical theory, but Plutarch’s
emphasis on philosophical goals for reading puts the two dimensions in parity. The
reader needs not only to perceive them separately but also to see their interrelationship
at work.
This emphasis on critical awareness of style in pursuit of inner substance gives rise
70Although I will continue to use the word “reader,” I am aware Plutarch is speaking of listening to
speech which may or may not be ex tempore. My interest here is in how he describes the process of
interpretive response.
71τοῖς μὲν οὖν καταρθουμένοις ἐpiιλογιστέον ὡς οὐκ ἀpiὸ τύχης οὐδ᾿ αὐτομάτως ἀλλ᾿ ἐpiιμελείᾳ καὶ piόνῳ
καὶ μαθήσει κατορθοῦνται, καὶ μιμητέον γε ταῦτα θαυμάζοντάς γε δὴ καὶ ζηλεοῦντας· τοῖς δ᾿ἁμαρτανομένοις
ἐpiιστάναι χρὴ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὑφ᾿ ὧν αἰτιῶν καὶ ὅθεν ἡ piαρατροpiὴ γέγονεν.
72The analogy is to drinkers who have emptied their drinking cups and then “turn them about” to
examine their ornamentation, an image striking for the dynamism and personal whimsy it conveys.
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at several points to Plutarch’s use of the metaphor of the bee for the attentive, active
reader. The bee first appears in Poetry as an example of how the student should be
trained to seek philosophical profit; as the bee gets the best honey from the roughest
plants, so the student should know that even from representations of artistic things a
positive idea may be extracted (32E).73 Bees are then compared to women in Listening
as users of flowers; those who listen to speeches only for the flourishes afforded by
the medium of rhetoric are like women who only seek pretty, fair-smelling flowers for
garlands which will soon wilt, but the student should be like the bee whose priority
is instead the sweetness of honey to be found within (41E-F). Finally, in his treatise
on Progress in Virtue, Plutarch uses reading habits as one indicator of how well one is
progressing. One’s goals and habits in reading should be to collect things of worth.
ὥσpiερ γὰρ ἄνθεσιν ὁμιλεῖν ὁ Σιμωνίδης φησὶ τὴν μέλιτταν, `ξανθὸν μέλι μηδομέναν,΄
οἱ δ᾿ ἄλλοι χρόαν αὐτῶν καὶ ὀσμὴν ἕτερον δ᾿ οὐδὲν ἀγαpiῶσιν, οὐδὲ λαμβάνουσιν, οὕτω
τῶν ἄλλων ἐν piοιήμασιν ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα καὶ piαιδιᾶς ἀναστρεφομένων αὐτὸς εὑρίσκων
τι καὶ συνάγων σpiουδῆς ἄχιον ἔοικεν ἤδη γνωριστικὸς ὑpiὸ συνηθείας καὶ φιλίας τοῦ
καλοῦ καὶ οἰκείου γεγονέναι.
For as Simonides says of the bee that it flits among the flowers, ‘making the
yellow honey its care,’ while others treasure their colour and smell and nothing
else, getting nothing from them, so, while others amid poems for the sake of
pleasure or diversion, if a man, through his own initiative, finds and collects
something worth while, it is reasonable to expect that he at last, from force
of habit and fondness for what is beautiful and appropriate, has made himself
capable of appreciating it. (Progress in Virtue 79C-D)74
As in On Curiosity, reading habits are indicative of mental demeanour, and proper
appetites or goals suggest a reader with good interpretative ability. Assuming the
order of these three treatises is original, the progression in use of the bee metaphor in
a sense enacts Plutarch’s priorities for reading; though the image is based on a line of
Simonides, in its first appearance there is no quotation, only a philosophical deployment
of the sentiment; only in its second use do we learn it is a quote, and in the final one, its
73Cf Rust 2009: 196 on the bee in Seneca EM 88.
74Trans after Babbitt 1927.
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author, a progression that shows evidence of the priorities Plutarch advocates for the
reading of poets. The bee is also not merely a seeker (with appetites) and a consumer
(with direction): he is also a collector who produces and benefits from his work, which
brings us to Plutarch’s ideas about the effects and products of reading.
The effects of reading, good and bad, are profound in Plutarch’s model. Youths
require guidance in their reading because the senses used in reading or listening to
text are as vulnerable to excess as their other appetites (14E-15A).75 He writes of the
uncritical, passive reader who accepts false representations in his reading as true and
is “carried away,” his “opinions corrupted”, suffering “bad things” and “trusting base
things” (14E-15A). Poor readers and listeners are poor writers and speakers (38E-F).
These various consequences are raised in counterpoint to the benefit of extracting philo-
sophically useful material from whatever is read; Plutarch even encourages the reader
to watch himself or herself reading and after reading, and to look for the effects of that
reading to see whether good text has had a good effect (38E-F). In On Curiosity, the
figure of the busybody who is incapable of regulating his intellectual appetites takes
various forms to illustrate various aspects of the principle in question. Intemperate
learners are intemperate speakers, Plutarch warns, a phenomenon Gellius himself no-
tices and reflects on (519C).76 But particularly striking is the case of the intemperate
reader. To illustrate the way someone who is uncontrollably curious fills his mind with
worthless things, Plutarch imagines a reader who compiles a worthless miscellany:
φέρε γάρ, εἴ τις ἐpiιὼν τὰ συγγράμματα τῶν piαλαιῶν ἐκλαμβάνοι τὰ κάκιστα τῶν
piαλαιῶν ἐκλαμβάνοι τὰ κάκιστα τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ βιβλίον ἔχοι σθντεταγμένον οἷον
῾Ομερικῶν στίχων ἀκεφάλων καὶ τραγικῶν σολοικισμῶν καὶ τῶν ὑpi᾿ Α᾿ρχιλόχου piρὸς
τὰς γυναῖκας ἀpiρεpiῶς καὶ ἀκολάστως εἰρημένων, ἑαυτὸν piαραδειγματίζοντος, ἆρ᾿ οὐκ
ἔστι τῆς τραγικῆς κατάρας ἄχιος
᾿ὄλοιο θνητῶν ἐκλέγων τὰς συμφοράς·
75Whitmarsh 2001: 52.
76Cf. Noctes 11.7.
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καὶ ἄνευ δὲ τῆς κατάρας ἀμpiρεpiὴς καὶ ἀνωφελὴς ὁ θησαυρισμὸς αὐτοῦ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων
ἁμαρτημάτων·
Well now, if someone going over the writings of the ancients were to take out the
worst bits of them, and if he had a book of such things assembled, “headless”
Homeric lines and tragic soloecisms and the unbecoming and licentious language
applied to women by which Archilochus makes a sorry spectacle of himself, then
wouldn’t he be worthy of the tragic curse,
damn you, collector of the catastrophes of mortals?
Even without the curse, that man’s hoard of others’ mistakes is unbecoming and
useless. (520A-B)77
The personal miscellany compiled from reading stands here for one’s learning derived
from reading. Such a book would be patently inappropriate and useless; so too someone
whose mind is in the same state. This is strongly reminiscent of Gellius’s own run-
in with misguided miscellany;78 and here, at the worst extreme of bad curiosity/bad
reading/bad writing, bad knowledge is, as in Quintilian, compared to hoarded, useless
wealth.
Just as Plutarch’s purpose for reading is philosophical, his framework for its ap-
proach and control orbits around the philosophical axis of moderate regulation of ap-
petites. The desire to read is a natural extension of the desire to know; but that desire
requires focus in specific directions. The mind also needs control in its pursuit of the
good desires, and in this active role is responsible for coordinating the things read with
the other things it has read or learned elsewhere, and for examining the thing read
in various ways. The consequences of successfully guiding one’s reading through such
an interpretive filter are growth, happiness and intelligence; failure to do so leads to
perversion, harm, and in the case of errors not recognised, the further perpetration of
such errors. Plutarch’s model of reading is highly socially conscious, seeing reading as
a social activity and one that everyone encounters, but its stakes are highly personal —
77Trans after Helmbold 1939.
78Noctes 14.6, on which Rust 2009: 175-177.
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the reader must read well for his or her own benefit.79 The central tenet of his reading
programme, he declares, is belief that “good reading is the start of good living.” Such
reading is active, controlled, measured, and above all self-conscious.
3.1.5 The Gellian context
To the frustration of those who would study the history of reading and literacy,
literate cultures have not always left us with evidence, in the form of specific descriptions
or reflections, of their own reading habits. Indeed, we might say that throughout history,
there is an ebb and flow to literate cultures’ interest in actively discussing and theorising
not just the act of reading, but the particular qualities I have found in these examples:
a concern for reflective caution, analytical procedure, and the formation of self-aware,
independent judgments.80 An increase in such active theorising can often be identified
with some larger cultural phenomenon or anxiety around literary culture, whether it is
particular social groups becoming newly literate, or emerging concerns about the place
of reading in society at large. Larger social phenomena that may prompt Gellius’s turn
toward this kind of writing-about-reading are beyond the scope of this thesis, although
he may be responding to not only the spread but the specialisation of literacy in the
empire — what Woolf has called the “elaboration. . . of reading and writing practices”.81
For the moment, though, we must concern ourselves with Gellius’s assumptions, as an
elite Roman, about the role and use of reading. So: what are the cultural politics of
Gellian reading?
Roman reading was extremely public. Romans often read socially, as an entertain-
79Ko¨nig 2007 discusses various social and cultural implications of Plutarch’s reading model.
80For a survey of writing-about-reading in cultural context throughout post-antique Western history,
see the Appendix of this thesis. For reasons of space, other Imperial authors with equally interesting
ideas about reading have not been discussed here. One such is Seneca, for whom see Rust 2009:
145-198; another is Galen, whose writing is full of less explicit but no less forceful rhetoric about and
prescriptions for reading, discussed below p179 and W. A. Johnson 2010: 74-97.
81Woolf 2009: 48.
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ment component of a dinner party, or simply to pass the time among friends.82 They got
together to hear new texts and very old ones.Literate, elite community was formed in
part around the social reception of text, even if for some members it was only a matter
of appearances. But even Roman reading that was not done in social groups could still
be termed public: a reader reading alone might well have had a lector, whom some Ro-
mans perceived as an audience of sorts.83. A conservative strain in Roman educational
thought, with roots in Cicero’s de Oratore and manifest later in Quintilian, connected
private, personally directed reading to the reader’s ability to function in the civic elite:
reading informed and exercised the orator’s forensic ability. A Roman practicing as
a judge or advocate might well consult texts in private for guidance in those duties.
Personal reading could also be shared in correspondence with literate peers in a sort of
elongated form of reading at a social gathering, as we see in the letters of Fronto. Most
significantly, private reading of the most ideal sort, carried out at night and in leisure
time, could well be directed toward a very public service, to the extent that it became
a powerful literary motif.84 Pliny the Elder is the clearest example of this phenomenon,
but the shelves Gellius haunts are littered with commentarii and other compiled work
which, though framed in terms of private hypomnemata, were published for public use.85
Even private reading, at Rome, directly informed or produced public life. Romans thus
almost always read with an audience, responding to text as their peers watched.86 To
read, or to be seen to read, was to affirm one’s place in elite community.
As a comparative example of a Roman whose private reading was a public service,
82W. A. Johnson 2000, W. A. Johnson 2009, W. A. Johnson 2010; and Parker 2009 for a nuanced
exploration of textual and oral habits around poetry, and a generally forceful demonstration that the
logistical aspects of Roman reading — in a group, alone, silently, aloud — were as varied as they are
today. Besides Gellius, see e.g. Pliny Ep 3.1.
83Parker 2009: 196-8 On lectores Starr 1991.
84Ker 2004 describes the Roman values of time-use surrounding the motif of lucubratio.
85Gellius encounters them frequently, including one he notes clearly was not intended for publication.
86Konstan 2009 emphasises the way ancient readers responded to text in social groups, indicating
that the standards of active reading were often met in verbal, face-to-face exchanges.
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and of a Roman whose public persona was crafted around his reading, and as an author
of interest to Gellius himself, I will take Pliny the Elder and his HN as a reference point.
As seen above, the HN presents its reading as imperial service. Pliny’s auctoritas,
after his death, was shored up by his nephew, who contributed to the literary record
further details of his uncle as consummate reader. Gellius himself is fixated on Pliny,
including his title among the rival works of the Noctes ’s preface.87 He also cites Pliny
a number of times, and Pliny is unique among Roman miscellanists Gellius reads in
that we can compare these citations to a surviving text: the HN. Scholars continue
to disagree on the nature of the relationship between Gellius and Pliny. There is of
course ongoing disagreement over how to read Pliny’s HN, and whether the modern
conception of “encyclopedia” applies in the ancient context.88 How Pliny conceived of
the work is a question distinct from how Gellius perceived it; and there are various ways
of understanding not only whether they should be classified together but what Gellius’s
purpose is in treating Pliny the way he does.89 I hope in this chapter to go some way to
resolving at least these latter questions. My approach offers several potential benefits:
It focuses on Gellius’s narratives of reading at their most interesting, and where we can
compare them (as much as is ever possible) to his “actual reading.” It also offers new
insight into the ancient reception of the HN, of which Gellius constitutes the largest
and most explicit body. And an examination of Gellius making much of his reading of
a text which in turn makes much of its own reading offers perhaps the most fruitful
opportunity to explore how Gellius’s narratives of reading live up to the priorities laid
out in the Preface, what cultural values he attaches to reading, and what role this serves
in his overall programme for the Noctes.
87Rust 2009: 111-117, and Astarita 1993: 32-34 on the relationship between the two.
88Doody 2009 makes a compelling case for distancing Pliny’s HN from both ancient “enkyklios
paideia” (pp10-17) and modern encyclopedism (pp17-21), contra Carey 2003 and T. Murphy 2004
(but T. Murphy 2004: 11 acknowledges the risks of anachronism).
89For a provocative suggestion of another miscellanist being treated harshly in subsequent literature
in terms critical of her compositional methods, Mu¨ller-Reineke 2007. Cf Noctes 1.8.
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Gellius’s peculiar approach to relating the act of reading can be best understood in
the context of the public nature of Roman reading. I have suggested that a writer’s
decision to narrate and construct reading in terms of a personal cognitive activity
can often be identified as having some socially influenced concern for how reading is
being done.90 While public reading in the medieval monasteries allowed interpretive
norms to be maintained, at Rome, especially for a Roman influenced by philosophy’s
concern for self-improvement through critical reading, public reading posed a potential
threat: reading could be overly influenced by social demands, causing readers to react
to text superficially in order to seek social recognition, and so fail to focus critically on
it.91 Competition or fashions among readers might shift their priorities from actually
reading to appearing to read: a performance without substance that, unchecked, might
confer unearned authority. Gellius’s narratives of reading focus on the moment of
encounter with text, the moment before the public performance of that encounter,
challenging the reader to reflect on his or her own individual relationship with the
text. Reading will be performed for an audience, but it must first be performed for the
self, a reflexive approach Gellius enacts by self-consciously recalling his own reading.
Gellius’s mode of reading is a mix of Quintilian’s obsession with context and Plutarch’s
concern for philosophical self-improvement; it is also a rejection of what he casts as
Pliny’s superficiality in reading. Gellius raises the stakes for the marginalised personal
reaction to text. In a culture where text was frequently handled in the presence of
others, Gellius works with his reader to exclude that audience, modelling instead an
approach to text that is, at least in the interpretive moment, critical, self-aware, and
solitary.
90See Langlands 2008 on reading Valerius Maximus.
91Examples in Gellius have been discussed in previous chapters; the Younger Pliny is concerned with
disrespectful listeners at the recitatio, e.g. 1.13.
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3.2 Tales of Imperial readers (9.4)
Noctes 9.4 is a story of reading from Gellius’s past. It narrates the reading experience
from start to finish: seeing an appealing text, having various critical reactions to its
contents, and deciding what to do with those contents. It is thus a prime example
of Gellian reading narratives: here we have a story of youthful reading, told from the
perspective of maturity. But it is also ground zero for Gellius’s fraught relationship
with Pliny the Elder, as Gellius presents Pliny’s material as the work of other authors.
The article in fact demands a second reading in which the reading story can be seen not
as Gellius’s own experience but as an imagining of Pliny’s experience, a cruel parody
of the qualities of Plinian reading (and Gellius’s perception of it) seen in the Prefatory
material examined above.92 That second reading in turn breaks down and provides for
an alternative second reading in which Gellius satirizes his own critical tendencies and
challenges the reader’s ability to read critically.93
3.2.1 First reading (9.4)
The first reading of 9.4 finds a story that epitomizes the compositional method
highlighted in the Preface, with Gellius literally picking up some books while on the way
to do something else and finding in them something pleasing and worth remembering.
It is located in the past, on his trip home from Athens, and relates the complete act of
learning-from-reading: he is attracted to a book, and enjoys what he finds, only to find
in the reflective act of making excerpts that the books’ contents are not as worthwhile
92In this section, I hope my treatment of Gellius’s attitude toward Pliny will not be mistaken for
value judgments on my own part about Pliny’s work, which is worthy of equally exhaustive study in
its own right that would be well beyond the scope of this thesis. One fine work along those lines is the
PhD thesis of Lao 2008.
93The possibility and implications of multiple readings in ancient literature have been much-
examined since Winkler 1985 on Apuleius. It is an approach to reading, especially reading for edi-
fication, that Quintilian articulates at 10.1.21. Cf Gellius’s prescribed reading at Pr. 14-18, which
depends on consideration and reevaluation.
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as he thought. It is a tale of maturation: Gellius learns not to judge a book by its
external appearance, author or antiquity, but rather to withhold judgment until its
contents have been read and reflected on – and then to internalize and deploy those
contents judiciously.
The first part of the reading narrative is the reader’s appetite for books, in which
Gellius explores the various aesthetic responses that precede the opening of a text.
cum e Graecia in Italiam rediremus et Brundisium iremus egressique e naui in
terram in portu illo inclito spatiaremur, quem Q. Ennius remotiore paulum, sed
admodum scito uocabulo “praepetem” appellauit, fasces librorum uenalium expos-
itos uidimus. atque ego auide statim pergo ad libros.
When I was returning from Greece to Italy and came to Brundisium and – having
left the boat for dry land – was walking around in that famous harbour (which
Quintus Ennius, using a word that was a bit of a stretch but certainly apt, called
praepes), I saw exposed bundles of books for sale. And immediately I greedily
went straight for them. (9.4.1-2)
Two separate motifs are immediately put into play: the trip home from Athens
and the sale of books. 9.4 is set firmly in the past, at a different stage of maturity, as
opposed to other narratives of reading which purport to be dashed off at the moment of
encounter.94 Gellius’s Athenian study, although it gives the Noctes its title, accounts for
only 23 articles. In those scenes, he recalls first encounters with materials and activities
that define his authorial persona: Greek literature and philosophy, sympotic discourse,
the relationship between Greek and Latin culture, and the exposure of frauds.95 In
three articles, including 9.4, the return voyage symbolizes the successful acquisition
and initial deployment of that learning.96 Most notably, Noctes 19.1 shows how far he
has come from 1.2: instead of sitting silently in the background while an important
bit of Epictetus is read aloud in Greek (which he later transcribes into his notes), he
94Often signalled with a simple nunc or nuper, e.g. 2.13, 2.23, 2.24, 3.3, 7.4, 11.3, 12.6, 15.7, lending
a sense of emergent vividness. Cf. Plutarch, Sympotic Questions 8.4.3, where a professor of literature
introduces some material with something he recently read – but not the source, just its contents.
95Greek philosophy: 1.2, 17.20. Symposium: 17.8, 18.2, 18.13. Greek vs Latin: 2.21.
96In 16.6, still in Brundisium, he mocks an ignorant litterator, and 19.1 finds him learning philosophy
at sea, en route to Brundisium. See discussion above, p71.
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asks a philosopher a question and receives in response a copy of Epictetus, which he
reads on his own and then translates into Latin. In 9.4, signalling that he is on his way
home, Gellius establishes tension by raising a question: if he is not still the freshman
philosophy student of 17.20 who disregards his teacher’s instruction about attending
to substance over style (above, p71), how far towards the mature, confident authorial
persona has he yet come?
The motif of the book trade also makes this a venue for performance and evaluation.
Little other evidence exists for Brundisium as the site of a substantial book trade, and
as has been noted the sale Gellius encounters hardly seems institutional or permanent.
But environments in which books are bought and sold are, in Gellius and other authors,
environments in which literary authority is hotly contested.97 It is possible that any
book could be encountered there, an uncertainty which tests the breadth of knowledge
of a customer or grammaticus browsing the collection. Once a manuscript has been
selected for examination, depth of literary and grammatical knowledge are then put
into play to evaluate the worth of the text, either in terms of manuscript quality or the
merit of its contents.98 This dockside stall is not a proper bookstore, and no others are
present, but the stakes are similar for how Gellius behaves in the act of approaching
and acquiring the books.
erant autem isti omnes libri Graeci miraculorum fabularumque pleni, res in-
auditae, incredulae, scriptores ueteres non paruae auctoritatis: Aristeas Pro-
connesius et Isigonus Nicaeensis et Ctesias et Onesicritus et Polystephanus et
Hegesias; ipsa autem uolumina ex diutino situ squalebant et habitu aspectuque
taetro erant.
97E.g. Sulpicius Apollinaris vs the pseudoexpert in the bookstore, Noctes 18.4. Cf. 13.31. Galen
too has a formative bookstore experience: shopping incognito, he observers as one customer buys a
book attributed to Galen, only to have another (well-educated, Galen notes) customer examine the
style briefly and declare correctly that it could not be by Galen. This prompts Galen to compose a
catalogue of his books (On His Own Books, 8-9). The second customer proves his education by being
able to critically respond to the book’s stylistic qualities, rather than just read the label on it. White
2009 summarises evidence and approaches for bookstores in antiquity, and argues (284-5) for their
significance as a site of intellectual encounter.
98Cf. 5.4.
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But those books were all Greek, full of wonders and stories, things unheard-
of, incredible, old writers hardly lacking authority: Aristeas the Proconnesian,
Isigonus the Nicaean, Ctesias, Onesicritus, Polystephanus, and Hegesias; but the
volumes themselves were stiff from long disuse and were in a shocking appearance
and state. (9.4.3-4)
The description of the volumes is ambiguous, using terms with multiple possible
meanings. My translation here is intended to capture Gellius’s youthful, almost na¨ıve
first reaction, recalling earnestly the Preface, where the exhaustive rolling and unrolling
of volumes signifies the extent of his industry.99 If it is good for someone to unroll lots
of books, then it is also good for books to be unrolled by someone — yet here are books
by authoritative writers which have, it seems by their stiffness and dustiness, never
been unrolled, a quality Gellius, in his earnest bookishness, reacts instinctively to as
shameful.100
It then becomes his duty to rescue the neglected books and extract their valuable
contents.
accessi tamen percontatusque pretium sum et adductus mira atque insperata uilit-
ate libros plurimos aere pauco emo eosque omnis duabus proximis noctibus cursim
transeo; atque in legendo carpsi exinde quaedam et notaui mirabilia et scriptoribus
fere nostris intemptata eaque his commentariis aspersi, ut, qui eos lectitabit, is
ne rudis omnino et ἀνήκοος inter istiusmodi rerum auditiones reperiatur.
Still, I approached and inquired about the price and, led along by their wondrous
and unexpected cheapness, I bought a lot of books for a little money and ran
through them all quickly in the next two nights; and in reading, then, I harvested
certain things, and noted wonders and things unattempted by our writers, and I
scattered them about in these commentarii so that he who reads them will not
be found to be at all unskilled or “unlearned” during the hearing of that sort of
thing. (9.4.5)
The language remains ambiguous but still suggests earnest curiosity. Gellius is used to
books he thinks are valuable having a high cost, and so feels he has a bargain that these
are so cheap. His description of reading recalls his Preface exactly: he spent “nights”
99Pr. 4, .12.
100On the status of physical books, Dupont 2009; Noctes 1.19, 3.17, 7.17.
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writing, he “went over” the texts, and the “noted” things that seem to have appealed
to him. He is also attracted most to material that Roman authors have not yet tried
to write about.
Sticking out from this narrative, though, is a reminder of the didactic purpose behind
his authorial persona — not the younger Gellius whose adventures we are following, but
the older Gellius who is relating them to us.101 The final sentence of the above passage
is strikingly direct in reminding us that there is something serious to be gained from
this discussion, but also threateningly vague about what it is, using abstract language
of ignorance and unpreparedness and failing to explain exactly what “this sort” of
material is, or why the reader would need to be prepared for it. More unsettling still,
Gellius adds that he has “scattered” it throughout the Noctes. This bold interruption
from the authorial persona stands out in this reading and will continue to stand out as
we move deeper into the narrative layers.
Having armed the reader with questions that operate on different levels — in the
story being related, what did Gellius find in the books; in our present reading exper-
ience, what is the quality they have for which we need to be prepared? — Gellius
begins to relate “what sort of thing was written in the books” (9.4.6).102 It is the
standard stuff of paradoxography: cannibal Scythians, cyclopic Arimaspi, men whose
feet point backwards, white-haired Albanians and distant, fasting Sauromatae (9.4.6).
But immediately he interrupts to note that one thing he found written in those books,
he later read in Book 7 of Pliny’s HN, an interjection which appears to complicate
the claim that these tales were “unattempted” by Roman authors (9.4.7).103 Still the
tales pile on, “going beyond all bounds of wonder,” until finally Gellius has had enough
101Cf Keulen 2009: 202 for the force of this echo of “Gellius’s educational programme.”
102Erant igitur in illis libris scripta huiuscemodi. . .
103Id etiam in isdem libris scriptum offendimus, quod postea in libro quoque Plinii Secundi Naturalis
Historiae sepitmo legi, esse. . .
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(9.4.10).104
sed cum ea scriberemus, tenuit nos non idoneae scripturae taedium nihil ad or-
nandum iuuandumque usum uitae pertinentis. libitum tamen est in loco hoc mi-
raculorum notare id etiam, quod Plinius Secundus, uir in temporibus aetatis suae
ingenii dignitatisque gratia auctoritate magna praeditus, non audisse neque le-
gisse, sed scire sese atque uidisse in libro Naturalis Historiae septimo scripsit.
But while I was writing those things, I became exhausted by such improper
writings that in no way pertain to the enjoyment or practice of life. Nevertheless
it pleased me also to note in this collection of miracles something else, that Pliny,
a man furnished in his day with much authority on account of his mental ability
and his dignitas, wrote in Book 7 of his Natural History that he had not heard
or read but that he knew and had seen. (9.4.12-13)105
Gellius reveals that the discovery in 9.4 is not of interesting books but of the books’
true worth. His younger self, not paying enough attention to what he reads, reflects
on the text when it is almost too late, as he is already copying it into his personal
notes. The revelation destabilises the beginning of the passage, casting into doubt the
earnest excitement he recalls himself feeling, and making it clear that at least some
of the narrative of reading is intended ironically by its narrator. The books’ physical
condition of ugly filth in fact reflects the moral quality of their contents; their cheapness
(uilitas) is, in fact, worthlessness. In 9.4’s story of reading we find a clear depiction of
what it means to be carried away by one’s textual appetites, and of the insufficiently
critical reader. And that story has a happy ending: just as Gellius is journeying from
youthful study at Greece back to his adult life at Rome, so he has come in this story
from old Greek paradoxography to a recent Roman scholar who is making what sounds
like a more plausible claim.
Gellius has shown himself learning to be a self-aware reader in a way that encourages
his own reader to greater self-awareness. By telling a tale of earlier reading from the
perspective of a more learned later self, he suggests a view of reading which always has
104Iam uero hoc egreditur omnem modum admirationis, quod. . . . Egreditur may recall egressi from
9.4.1, in Gellius’s curiously over-narrated departure from the ship, although to what purpose is unclear.
105For the response related in the moment of textual encounter (cum ea scribemus), e.g. 2.12.2,
2.23.1-3, 3.3.7, 3.4, 4.13, 4.14, 7.2, 12.15, 13.19.2, 15.8 (cf 11.8.4).
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one eye toward that future self, a conscientiousness that may stand in place of an actual
social audience to one’s reading. The reader considers everything not just in terms of
how it might be used, but also in terms of whether it is worth the attention he or she is
presently giving it, and how he or she will remember this act of reading in the future.
But Gellius is not done with the wonder-stories. He has confessed to one act of
deception in his narrative: he has revealed that his description of the dirty old books
was meant figuratively, not literally. But he has also destabilised his characterisation
of Pliny: he contradicted himself in declaring the wonder stories were “unattempted”
by Roman authors, as he admits he saw some in Pliny. He also has praised Pliny,
who nonetheless included some of the material he criticised. Gellius’s opinion of Pliny,
in other words, is unclear — the kind of ambiguity he encourages his readers in Pr.
14-18 to resolve by consideration, investigation, and consulting his sources. He has
even given a citation for his readers to follow: Book 7 of the HN.106 While it may seem
solipsistic to suggest an ancient reading model that so closely mirrors a modern scholarly
strategy, it is this quality that makes Gellius’s treatment of reading unique: he writes
about reading in order to encourage it in his reader, and positions his work not as the
final say on a topic but as the jumping-off point for his reader’s own consideration.107
Gellius’s ancient reader should, at the end of 9.4, be curious and confused about the
overt performance of reading it contains, and to better understand that performance
be inclined not only to reread 9.4 but to consider its source: Book 7 of Pliny’s Natural
History.
1069.4.7, .13, .16
107Cameron 2004 on citation in ancient literature. Contra Rust 2009: 64-77, not only does Gellius
specifically instruct his reader to following citations, but often offers a citation to a specific volume
and enough of a topical keyword to enable skimming (cf Whiteley 1978: 108).
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3.2.2 Second reading (9.4)
The reader who dutifully consults Book 7 of Pliny will find virtually all of the
material Gellius claimed to have from the Greek books, in the same order and, generally,
attributed to the same authors. Gellius’s wholesale criticism of the stories, combined
with his reminders that they are to be found in Pliny, implicate Pliny in the sort of
failure Gellius only barely saved himself from. The relationship between Gellius 9.4 and
Pliny 7.8ff has been long debated, but Gellius is clearly equally familiar with both Pliny
and some earlier Greek versions.108 The stakes of the reading-story have thus changed.
Gellius is concerned not with his own youthful reading of Greek books, but with Pliny’s
reading of the same: the story is this not of his own actual experiences, but rather a
parody of Pliny’s, a re-performance of Pliny’s reading. Pliny 7 is the product of Pliny’s
own motivation and methods as a reader, and Gellius imagines what that process was
like for Pliny as a way of critiquing his qualifications as a miscellanist. The story we
must now look for in 9.4, then, is the story of Pliny’s reading, as told by Gellius.
Gellius’s attraction to the Greek volumes, which as we saw in the first reading was
enthusiastically reported and later ironised, now recalls the end of Pliny’s introduction
to Book 7. To the younger Gellius, the books had authority by virtue of their age,
and value by virtue of their Greekness, a perspective he later recanted when he realised
108Nettleship 1883: 398-9 believes Gellius and Pliny shared common sources, but sees the debate
essentially in terms of modern plagiarism. More recently, Holford-Strevens 2003: 70f has argued
convincingly that Gellius has consulted both Pliny and some form of at least one of the Greek authors.
Nettleship’s sympathy for Gellius aside, the two ideas — that Gellius has read Pliny, and that Gellius
has also read Aristeas et al — are far from mutually exclusive. Even if Gellius has done the legwork
of consulting the other authors, the one-to-one correspondence in subject matter between Noctes 9.4
and HN 7.9-26 has yet to be adequately explained, which this discussion aims to address. Keulen
2009: 200-1 takes the obviousness of the relationship for granted, but is interested only in what is
here termed the first reading; in his reading, the fiction emerges by the end of the story, activating a
“subtle way of humiliating a predecessor” by implying that it was the HN that Gellius really bought.
Keulen holds that the act of purchasing a text is inherently disrespectful. But Keulen does not make
clear how the full extent of the fiction is meant to be detected by the reader, nor is this interpretation
of the book trade motif reconciled with the other bookstore scenes in Gellius. Cf Rust 2009: 195,
Lindermann 2006: 120-52.
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the contents were worthless. But that judgment that Gellius disavows is earnestly
proclaimed by Pliny as he prepares his reader to hear some amazing-sounding things:
nec tamen ego in plerisque eorum obstringam fidem meam, potiusque ad auctores
relegabo qui dubiis reddentur omnibus, modo ne sit fastidio Graecos sequi tanto
maiore eorum diligentia uel cura uetustiore.
Nevertheless I shall not implicate my own credibility in many of these, but will
rather refer them to the authorities who will be cited for anything doubtful, only
let us not scorn to follow the Greeks whose diligence is as much greater as their
work is more antique. (HN 7.8)
Gellius has grown out of a taste for old Greek books that Pliny never lost. Moreover,
Gellius’s reading of the books, once he has them in hand, can now be read as recalling
both his critique of Pliny and his indiscriminate ilk and specifically Pliny’s own famously
sleepless persona:
. . . eosque omnis duabus proximis noctibus cursim transeo.
. . . and I skimmed through all of them hastily during the next two nights. (9.4.5)109
A haste that at first suggested urgency now suggests reading without attention to detail,
or – as Gellius put it in his Preface – sine cura discriminis (Pr. 11). And Gellius’s
noctes are now not the noctes of the Noctes but the noctes of Pliny’s own Preface:
nec dubitamus multa esse quae et nos praeterierint; homines enim sumus et oc-
cupati officiis, subsiciuisque temporibus ista curamus, id est nocturnis, ne quis
uestrum putet his cessatum horis. dies uobis impendimus, cum somno ualetu-
dinem conputamus, uel hoc solo praemio contenti quod, dum ista (ut ait M. Varro)
muginamur, pluribus horis uiuamus: profecto uita uigilia est.
Nor do I doubt that there is much that has escaped me; for I’m only human
and occupied with duties, and I work on these things in spare time, that is the
nighttime, lest any of your people should think I am not putting in full hours. I
devote my days to you, and I work out enough sleep for health, indeed content
with just this reward: that, while I am dallying (as Varro said) with these things,
I am living extra hours: for certainly, staying up all night is being alive. (HN Pr.
18)
109And the use of noctes recalls the title of the work, alerting us to high-stakes performance of
authorship.
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If the lucubratory motif serves to turn the writer’s private domestic work space into
a scene for performance, Gellius here has broken into Pliny’s house and set himself
up in the earlier writer’s study, using Pliny’s proud vigilia as a focal point for his
criticism.110 Gellius here suggests that Pliny may have been “wakeful” but was far
from “watchful.”111 It is a criticism he levels more explicitly at Pliny elsewhere, in
Noctes 9.16, where he describes Pliny’s oratorical work. The book and its author are
introduced in highly ambiguous terms – Pliny was thought to be the most learned of his
age, the book contains much to “delight the learned,” things Pliny regarded as clever
or skilful (9.16.1, 3-4) – before a more direct critique is levelled: a rather obvious (to
Gellius’s mind) error escaped Pliny’s notice entirely (fugit autem Plinium. . . , 9.16.7).
Pliny’s reputation and authorial credibility are indicted equally: he mistook good things
he read or heard for bad, and his readers mistook indiscriminate accumulation for
learnedness.112
Gellius’s authorial interjection that he “harvested” and “scattered” the wonder-
stories remains ambiguous and confusing in this reading (9.4.5).113 Although the links
between the two passage clearly signal that Gellius’s morality tale is meant as a satire
of Plinian methodology, the claim that he aspersi such stories throughout the com-
mentarii of the Noctes raises the prospect that other ironically viewed material may
be presented elsewhere without the context of a cautionary tale to signal that irony.
110For the lucubratory motif inviting readers into the writer’s study, Ker 2004. Cf Noctes Pr.10:
. . . prope etiam subrustice ex ipso loco ac tempore hibernarum vigiliarum Atticas Noctes inscripsimus.
111The story of 9.4’s first reading also featured Gellius’s observation that the stories he was noting
down were intemptata by Roman authors, which seems clearly to mean that Roman authors had
not undertaken the project of writing about them. Reading Pliny 7 reveals that not to be the case.
Although there is little evidence of intemptatus being used in a sense other than that of making the
effort to do something, its root, tempto, can clearly be used to refer to testing something’s quality or
experimenting with it (OLD). Indeed Pliny several times seems to come close to this sense in referring
to man’s infinite curiosity in experimenting with nature (HN 25.1, 34.171). It is thus tempting to read
Gellius’s intemptata as a dig at Pliny for not evaluating the substance of his material more thoroughly,
but absent better attestations of the word being used in this sense it is not a point I wish to press.
112Cf. Gunderson 2009: 182-3.
113. . . atque in legendo carpsi exinde quaedam et notai. . . .
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The understanding that Gellius is condemning all of the material as worthless evokes a
more unpleasant sense of aspergo; perhaps Gellius is confessing to having “defiled” his
commentarii with the stories.114 His challenge to readers to prove themselves neither
rudes nor ἀνήκοοι is likewise still unclear: now that they have seen such stories, what
is the correct response? This forceful but vague assertion of authorial intent continues
to serve as a reference point for the reader’s search for meaning in the passage.
In a second reading that sees Gellius’s parody of Pliny at work, it’s clear that he has
reworked and occasionally expanded the substance of the wonder-stories, unable to res-
ist adding his own touches but also taking the occasional dig at Pliny’s presentation.115
Gellius collapses the story of the cannibal Scythians, which occupies Pliny 7.9-10, into
one sentence, and transfers the Greek word for cannibal from 7.11, where it forms part
of Pliny’s transition to a new topic, to the list of facts about the Scythians.116 Several
of the authors of the purported Greek volumes are present, underscoring the similarity
between Gellius’s bookbuying experience and the one he imagines for Pliny.117 And
the tribe that lives on scent alone, the statement of whose existence Gellius declared
“beyond the limits of wonder,” is placed by Pliny “at the outer limits of India” (HN
7.25).
Finally, then, the second reading of 9.4 comes to Gellius’s description of Pliny which
had appeared positive in light of the implied contrast between his eyewitness accounts
of miracles and the tediously vague, tradition-sourced tales of old Greek books. Now,
though, its ambiguity is collapsed in a different direction.
. . . Plinius Secundus, uir in temporibus aetatis suae ingenii dignitatisque gratia
114Aspergo appears harmlessly in 1.7 and derisively in 13.20, and in 17.21 again refers ambiguously
to Gellius adding material to his Noctes.
115Anderson 2004: 108-13 discusses more high-profile examples of Gellius trying his hand at a tale
someone else has told (Noctes 5.14, 16.19).
116HN 7.11: Super alios autem Anthropophagous Scythas. . . . Noctes 9.4.6: Scythas illos penitissimos,
qui sub ipsis septentrionibus aetatem agunt, corporibus hominum uesci eiusque uictus alimento uitam
ducere et ἀνθροpiοφάγους nominari.
117Aristeas is cited at 7.10, Isigonus at 7.12, and Ctesias at 7.23.
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auctoritate magna praeditus. . . .
. . . Pliny, a man endowed with great authority in his day on account of his char-
acter and his official dignity. . . . (9.4.13)
Auctoritas is what has been at stake in this chapter: the auctoritas of the purported
Greek authors was revealed as only surface-deep, and now Pliny’s is revealed as inap-
propriate. His character and career notwithstanding, he acquitted himself no better
in these wonder stories than did their original authors, or Gellius’s fictional younger
version of himself. Gellius emphasizes that the authority was bestowed on Pliny in
the past for one reason, but the tendentious nature of authority is such that now it
should perhaps be revoked. And the larger Plinian scholastic project is at stake: the
story’s fictional setting of the journey from Greece to Rome, previously cast simply as
the story of maturity, now becomes a more pointed veiled criticism of Pliny’s inability
to effectively import Greek learning into his Roman work.118 Pliny’s authority is as
conditional as his reputation in Noctes 9.16: unjustified by his actual abilities, and
mistakenly attributed by an undiscerning public.
In its second reading, then, 9.4 is a satirical performance of another’s reading in
which Gellius dons a Pliny-mask and then pretends to read carelessly and misguidedly.
His version of Pliny only wants to acquire material, and does not care about its quality,
nor the effect that storehouse of material will have on its reader. But Gellius has
already declared himself an unreliable narrator in this matter, and the donning of a
mask demands scrutiny of the mask itself. Indeed, the emphasis in Gellius’s rhetoric
and implied criticism on inattentive and misguided reading should focus attention even
more directly on his source material, and a closer look at Pliny will demand another
reading of the passage.
118Cf Keulen 2009: 202: “Gellius invites us to see the works of his rivals and the disgustingly trashy
books from Greece as amounting to the same thing.”
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3.2.3 Another second reading (9.4)
If the first reading of 9.4 is Gellius’s story of his own textual encounter in youth,
and the second reading is his story of Pliny’s general approach, the alternative second
reading is the story the reader is encouraged to tell about his or her own reading of
the passage. Gellius’s parody of Pliny has its own problems which accumulate to the
point of self-parody. In a text which plays with themes of attention, reflection and
critical evaluation, the reader is encouraged to examine the text again and observe his
or her own reaction to it. There is, of course, a satisfying smugness in the critical pose
Gellius adopts both for his youthful self and in his judgment of Pliny. But literary
attack can tempt the critic to excess, as Gellius well knows, and so the reader who
pays close attention both to Gellius and to Pliny will find that the former’s satire of
the latter’s flaws has its own systematic flaws that present a sort of self-satire. It
turns out that Gellius is not condemning Pliny or the wondrous stories entirely; he is
presenting a sort of morality tale about the dangers they represent both to the curious
reader and to the critical scholar.119 This morality tale emerges from the coexistence of
both “second readings.” The role of zealous critic, especially of rivals and predecessors,
is one Gellius adopts from time to time in the Noctes. He shows his awareness of
its potential to burnish his own authority, as well as its pitfalls of error and zeal,
over the course of his seven engagements with the grammatical miscellanist and rival
writer-of-readings Caesellius Vindex.120 Like Pliny’s HN, Vindex’s title appears in
Gellius’s list of works in the Preface.121 Gellius presents Vindex’s work as one his
reader is likely to encounter but should approach with caution because of its many
flaws — flaws that place Caesellius Vindex at the intersection of the poor reader and
119Cf Keulen 2009: 199ff.
1202.16, 3.16, 6.2, 9.14, 11.15, 18.11, 20.2. See Holford-Strevens 2003: 167-8. Anderson 1994: 1857
sees no self-awareness in Gellius’s treatment of Vindex, or indeed of Pliny in 9.4, a reading which seems
based on an understanding of Gellius as something like a modern scholar.
121. . . alius Antiquarum Lectionum. . . .
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the poor teacher.122 Vindex lacks any evidence to support his claims, is unable to read
antique Latin, fails to discuss interesting questions, has poor taste and is inattentive,
and lacks sufficient knowledge of Latin vocabulary.123 Gellius begins one pointed attack
on Vindex’s readerly attentiveness by acknowledging that his target is a common one:
turpe erratum offendimus in illis celebratissimis Commentariis Lectionum Anti-
quarum Caeselli Vindicis, hominis hercle pleraque haut indiligentis. quod erratum
multos fugit, quamquam multa in Caesellio reprehendendo etiam per calumnias
rimarentur.
I encountered a disgraceful error in those celebrated Commentarii on Ancient
Readings by Caesellius Vindex, a man certainly not very careless at all. This
error has escaped the notice of many, although much earth has been overturned
in the effort to catch Caesellius in an error — even through misrepresentation.
(6.2.1-2)
Gellius goes on here to criticize Vindex for evaluating a usage of Ennius based on a
misreading of its grammatical context. On another occasion, he takes another critic of
Vindex to task – perhaps one of the people he has in mind in the above passage – and
in so doing condemns both Vindex for failing to ask the right question about the word
errabundus and his critic for failing to notice that particular failure on Vindex’s part
(11.15). What emerges clearly from the Vindex articles is an awareness on Gellius’s
part that the act of criticizing other scholars — writers who may have earned their
authority through scholastic accomplishment or other fame but who will never have
the antique authority that the Republican authors do — is highly competitive and
tempts the overzealous critic to error (as in the case of Vindex’s critics).124 It is that
pose of overzealous critic that the third reading of 9.4 finds Gellius taking, as a closer
examination of his use of Pliny 7.9-26 reveals that he has thoroughly misrepresented
the target of his satire.
122Caesellius is a grammaticus at Noctes 18.11.
123In 2.16.6, Caesellius makes a claim but auctorem idoneum nullum nominat. In 3.16.11 he misreads
an archaic term.
124Cf 6.3.22, and Sluiter 2000: 202 on ancient ideals of commentary: “The commentator is duty-
bound to give an optimal representation of his source-text [. . . ].”
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Gellius highlighted several errors in his performance of Pliny’s reading of Greek
books, none of which are actually borne out in an attentive reading of Pliny. He em-
phasized the eagerness with which he sought material and the inattention to quality
that resulted; he represented an unhealthy fondness for old Greek works; and he at-
tributed the stories to the vagueness of memory and tradition rather than to specific
sources. The hasty copying which results in 9.4 omits careful and detailed discussion of
each wondrous fact on Pliny’s part; the men with the backwards feet, for example, are
located in a specific valley with its own name and are ascribed to a near-autopsy source,
who provides not only notes on their physiology but also an explanation of why they
were rarely encountered (HN 7.11). Gellius has also passed over wondrous tales that
implicate a Roman source in their transmission, such as the various people who can res-
ist and control snakes; Varro is the corroborating source for one story (HN 7.13). In the
case of the African tribes who have the evil eye, Cicero “is an authority among us” for
a related phenomenon, and some miraculous people are actually located in Italy, near
Rome (HN 7.18, 19). Despite Gellius’s depiction, the wondrous phenomena are both
close at hand and discussed by Roman authors; moreover, Pliny is equally aware of and
interested in such Roman treatments, and in the rest of the HN, is aggressively critical
of Greek sources even as he reluctantly consults them.125 Finally, Pliny is consistently
precise where Gellius is dismissively vague: the Albanians’ peculiarities of hair and
vision are traditum esse memoratumque in Gellius, are sourced specifically to Isogonus
by Pliny (Noctes 9.4.6, HN 7.12). Isogonus and Nymphodorus are both cited for the
magical tribes of Africa, which Gellius places in “those same books” (Noctes 9.4.7, HN
7.15-16). And Megasthenes is Pliny’s source for some people Gellius reads of in “those
writers” (Noctes 9.4.10, HN 7.25). In his actual reading as represented in Book 7, then,
125Beagon 1992: 119-20 would read HN 7.8, Pliny’s introductory appeal to Greek authority, as thus
disingenuous; Pliny’s reader should presumably not be willing too long to forget the text’s domin-
ant view of Greek authors as unreliable and mendacious. Beagon 1992: 18-21 summarises Pliny’s
ambivalent relationship with his Greek sources.
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Pliny is more careful, discriminating, and detailed than Gellius’s rendition suggests. It
is up to Gellius’s reader to make this comparison and find that Gellius’s critique, as
laid out in the initial second reading, does not represent a simple judgment of Pliny’s
treatment of such material. In writing and re-writing the reading and re-reading that
attends such problematic text, he explores the relationship between desire, reading and
knowledge.
This exploration is extended into the Noctes ’s paratext: the reader’s own desire
is brought into play by Gellius’s table of contents. There, 9.4 is advertised in much
the same terms that Gellius’s youthful/Plinian persona perceived the supposed Greek
books:
de barbararum gentium prodigiosis miraculis; deque diris et exitiosis effascina-
tionibus; atque inibi de feminis repente uersis in mares.
Concerning wonderful marvels of barbarian peoples; and concerning cruel and
deadly bewitchments; and then concerning women changed unexpectedly into
men. (cap.9.4)
Gellius’s reader, who may well be attracted by this incomplete advertisement of 9.4’s
contents — Gellius tells us here what may be quaeri, but hardly what will be inveniri126
— is thus made a character in the same sort of story that 9.4 tells.127 It is the tale of
a reader who is drawn to “wonderful” text and thus must identify its true quality (on
guard against “sorceries,” a Plinianism128) before it is too late is thus brought in a full
circle from Gellius, through Pliny, and back to the reader, who may well have sought
out this passage based on that description.129 As I have shown, the passage contains
those facts — but more substantially, it contains a discourse about the reading of those
126Cf Pr.25.
127It is not unreasonable to be attracted to wonders, as long as they are authorised or put to the
test: 3.6, 9.7.
128Pliny speaks of effascinationes, a kind of sorcery projected by the gaze, at HN 19.50, 28.22, 37.145.
129Goldhill 2009: 97 writes of the “chain of books” in reading of Libanius reading Demosthenes, as
compared to the “chain of song” of hearing Homer sing of Achilles singing of earlier heroes. We might
say Noctes 9.4 conjures a chain of desirous reading.
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facts. Gellius, by performing for his reader various readings of Pliny, repurposes Pliny’s
own content in a way that recalls the changing status of sexually ambiguous individuals:
idem Plinius in eodem libro uerba haec scripsit: “gignuntur homines utriusque
sexus, quos ‘hermaphroditos’ uocamus, olim ‘androgynos’ uocatos et in prodigiis
habitos, nunc uero in deliciis.”
That same Pliny in that same book wrote these words: “Humans are born of
both sexes, whom we call ‘hermaphrodites’ and once upon a time were called
‘androgynes;’ they used to be considered wonders, but now indeed are considered
pleasures.” (9.4.16)
What was “wonderful” when we turned to this passage, following the Table of Contents,
has also become pleasurable, and pleasure in reading is dangerous.130 Gellius has deftly
navigated that hazard, and offered the reader an exercise in doing the same. His
narratives of reading draw out the moment of encounter with text, offering within each
reading a spectrum of reaction from attraction to disgust or satisfaction to doubt.
To read something, in 9.4, is to process it, to work over it and think about where
it came from and what it might be for. And while Pliny remains “the same Pliny”
throughout, Gellius shows his ability to shuﬄe masks at will and become a different
kind of reader as the situation demands.131
3.2.4 More of the same (10.12)
10.12 offers a useful point of comparison for 9.4: it employs many of the same
devices, to similar ends, but in a different form. Unlike 9.4, it is structured as a critical
essay rather than a tale of reading, but like 9.4 it uses a seriocomic attack on Pliny
the writer to make a more nuanced point about Pliny the reader. Again Gellius uses
citations to the passage in Pliny he is criticizing to direct his reader to that passage, the
130For Keulen 2009: 201, the reference to ambiguously gendered persons can only be a dig at Fa-
vorinus.
131He has also fully subsumed Pliny into his own miscellaneous programme. Praepes in 9.4.1 is
an explicit reference to Noctes 7.6, and Henry 1994: 1930 notes the way the end of 9.4 overlaps
thematically with the beginning of 9.5.
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consultation of which reveals Gellius’s own critical rhetoric to be a playful subversion of
Pliny’s; and it is in resolving the conflict presented by this duplicity that the reader finds
Gellius’s real criticism.132 10.12 differs from 9.4 in one important respect: where in 9.4
the offending knowledge was superficially wondrous but in fact worthless, 10.12 gestures
to wonder that may prove insubstantial but that also may hide further complexity. In
this section we will see how Gellius explores the problem of readerly encounter through
the intertwined concepts of magic and mechanism, falsehood and fiction.
Pliny stands accused by Gellius of slander by means of poor judgment. 10.12 high-
lights several wondrous ideas about the chameleon which Pliny attributes to Demo-
critus; these things, Gellius says, inspire wonder (admiratio) but are characterised by
lack of substance (uanitas) and are not worthy (dignum) of Democritus. The essay
begins by relating Pliny’s own claim of having read the book, and contrasts Pliny’s
response to reading Democritus with Gellius’s to reading Pliny.
librum esse Democriti, nobilissimi philosophorum, de ui et natura chamaeleontis
eumque se legisse Plinius Secundus in Naturalis Historiae uicesimo octavo refert
multaque uana atque intoleranda auribus deinde quasi a Democrito scripta tradit,
ex quibus pauca haec inuiti meminimus, quia pertaesum est:
That there is a book on the force and nature of the chameleon by Democritus, the
most noble of philosophers, and that he had read it himself, is asserted by Pliny
Secundus in the twenty-eighth book of his Natural History ; and then he relates
to our ears many insubstantial and unbearable things, as if they were written
by Democritus, from which I remembered these few things, unwillingly, because
they exhausted/disgusted me: (10.12.1)133
This characterisation of Pliny’s method recalls the Pliny evoked in 9.4: he read a book
and immediately excerpted and wrote down what he found in it, despite its lack of value.
The effect on the reader, just as described in Gellius’s Preface, is one of exhaustion and
disgust (pertaesum est). And yet Gellius has remembered a few of them; it emerges
that he had a reason for this, but it also suggests that the material had some sort of
132Cf Gunderson 2009: 183-4.
133Cf. 4.13.3
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sticking power that lodged it in his brain even though he knew better.
After relating two of these assertions about the chameleon, Gellius comes to a point
where he struggles to reconcile his desire to continue with the obvious flaws in the
material he is relating (in a way that recalls 9.4.12’s mid-composition epiphany).
item aliud, quod hercle an ponerem dubitaui, — ita est deridiculae uanitatis —
nisi idcirco plane posui, quod oportuit nos dicere, quid de istiusmodi admirationum
fallaci inlecebra sentiremus, qua plerumque capiuntur et ad perniciem elabuntur
ingenia maxime sollertia eaque potissimum, quae discendi cupidiora sunt. sed
redeo ad Plinium.
Also there’s another, which by God I wasn’t sure whether I should include — it
is of such ridiculous insubstantiality — unless, therefore, I make it clear that I
ought to say what I think about the false allure of such wonders by which the most
skilled minds, who above all desire the acquisition of knowledge, are captivated
and so sink into ruin. But back to Pliny. (10.12.4-5)
Pliny is criticised for failing a fundamental test of his ability as a reader.134 Gellius
implies that despite his keen mind, he has ruined himself in repeating tales of such
laughable uanitas, having been led astray by wonder. Inlecebra, the quality Gellius
attributes to “such wonders,” is a highly ambiguous phenomenon, describing the kind
of appeal that bypasses the conscious mind and speaks directly to appetites. This
makes it a powerful rhetorical device in the right hands, but also a dangerous one for
the disingenuous or malicious.135 It can mix with pleasure for effects both good and
bad, but more significantly it poses a challenge to those who encounter it: a question
might have the necessary inlecebra to distract a troubled mind, but one philosopher —
significantly, Democritus himself — blinded himself to free his mind from the inlecebrae
of vision for the purposes of contemplation.In this case, Gellius is speaking of a false
inlecebra which is an aspect of wonders – they entice and allure the part of the mind
that is interested in knowledge and novelty, but being false or absurd, will disappoint
134Cf Gunderson 2009: 183. Gellius’s redeo ad Plinium should be read as sarcastic (Gunderson 2009:
184). We might even silently supply rideo for redeo.
135See discussion of inlecebra above, p46.
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upon conscious examination.136 Moreover, it is not a noun such as scientia that Pliny
is here “desirous” of, but the gerund discendum — the act of learning. The sense of this
critique, then is, that Pliny is addicted to the encounter with new knowledge, seduced
by his appetites but never reflective. Gellius laughs at the lack of substance of these
things, but Pliny never got past the wonder.
And so it is that Gellius relates the invisibility potion that prompted the whole
outburst.
sed redeo ad Plinium. sinistrum pedem ait chamaeleontis ferro ex igni calefacto
torreri cum herba. . . .
But back to Pliny. He says that the left foot of the chameleon is roasted with an
iron heated from the fire, with an herb. . . . (10.12.5)
With ait, Gellius’s judgment on the source of the lies is clear: not only could they not
be Democritean, but it is Pliny who is responsible for their marvelousness. Pliny has
written them, and then unwisely attributed them to Democritus.
his portentis atque praestigiis a Plinio Secundo scriptis non dignum esse cogno-
men Democriti puto; uel illud quale est, quod idem Plinius in decimo libro Demo-
critum scripsisse adseuerat aues quasdam esse certis uocabulis et earum auium
confuso sanguine gigni serpentem; eum si quis ederit, linguas auium et conloquia
interpretaturum.
I find the name of Democritus to be unworthy of these portents and tricks written
by Pliny; and of the same nature is the fact that Pliny likewise seriously declares in
his 10th book that Democritus wrote that certain birds have their own language,
and that a serpent is born from the mingled blood of those birds; and if anyone
eats it, he will understand the languages and speech of birds. (10.12.6)
Again all the blame for these shameful assertions is put on Pliny, who destroys his
credibility as a reader by claiming they were written by Democritus. The implication
seems to be that Pliny should have known better because the stories were uana and
not dignum, but he attributed them to the philosopher anyway. Gellius reflects sadly
136Suitably for the games Gellius is playing with Pliny’s problematic content, 15.2 discusses the
training by which the philosophical student can be exposed in small amounts to inlecebra in order to
learn to resist it. (Cf 14.5.)
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that such slander of Democritus is common, but promises to offer a comparison of sorts,
both in terms of the substance of a wondrous tale and the scrutiny of its teller.
multa autem uidentur ab hominibus istis male sollertibus huiuscemodi commenta
in Democriti nomen data nobilitatis auctoritatisque eius perfugio utentibus. sed
id, quod Archytam Pythagoricum commentum esse atque fecisse traditur, neque
minus admirabile neque tamen uanum aeque uideri debet.
But it seems many lies (commenta) of this sort have been attributed to Demo-
critus by those men who are wickedly ingenious, using the refuge of his nobility
and authority. But that thing which Archytas the Pythagorean is said to have
devised (commentum est) and made ought to seem no less wondrous, but not at
all as insubstantial. (10.12.8-9)
Archytas, it seems, constructed a simulacrum of a dove with such mechanical ingenuity
that it actually flew — and the story has the authority of many noble Greeks as well
as the diligent researcher Favorinus, whose words Gellius directly quotes.
It is on this tale that 10.12 hinges. As Gellius moves from Pliny et al ’s slander of
Democritus to Favorinus et al ’s amazing-but-true tale of Archytas’s dove, he activates
the double meaning of the word commentum. Commentum and comminiscor can refer
both to the contrivance of a device or scheme and to the fabrication of a lie or the per-
petration of a deception.137 The pun is impossible to reproduce in English, although
the word “device,” in its literal and figurative senses, comes close. Pliny and others
ascribed various lies/devices to Democritus, but Archytas made an actual device — a
device, moreover, that has the appearance of a real thing on account of its ingenious
construction. One kind of creative ingenuity (coming up with lies to attribute to au-
thorities) is compared to another (crafting a mechanical image of a real thing). This
use of ambiguous language to discuss the ambiguity of invention should be a reminder
of 9.4’s duplicity: the way literal descriptions became figurative, the way fictional books
became other, real ones, and the way the commentarius notes became a very different
kind of commentary. And with 9.4 in mind, the reader will be inclined to follow the
137OLD s.v. commentum, comminiscor.
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references Gellius provides to books 28 and 10 of Pliny’s HN.
Comparison of Gellius’s attack with its target reveals an approach identical to that
of 9.4, in which Gellius pretends to have carelessly misinterpreted Pliny in a way that
can hardly be an accident. In the first reading of the essay, he argued that Pliny had
been seduced by wondrous but uana tales into mindlessly ascribing them to Democritus,
of whom they were not dignum. It turns out, however, that Pliny objected strenuously
to Democritus’s chameleon magic, on exactly the same terms that Gellius criticised
him. Pliny smirks at Democritus for finding such a thing dignum of its own book, and
notes the pleasure with which he was able to see the lies of Greek uanitas revealed
therein.
. . . priusque chameleonem peculiare uolumine dignum existimatum Democrito ac
per singula membra desecratum, non sine magna uoluptate nostra cognitis prod-
itisque mendaciis Graecae uanitatis.
. . . first, the chameleon, which was thought by Democritus to be worthy of its own
volume, dedicated to each part of the body; and the lies of Greek emptiness were
examined by and revealed to me with considerable pleasure on my part. (HN
28.112)
The charge with which Gellius began his indictment of Pliny is the same with which
Pliny begins his indictment of Democritus. Indeed, Pliny is eager to distance himself
from many of these assertions. The chameleon’s ability to pull the hawk out of the sky,
which Gellius attributes to Pliny, is qualified by Pliny with a distancing traditur.138
Likewise the recipe for making rain by roasting the chameleon with oak is disavowed:
Democritus narrat. And it is at this point that Pliny, like Gellius, interrupts himself to
object to the content of the material and explain why he is including it.
reliqua ad ueneficia pertinentia quae dicit, quamquam falsa existimantes, omit-
temus praeterquam ubi inrisu coarguendum.
138Pliny HN 28.113: detrahere nim superuolantem ad se traditur et uoluntarium praebere lacerandum
ceteris animalibus. Cf. 9.4, where Gellius cast specific citations by Pliny as vague and insubstantial.
I have no good explanation for Gellius’s use of auibus where Pliny says animalibus in the tale of the
hawk.
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The rest of what he says, pertaining to sorcery, although I find it to be false, I
shall omit except where it needs to be refuted through ridicule. (HN 28.114)
The verbal similarities in the two sets of critical rhetoric are impossible to ignore,
and need to be reconciled with Gellius’s clear misrepresentation. Gellius, of course,
had decried the deridicula uanitas of this same material which Pliny seeks to refute
inrisu. Pliny continues to distance himself, qualifying the absurd invisibility potion
with a si credimus and, at the passage on birds and languages, noting that you need
to be gullible enough to believe in the Sirens to believe what Democritus tradit.139
Pliny also emphasises his critical judgment with existimantes, countering Democritus’s
judgment that the topic was worth its own volume at all. In short, Gellius has criticized
Pliny for failing to be critical; but Pliny is critical, and in exactly the same terms as
Gellius is critical of him. As with Noctes 9.4 and book 7 of Pliny, Gellius’s criticism is
undermined by the reality of the text he is criticizing.
At stake in 10.12 is thus once again the point of encounter with text. Gellius, on
first reading, lambasts Pliny for his inability to correctly handle the volatile force that is
inlecebra, and his confused priorities which cause him to prize the act of learning more
than knowledge itself, both of which implicate him in a long tradition of transmitting
bad knowledge. Gellius’s Pliny is, as Gunderson says, “part of the problem. Gellius’s
keen eye for genuine antiquities provides the solution.”140 But Pliny is not so bad
a reader; in fact, he has emphasised his own encounters with the text, highlighting
his scepticism and scrutiny. This discourse on attention orbits around a simple duality
Gellius provides: the difference between how something appears (wonderful) and how it
actually is (insubstantial. . . or true?).141 The way to see beyond a wondrous appearance
is through careful examination: we know that the tale of Archytas’s dove is true because
139Pliny HN 10.137.
140Gunderson 2009: 184.
141Noctes 10.12.9.
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Favorinus has done his research. This then is a challenge to the reader about his or
her own encounter with Gellius’s account, and whether the author’s deception will be
detected. Of course, alternative approaches cannot be discounted: that Gellius has
not sought so much to deceive as to sloppily appropriate. A certain amount of charity
may be required to entertain the possibility that this is not “plagiarism”; but in light
of Gellius’s persistent self-reflexiveness and explicit discussion of the reading strategies
involved, 10.12’s critique of a poor reader demands to be examined for its own performed
reading abilities. Gellius’s account elides the distance between wondrous knowledge and
an account of one’s reading of wondrous knowledge: both, in their own way, are to be
critically read.
3.3 Tales of further reading: “research” narratives
I have argued above that a key element of Gellius’s programme for reading —
prescribed for the reader in the Preface and enabled by his strategies for narrating his
reading — is the active resolution of inconsistencies or problems raised in the text,
a strategy itself built on two different abilities: a sensitivity to text that withholds
judgment until its veracity or quality can be determined, and a focused intent to identify
the correct authority to resolve a dispute. In this section I will examine the passages
in which Gellius’s narrations of his reading combine two qualities — general readerly
alertness, and the willingness to pursue inquiries — to create stories of research or
further reading.142
142The passages I discuss here are mostly neglected by scholars. Cf 2.12, 2.23 (where the initial
aesthetic reaction and the later reflective opinion are contrasted), 3.4 (where Gellius’s antiquarian
knowledge about beards contrasts with biographical assertions), 5.15, 5.16, 6.1, 6.20, 7.5 (.2: Hoc ubi
legimus, mirabamur. . . ), 7.12 (where Gellius’s inability to imagine the author’s compositional method
signals a criticism), 9.7, 12.6, 14.6, 15.7.
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3.3.1 The research narrative paradigm (13.7)
In 13.7, Gellius describes his discomfort at finding two Greek authorities in disagree-
ment, and the additional authority he consulted to resolve that disagreement.143 This
passage shows the way narratives of reading can literally emerge from (and thus may
be seen to lurk always behind) a simple quotation or paraphrase.144 As often in the
Noctes, Gellius here presents two assertions from different authors on the same topic,
but highlights their disagreement and the effect that dissent had on him.145 This results
in him resolving to consult another source, whose words he leaves out of the passage
as an apparent prompt to his reader.146 When read alongside the conflict, however,
the referenced passage provides not only a resolution to Gellius’s consternation but a
reflection on the nature of authority. 13.7 thus highlights not just the intellectual and
emotional reactions that can occur at the point of encounter with text, and the steps
that can be taken as a result, but also the lessons that such effort can teach.
The passage begins with what reads like a normal Gellian report of another author’s
assertion, but quickly introduces a conflict; narrative then coalesces around Gellius’s
intellectual response to that conflict. Gellius notes that Herodotos says that lions only
have one offspring, then quotes Herodotos making this assertion and explaining that the
lion discharges her uterus with the newborn. “Homer, on the other hand,” refers several
times to multiple offspring of a single lion, and Gellius quotes two passages (Homerus
autem. . . , 13.7.2-3). Gellius gives no indication that he was engaged in research on
lions, or trying to find anything in particular, but rather suggests that he encountered
143Vessey 1994: 1872 on Gellius’s independence from authorities.
144Gellius’s reading is always implicit in a reading-note, and a social reading scene can break out at
any moment (e.g. 17.5). Sometimes he simply tantalises the reader by withholding the verba ipsa until
the end, as in 6.6.
145Cf. Vardi 1996 on the more formal rhetorical exercise and critical activities of diiudicatio and
conlatio, which examine how different authors wrote on the same theme, or how one author imitated
another. At stake in 13.7 seems to be something other than an aesthetic judgment.
146Or readers. Cf. Holford-Strevens 2003: 32, Anderson 1994: 1850.
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one of these claims and compared it to his prior awareness of the other; in short, that the
conflict appeared to him in the course of some unspecified other reading. He describes
his reaction:
ea nos dissensio atque diuersitas cum agitaret inclutissimi poetarum et historicum
nobilissimi, placuit libros Aristotelis philosophi inspici quos De Animalibus ex-
quisitissime composuit.
Since this disagreement and difference of opinion between the most renowned of
poets and the most noble of historians troubled me, it pleased me to search the
books of the philosopher Aristotle which he composed, most meticulously, On
Animals. (13.7.6)147
Gellius here expands the definition of pleasure, the condition indicated in the Preface
for making a note of something. What pleases him is not a discrete fact or quote, but
the resolution of a conflict which is understandably puzzling.148 It recalls the way
well-produced books have a positive effect on the reader and poorly-produced books
a negative one; that Gellius searches out a book which is itself the result of the most
thorough searching.149
Gellius concludes the passage with a statement of intent to include the outcome of
that research:
in quibus, quod super ista re scriptum inueniemus, cum ipsius Aristotelis verbis
in his commentariis scribemus.
What I will find in those books about that matter I will include in these com-
mentarii, with the words of Aristotle himself. (13.7.6)150
The future-tense verbs, and the fact that the words of Aristotle are not included,
enhance this reading narrative’s immersive quality by inviting the reader to fill them
in. The words themselves have been made essential to understanding by the passage’s
147Pliny HN 8.43-44 has the same idea, and explains Aristotle’s thorough investigative techniques in
compiling the work.
148Diversitas is also worthy of note in Noctes 20.7.
149exquisitissime — literally, most thoroughly researched. Cf. Pliny’s claim in his preface to have
taken his material ex exquisitis auctoribus centum, which suggests diligence in his part in finding and
selecting the authors. Here, Gellius is characterising Aristotle’s own methods.
150Some mss. read invenerimus.
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format thus far, and their absence of the promised material is strongly felt. Actual
uerba are somehow critical — and yet here are lacking. The reader is prompted to do
what Gellius set out to do, and satisfy himself or herself with an inspection of Aristotle’s
books on animals.151
Aristotle Hist. Anim. 6.579b seems to be the passage Gellius has in mind.152 There,
two things may be found. An authoritative answer is given on the matter of how many
young a lion has, but that is not what had agitated Gellius. What agitated him was
that two authorities had disagreed, and Aristotle has an explanation for that, too:
ὁ δὲ λεχθεὶς μῦθος piερὶ τοῦ ἐκβαλλειν τὰς ὑστὲρας τίκτοντα ληρώδης ἐστί, σθνετέθη
δ᾿ ἐκ τοῦ σpiανίους εἴναι τοὺς λέοντας, ἀpiοροῦντας τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ τὸν μῦθον συνθέν-
τος.
The story which is told about the lioness losing her uterus in parturition is non-
sense, and was made up to account for the scarcity of lions by someone who was
at a loss to explain it otherwise. (HA 6.579b)153
The reason for the disagreement is that Herodotos had invented his fact; if we read
this as an obliquely implied criticism of Herodotos by Gellius, it is in line with the
treatment he receives elsewhere in the Noctes as good for a tall tale but not much
else.154
It is difficult to imagine this passage being intended in any way other than to
encourage the reader to complete the necessary research.155 As in the other examples
we have discussed, Gellius’s narrative medium encourages the reader to practice the
values and techniques which are the implicit message of that narrative. Gellius models
for his reader how to resolve conflicts in reading material, and encourages the reader
to follow that technique. What results is a deeper understanding of the nature of
151For inspicere, 2.2.7, 18.5.11, and 15.3.8 (also open-ended).
152Rolfe 1927: II: 249.
153Trans Peck 1970.
154At 3.10.11 he is a homo fabulator, 8.4 was apparently devoted to some lies he told about pine
trees and rain, and at 16.29 Gellius notes that he fabulam scripsit about Arion and the dolphin. Even
Taurus is skeptical at 17.8.
155Cf 4.12; Rust 2009: 81.
147
authority: that not all authorities are created equally, and that some are given to
conjecture and invention despite their antiquity and reputation.156 Most interestingly,
the resolution to the conflict cuts to the heart of the compositional mindset in a way
that surely interests Gellius: the authority behind the one-offspring story has not simply
lied or made something up, but was actually trying to explain something. Here, as
elsewhere, Gellius shows his interest in the motivations of readers and writers, and
the way in which they satisfy those motivations.157 We can also see indications of the
continuum of reading/writing identified in the Preface. Aristotle’s books are thoroughly
researched, and they are used in the course of Gellius’s thorough research, which — in
its presentation — prompts the reader to thorough research. By describing his use of
further reading to resolve a conflict in something he has read, and pointing the reader
to a commentary on the nature and origins of that conflict, Gellius indicates to his
reader that critical alertness to one’s reading material, and a willingness to pursue
one’s skeptical reactions in the course of reading, can prove unexpectedly illuminating.
With tales of further reading, Gellius highlights a certain kind of reading: one that
is sceptical, but also sensitive to the discrete components of the text being read. He
models encounters with text in which he responds in an active and critical way to the
raw material of rhetoric, poetry and history — exemplary tales and evocative images.
13.12 could have been presented as just a serious of notes on lion reproduction — the
contradictory opinions of different authors on the same question, as in 20.7 – but it
was not. Instead, Gellius narrated a story around it, a story of his recognition of and
reaction to the conflict, and his desire to resolve it. We might add to this passages
like 17.15, which is there not room to discuss here, in which a collection of related
facts about hellebore are united by a story of reading and discovery in Pliny the Elder
156Vessey 1994: 1894 includes among the goals of the Noctes to challenge the reader’s attitude toward
“received knowledge”.
157Henry 1994: 1935 sees Book 13 as generally concerned with states and activities of mind, and
observes that the Iliadic similes invoked in 13.7 refer to characters’ states of mind.
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(who himself discusses that plant’s salutary effects on the attentiveness of those writing
commentarii).158
Similarly, in 16.11, Gellius refers to his encounter or encounters with a popular
but enigmatic bit of paradoxography, which prompts a long search culminating in an
authoritative anecdote. It begins with Gellius ruminating on one paradoxographical
tribe, and then reflecting that “we see” their characteristics applied to another tribe as
well. This usage recalls his occasional use of audio to indicate a verbal tic he approves
or disapproves of in his contemporaries — a reference to habitual usage that is not
intended to suggest any one instance.159
hac eadem ui praeditos esse quosdam uidemus, qui Psylli uocantur. quorum super
nomine et genere cum in ueteribus litteris quaesissem, in quarto denique Herodoti
libro fabulam de Psyllis hanc inuenimus:
We see that certain folks are endowed with the same power, called Psylli. When I
had investigated among ancient letters about their name and race, I finally found
this story about the Psylli in the fourth book of Herodotos: (16.11.3)160
Gellius goes on to retell Herodotos’s story of the Psylli (Histories 4.173), expanding
on key moments in the story and giving it a vivid flourish. What Gellius was after,
it seems, is an explanation and an origin for their name, not a firm account of their
existence. Though the inquiry might have been prompted by any of several appearances
of the Psylli in Classical literature (including, recently for Gellius, Suetonius Augustus
17.4161), for the attentive reader of the Noctes, a paradoxographical tribe might recall
Pliny the Elder, and indeed Pliny mentions the Psylli in six different Books of the HN.
Most suggestively, they are in the stretch of HN 7 Gellius pillages for Noctes 9.4, where
158Pliny HN 25.51-52.
159There are various things Gellius has noticed over time, or is engaged in ongoing inquiries into, e.g.
1.25.12, 2.13, 2.19.3 (. . . equidem adhuc quaero.) For Gellius’s pet peeve of decayed or common usage
in elite contexts — often the starting point for lengthy research —, 1.22. For a different sense of audio,
2.15.8.
160Denique seems to indicate both the duration of Gellius’s research and the conclusiveness of his
discovery.
161Cf Lucan 9.890ff, Plutarch Cato Minor 56.
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they appear alongside the Marsi, their Italian counterpart, and thus are passed over.162
We might see here some more deeply buried version of the games played in 9.4 and
10.12, an optional reading that would continue what Gunderson identifies as Gellius’s
attempt to rewrite Pliny out of existence.163 Either way, the search for more knowledge
has here yielded equal parts knowledge and meta-knowledge; once again, every textual
encounter contains the potential to learn far more.
3.4 The bookish without their books: readerly life-
styles of Gellius and Pliny
In this final section, I will discuss the depiction of a reader’s lifestyle: his (in this
case) habits around, in relation to and in the absence of texts. First I will examine
Gellius’s references to how what he reads enters his memory, and how he coordinates
that stored knowledge with new encounters. Then I will examine how he describes his
textually-informed mental life in the absence of texts, which we might term the afterlife
that texts have in his mind. I will then contrast this self-depiction with Pliny the
Younger’s depiction of his uncle, which I will show is in direct contrast to Gellius’s own
readerly persona in ways that are consonant with the engagements I have described
above.
3.4.1 Gellius in the aftermath of texts
The final element of Gellius’s model of reading as both constructed in the Preface
and effected in his various narratives is the relationship of reading to memory. Reading
not only transfers words and ideas into the memory, it stimulates it; this is the last
162They are also discussed in Book 25, Gellius’s source for hellebore in Noctes 17.15.
163Gunderson 2009: 182-5.
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stage in actually benefiting from what one reads. Gellius relates at various points
his interactions with his memory around texts, whether heard or seen, and the way
remembered text re-emerges in his mind. It should not be surprising at this point
that a key part of this kind of reading is careful re-examination of text, as Quintilian
indicates.
repetamus autem et tractemus et, ut cibos mansos ac prope liquefactos demittimus
quo facilius digerantur, ita lectio non cruda sed multa iteratione mollita et uelut
ut confecta memoriae imitationique tradatur.
Let us repeat and draw [reading] out and, as our food is chewed and liquefied
before we swallow, the better to digest it, so let reading be handed over to memory
and imitation not undigested but softened with much repetition and, as it were,
fully digested. (Inst 10.1.19.)164
Quintilian is here arguing for the superiority of visual reading, as it allows this
digestion to be more easily done, but Gellius, who hears texts read aloud as often as he
sees them, goes one step further. He describes on several occasions a process by which
he reconstructs the text in his mind, focusing on the highlights. We might see this as a
mirror of the excerpting behaviour he relates in 9.4, where his failure was to correctly
distinguish between good and bad material for excerpting; here at 17.2, rather than
copying them into his notebook, he copies them into his mind:165
cum librum ueteris scriptoris legebamus, conabamur postea memoriae uegetandae
gratia indipisci animo ac recensere, quae in eo libro scripta essent in utrasque
existimationes laudis aut culpae adnotamentis digna, eratque hoc sane quam utile
exercitium ad conciliandas nobis, ubi uenisset usus, uerborum sententiarumque
elegantium recordationes.
When I read a book of an antique writer, I tried afterwards for the sake of
invigorating my memory to reexamine and acquire in my mind what had been
written in the book that I thought was worthy either of praise or blame; and it
was indeed a very useful exercise for improving my recall of elegant words and
phrases, when the need should arise. (17.2.1)
164Digerere refers not so much to digestion as, in the ancient understanding of nutriment, to distribute
the elements of food to the rest of the body.
165On this passage generally, cf Gunderson 2009: 146-50 who also notices its reflection of the process
of creating the Noctes.
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With cum and the imperfect, Gellius paints a picture of not one but every encounter
he had with an old text, bridging the gap between encounter with text and future
opportunites which would showcase his success or failure at reading that text. The
emphasis on the physicality of the book and its text (in eo libro scripta) suggests a
powerful mental act, a mental reconstruction of the highlights of the volume. At the
moment of reading, he was alert to the things worthy of note (adnotamentis digna),
and now he can recall, sort, and fix them in his mind. The physical act of note-taking,
then, stands in as a metaphorical criterion for memorisation; the symbolic use we have
seen throughout the Noctes of noting to stand in for learning or remembering is a native
association to Gellius’s mind. The notes that follow this narration of memorisation in
17.2 — and here things remembered re-emerge in a textual, note form — all consist
of a quotation, then an explanation of a key word or figure in that quotation, and
notes on its usage and/or etymology.166 Each item in this litany enacts the moment
of encounter for reader, testing whether or he or she will notice the word that caught
Gellius’s eye.167 Gellius makes clear the way in which he acquired the kinds of learning
whose possession he praises and whose lack he condemns through the Noctes. This
is Gellius’s style of reading as examined at the beginning of this chapter: attuned to
certain criteria, and internalised with an eye toward further use, whether in writing
or text.168 Gellius emphasises the absence of text in which this activity is undertaken
when he discusses it again at 19.7, where he is literally travelling away from the text
166e.g. 17.2.9: “Et Romani” inquit “multis armis et magno commeatu praedaque ingenti copiantur.”
“Copiantur” verbum castrense est, nec facile id reperias apud civilium causarum oratores, ex eademque
figura est, qua “lignantur” et “pabulantur” et “aquantur”. For Gunderson 2009: 31n32, this passage
is “explicit. . . on reading as mining”. But Gellius, having made extracts of sentences, analyses them
and extracts further from them words in context. He does not so much mine raw static elements as
excavate and study phenomena.
167Holford-Strevens 2003: 34-5 notes the “deliberate disruption” with which these quotations seem
to be out of order compared to the source text.
168Quintilian might also approve of the way Gellius is reading history in order to obtain vocabulary.
Cf Holford-Strevens 2003: 243.
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while he tries to recall its highlights for the purposes of further use.169 Often in the
Noctes characters produce their past reading in the form of speech; Gellius here shows
not just how those readings can happen and be secured for the future, but a kind of
reading which is always imagining such opportunities for production.170
As an alert reader, Gellius keeps an eye out for both res and uerba — the two
things Quintilian identified as what an orator can get out of reading — although he
seems partial to the uerba, both in terms of individual usages (as in 17.2) and exact
quotations. But always these recollections come with metadata; he has committed to
memory both the material and something about it, whether notes on its style, or its
implications, or its use. At 16.1, he recalls hearing a quotation from Musonius and
dutifully committing it to memory.171
adulescentuli cum etiamtum in scholis essemus, ἐνθυμημάτιον hoc Graecum, quod
adposui, dictum esse a Musonio philosopho audiebamus et, quoniam uere atque
luculente dictum uerbis est breuibus et rotundis uinctum, perquam libenter memin-
eramus.
When I was still young and at school, I heard that this Greek enthymeme had been
spoken by Musonius the philosopher and, because it was said truly and brilliantly,
linked with brief and round words, I very gladly memorised it. (16.1.1)
The quotation follows, proving his memorisation. But we have seen that adolescent
student instincts are not always right in Gellius, and so this adolescent memorisation
is to be trumped by adult reading. The memory act based on a thing heard provides
Gellius with something to coordinate, later, against other reading.172
postea istam ipsam sententiam in Catonis oratione, quam dixit Numantiae apud
equites, positam legimus.
169Gellius and Julius Celsinus are walking home from a dinner at which a poem had been read, and
amuse themselves by reflecting on interesting words. It is significant that this is an autumn evening:
Gellius is on his way to a winter night (cf Pr.1). When they have understood a word’s import, they
commit it to memory (memoriae mandabamus), for which cf. Quintilian (memoriae tradatur) above.
Beall 2004: 215-6 discusses both passages in the context of 10.25, below.
170Gunderson 2009: 150.
171Holford-Strevens 2003: 221.
172For which cf e.g. 13.12.
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Later I read this very sententia deployed in the speech of Cato which he gave at
Numantia among the equites. (16.1.3)
A cultural showdown is being staged; Cato, though less succinct, wins on antiquity
(and perhaps Latinity). Gellius looks back on his youthful memorisation with ambi-
valence, indicating that only later reading let him put it in perspective; on the other
hand, memorising something he liked allowed him to read Cato with more context. We
will see in the next chapter how these sorts of showdowns can be significant.
Finally, sometimes only the res makes it into Gellius’s memory/Noctes. Gellius
begins 4.14 with the moment of his encounter with another miscellany, narrating his
aesthetic reaction. A particular decree in Book 9 of Ateius Capito’s Coniectanei seemed
full of “antique dignity,” and so he remembered it. Gellius explains why he remembered
it, apparently for its sentiment rather than its phrasing, and accordingly provides just
that.173 At 1.23, on the other hand, Gellius illustrates how memory works in relation
to res and uerba by focusing on his memory at the particular moment of composing
the Noctes :
historia de Papirio Praetextato dicta scriptaque est a M. Catone in oratione, qua
usus est ad milites contra Galbam, cum multa quidem uenustate atque luce atque
munditia uerborum. ea Catonis uerba huic prorsus commentario indidissem, si
libri copia fuisset id temporis, cum haec dictaui.
The story of Papirius Praetextatus is told and written by Marcus Cato in the
speech he delivered to the soldiers against Galba, with indeed much charm and
clarity and elegance of word choice. I would by all means have put those words
of Cato in this note, if the book had been available at the time that I dictated
these words. (1.23.1-2)
Here Gellius can only remember that the story was told and written by Cato in
variously distinguished words — he cannot remember the words themselves.174 He
knows that the words were good, but has only the content to offer.175
173Noctes 4.14.2: Propterea id meminimus, idque ob hanc causam et in hanc sententiam scriptum
est:. . . .
174Vessey 1994: 1873-83.
175Keulen 2009: 251 reads Gellius’s lack of access as a suggestion that someone else was using the book
and an invitation to imagine who; I would rather see it more simply as a gesture to the relationship
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quod si non uirtutes dignitatesque uerborum, sed rem ipsam scire quaeris, res
ferme ad hunc modum est:
But if you would like to know not the virtues and dignity of the words, but the
tale itself, it goes basically like this: (1.23.3-4)
Gellius seems to be alone among extant authors in telling this tale, making it difficult
to determine what sort of rivalry or performance as a storyteller is at work.176 But the
close citation, reminiscent of his readings of Pliny, and the ironic declaration that the
words are noteworthy but that he will not relate them, suggest Gellius is directing his
reader to find the speech and read it for himself or herself.177 He has shown what kind
of reader he was — he noticed the quality and content of the words, but did not learn
the words themselves — and shows himself in the moment of remembering that reading,
and its effects.
The idiosyncracies of the Noctes ’s characters emerge from not only their manner of
reading but what they take away from it; Gellius, in crafting his own autobiography,
invites the reader into his moments of reading and writing which are at once intimate
and protreptic. We see Gellius’s mind at work in and around text, a mind which has
clear priorities and goals but which is, like the text it produced, occasionally imperfect.
Gellius offers this intimate portrait of himself for the reader to compare himself or herself
against, sometimes even in the reading of the same texts. Will his reader remember
better the words of Cato’s speech? Yet all this memory work must be building to
something important, looking forward to the moment when the texts are not at all
available.
between a source text and one’s notes on it. Cf 2.24.15, where the reader must decide whether a detail
Gellius narrates his inability to recall is significant, or 6.16, which seems to play with the notion of
appetites, offering an incomplete recollection which may or may not be worthwhile. Cf also 10.15.
Vessey 1994: 1873 speculates that Gellius might never have seen it — “not that it really matters.”
176Anderson 2004: 107. Quintilian Inst. 10.5.4 discusses conuersio, and how it differs from emulation.
The story itself is unique, but Vessey 1994: 1876 hears a “familiar ring” in its themes, as does Henry
1994: 1922.
177Vessey 1994: 1887-83 observes Gellius may be inviting a comparison with the original.
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3.4.2 Gellius without texts
Having seen the importance of reading, and its particular mechanics, has for Gellius
in obtaining words and ideas, we may examine what Gellius does when he has no texts to
hand or in his recent memory. As a student of philosophy, he is ever vigilant to keep his
mind from being distracted into unworthy pursuits, and at 10.25 he describes a mental
vocabulary exercise he used for that purpose while riding in a carriage.178 In this scene,
he remembers testing his ability to recall a number of thematically linked words, all
of which he had previously read, adding a grammatical note where appropriate. The
scene demonstrates the full extent and efficacy of his readerly habits, showing that he
has in his head a collection of words read (and hinting, by noting the context of one of
them, that he can supply a context for any of them) which he can sort and recall by
any criterion.179 And as with the programmatic description of his note-taking habits
at Pr. 2, Gellius identifies this activity with both his enrichment and his pleasure:
telorum iaculorum gladiorumque uocabula, quae in historiis ueteribus scripta
sunt, item nauigiorum genera et nomina libitum forte nobis est sedentibus in
reda conquirere, ne quid aliarum ineptiarum uacantem stupentemque animum oc-
cuparet. quae tum igitur suppetierant, haec sunt: hasta, pilum, phalarica,[. . . ]
It happened to please me, while I was riding in a carriage, to recollect the names
of weapons, projectiles and blades which are written in the antique histories, and
likewise the kinds of ships and their names, lest any more worthless things should
overcome my empty and torpid mind. And so the ones that were at hand to me
were these: “spear,” “javelin,” “missile,” [. . . ] (10.25.1-2)180
The list of words available in Gellius’s mind — clearly extracted from reading with
contextual information on nuance, as depicted in 17.2 — goes on, totalling 26 different
kinds of weapon. Gellius reflects on one or two which are “less common” and so, he
178Other possible loci for use of books are 14.2 (Anderson 1994: 1856 and 13.13 (Rust 2009: 92-111).
179Gunderson 2009: 155-6 also sees the link to 17.2. He would have Gellius’s act of gathering be
the reconstruction of the texts read; it seems to me instead that Gellius is showing what he has taken
away from the texts. The texts are gone; what remains?
180Cf 10.9.
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muses, in need of lexical elaboration (10.25.3-4). He then moves on to a new thematic
category.
nauium autem, quas reminisci tunc potuimus, appellationes hae sunt: gauli, cor-
bitae, [. . . ]
But the names of ships which I could then remember were these: “ship,” “cargo-
ship,” [. . . ] (10.25.5)181
Gellius summons around thirty boat-words, seeming to struggle more to reconcile
linguistic conflicts; while the Romans have plenty of words for weapons, even weapons
they identify with other cultures, Greek naval vocabulary impinges on the Roman,
and some Latin terms seem to conflict.182 None of these words get a citation, which
could be seen as a gentle invitation to the reader to fill some in. In the context of his
narratives of readerly and memory habits elsewhere, though, it is certainly a gesture to
the reading that underlies it: wide, attentive, and capable of dissociating vocabulary
from its context while still retaining awareness of that context.
This exercise of Gellius’s is risky. It could easily be read as exactly the sort of
indulgence in trifles that he claims to wish to avoid.183 Even given the high value Gellius
clearly places on a wide, antique and multilingual vocabulary, Quintilian indicates that
there are different registers of vocabulary knowledge. In Book 10 of his Institutio, he
alludes to the memorisation of synonyms by orators:
et quae idem significarent <scio>solitos ediscere, quo facilius et occurreret unum
ex pluribus, et, cum essent usi aliquo, si breue intra spatium rursus desideraretur,
effugiendae repetitionis gratia sumerent aliud quo idem intellegi posset. quod cum
181There may be some pun in appellationes (rather than uocabula, as at 10.25.1) for ships, recalling
the verb appello, to move a ship to land, homonymous with appello, to name. OLD, s.v. appello 1,
2. The exact import is unclear — it could have something to do with the angst over verbs of ship
movement in 10.26, discussed below — but for a comparable reading c. Gunderson 2009: 156 on
occuparet in the list of tela.
182e.g. . . . celoces uel, ut Graeci dicunt, κέλητες. . . and prosumiae uel geseoretae uel oriolae.
183Cf 11.23. This is Keulen 2009: 47-9’s reading, and he would read it in light of Fronto Ad Antonin
1.2.5. I would relocate the tension of intellectual ethics not in the choice to recollect words but in the
contextual grasp of those words as recollected. For the problem of putting Gellius’s activity down to
“archaism,” Vessey 1994: 1867, 1869-70.
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est puerile et cuiusdam infelicis operae, tum etiam utile parum: turbam enim
tantum modo congregat, ex qua sine discrimine occupet proximum quodque. nobis
autem copia cum iudicio paranda est uim orandi non circulatoriam uolubilitatem
spectantibus. id autem consequemur optima legendo atque audiendo; non enim
solum nomina ipsa rerum cognoscemus hac cura, sed quod quoque loco sit aptis-
simum.
I know people who were accustomed to learn by heart [words] which mean the
same thing, so that one of the whole lot might occur to them more easily, and,
when they used any of them, if they needed it again in a short interval, they
could, in the name of shunning repetition, obtain another [word] with the same
sense. This not only is puerile and has something of fruitless labour about it,
but it is just as useless! Indeed, it only convenes a throng, out of which the
speaker might indiscriminately grab whoever is nearest. But for us, with our eye
on oratorical force, rather than fraudulent volubility, we should accumulate our
word-wealth with iudicium. This, though, is done by hearing and reading the
very best [models]; with such care, we will know not just names themselves of
things, but which one is most appropriate where. (Inst 10.1.7-8)184
But Gellius does signal a functional and nuanced eye to his vocabulary knowledge.
One word from each thematic list — a boat and a weapon — features in each of the sub-
sequent articles (10.26 and 10.27).185 In 10.26, Gellius perceives the difference between
two kinds of naval vehicle in the course of defending a figure of speech in Sallust.186
Gellius is defending Sallust from charges of using an inappropriate verb (progressus) to
characterise the movement of ships. Although ships are naves throughout, Gellius, hav-
ing demonstrated that many other verbs of movement are figuratively used for vessels,
notes that Sallust also applies the offending verb to scaphae. Scaphae were nineteenth
in the list of boat-words Gellius was able to remember. 10.27, meanwhile, is concerned
with Carthage, which was once Rome’s rival for control of the world (according to the
litteris ueteribus memoria). He then relates the anecdote that Quintus Fabius sent the
Carthaginians a spear and a staff, signa of war and peace, asking the Carthaginians
184As in the other case studies of Quintilian’s models of oratorical-learning-from-reading, visual lan-
guage (occurreret) is used, which is perhaps indicative of older mnemonic practices based on visualiz-
ation.
185For this kind of interconnection, cf Rust 2009: 91 on 17.21 and 13.2, and (better) Rust 2009: 180
on 5.10, 5.11, and 9.16.
186On which see Gunderson 2009: 161-5.
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to accept whichever they preferred; and the Carthaginians, being possessed of equal
confidence, replied that the Romans could leave with them whichever they liked. The
spear is a hasta, the first name for a weapon that Gellius recalled. That these words
are not just wealth from his treasury, but tokens, stamped and significant of actual
learning, is emphasised by the alternate version he adds in 10.27: it was not an ac-
tual spear and staff sent as signa, but tesserulae with images of a spear and a staff —
simulacra of signa, symbols of symbols.187 In both passages, Gellius shows that the
words he was able to reel off as an exercise for his mind while riding in the carriage are
words that he notices in the course of reading and can use in the course of writing. His
vocabulary-listing, it would seem, is safe.
With the memory list, Gellius narrates explicitly a mental act which could easily be
taken for granted. The passage’s form is not, for example, simply a list of synonyms;
rather, it is set in the narrative frame of deciding to think of some synonyms which
he had read. Sometimes, though, things Gellius has previously read and committed to
memory emerge not through a conscious mental gathering but by means of the sort of
semiconscious associative recall that Quintilian and Plutarch both reflect an interest in.
Gellius narrates this sort of intrusion by his own memory on the compositional moment,
not only illustrating the benefits of his reading habits but showing his ability to observe
his mind at work and utilize that with which it provides him. One example is in the
passage just before the carriage scene, 10.24, in which — perhaps setting the stage for
10.25’s focus on memory training — Gellius coordinates several kinds of linguistic and
textual encounter. He is responding to a current idiom for expressing future time in
number of days, and the audio with which he reports current usage is qualified against
187This glimpse of recursive representation recalls the elusive unreality of the texts in 9.4, and the
central role in 10.12 of commentum. For tesserulae being significant/symbolic, cf 18.13, above p74.
For other versions of this story, Livy 21.18 (the most dramatic variant), and Pomponius quoted in
Justinian’s Digest, 1.2.2.37.
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Late Republican usage cited from Cicero, Augustus, and the praetorian edict.188 This
train of thought is then interrupted by another piece of evidence:
neque praetor solum, sed pleraque omnis uetustas sic locuta est. uenit ecce illius
uersis Pomponiani in mentem[. . . ]
Not only the praetor, but rather all of antiquity spoke this way. Look, that line
of Pomponianus has just occurred to me[. . . ] (10.24.4-5.)
Gellius goes on to quote the line. A similar moment is at 1.11 when, in the midst of
reflecting on the flute-players who played the Spartans into battle, another story comes
into his mind about a very different kind of accompaniment on flute.189 The stuff of
reading, adequately noticed at the moment of encounter, is thus available later not
only for active recall but to bubble up, unbidden, into the mind.190 While that Pliny
surrounds himself with texts, shutting their contents away in a treasury, his encounters
with the texts lack any of the emphasis on mental activity that characterise Gellius’s.
In his Preface to the HN, Pliny emphasises the industry and acquisitiveness of the
reading that went into the work. He suggests bulk transfers of wealth, amassing a
fortune, and burning the midnight oil in service to the emperor to produce a sort of
tool or resource. Gellius seems to respond, sending up Pliny as so eager to find new
bits of knowledge for his project that he fails to actually examine them; someone who
for all his wakeful nights was hardly mentally alert as a reader. By contrast, Gellius
is careful to indicate all the different ways in which he is sensitive to and appreciative
188Holford-Strevens 2003: 180, but cf Gunderson 2009: 268 for the inherent paradox, and for reflec-
tions on what is coming into whose mind.
1891.11.10: Ecce autem per tibicinia Laconica tibiae quoque illius contionariae in mentem uenit, quam
C. Graccho cum populo agente praeisse ac praeministrasse modulos ferunt.
190Cf. Noctes 2.3.5 (. . . venit nobis in memoriam Fidum Optatum. . . ostendisse mihi librum. . . ). The
idiom “to come into the mind,” or “to occur to,” is common enough in Latin, but there may be
something of the dramatic Plautine moment in Gellius’s first-person deployment of it, e.g.: Amphitruo
293 (Mi in mentem uenit. . . ), Aulularia 226 (Venit hoc mihi, Megadore, in mentem. . . ). Cicero uses
it often rhetorically, for example in In Verrem, not only in the third person but also to attack an
addressee or to expose his own emotion or thought (e.g. 2.4.28: Hic tibi in mentem non uenit. . . ?
2.4.110: Venit enim mihi fani, loci, religionis illius in mentem.). It is also an occasional feature of
Cicero’s correspondence, particularly with Atticus. Cf 20.6 as discussed by Anderson 1994: 1892. Cf
10.24.5.
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of everything he reads, judiciously selecting material not for its bulk value but for its
specific utility or worth.
Younger Pliny appends to an index of his uncle’s books in Ep. 3.5 a sketch of Pliny’s
work habits which has been largely accepted by modern scholars.191 Two qualities stand
out from this sketch: his industrious use of time, and his attachment to books. There
is both a sympathy with Pliny’s priorities in his own Preface, and a new, more bookish
focus — in keeping with Younger Pliny’s own values — on the literary studiousness
of the whole project.192 Following the list of all his works, he marvels with his reader
at the extent of Pliny’s accomplishments, adding that the effort that produced them
went hand in hand with forensic labours and imperial service (Ep 3.5.7). Younger Pliny
draws out of the motto uita uigilia est a specific link between literal wakefulness and
cognitive alertness by deftly switching from discussion of his mind to his sleep habits:
sed erat acre ingenium, incredibile studium, summa uigilantia. lucubrare Vulcan-
alibus incipiebat non auspicandi causa sed studendi statim a nocte multa, hieme
uero ab hora septima uel cum tardissime octaua, saepe sexta. erat sane somni
paratissimi, non numquam etiam inter ipsa studia instantis et deserentis.
But his mind was keen, his studiousness beyond belief, his vigilance of the highest
order. He burned the midnight oil from the Vulcanalia on, not to start the day
right but to study through most of the night, indeed in winter from the seventh
hour or even eight at the latest, though often six. Of course he was always ready
for a snooze, even sometimes starting and then stopping sleep in the midst of his
very studies. (Ep 3.5.8)
Is Younger Pliny acknowledging a potential criticism of his uncle, one Gellius seems
to press at his parody of 9.4, when he stays up all night and shows himself nodding off
in the act of thoughtlessly copying from the old Greek books? Indeed, it is with copying
191Beagon 2005: 32. T. Murphy 2004: 3, 9. Cf. Dorandi 1991: 14. See Henderson 2002 for a
full account of this letter and its relationship to 3.1. I generally follow his reading that the letter
pokes fun at but also praises Uncle Pliny. Carey 2003: 5, 31 discusses the letter as part of Pliny
the Elder’s persona, and its impact on his reception as an “omnivorous consumer.” That this is a
transparent reflection (rather than a careful construction) of Pliny’s actual style of work, and indeed
is paradigmatic of all Roman scholarship, is an assumption made in the context of other texts; e.g.,
Kaster 1995: xxxi.
192Younger Pliny’s letters only rarely reflect on or even relate his own reading, but are obsessed with
representing his writing. Cf. Hoffer 1999: 41.
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extracts that this version of Pliny concerns himself at every free moment, and the most
striking comparison with Gellius comes near the end of the letter, when Younger Pliny
explains why his uncle preferred to travel by sedan chair.
in itinere quasi solutus ceteris curis, huic uni uacabat: ad latus notarius cum libro
et pugillaribus, cuius manus hieme manicis muniebantur, ut ne caeli quidem as-
peritas ullum studii tempus eriperet; qua ex causa Romae quoque sella uehebatur.
During travel, as if liberated from other cares, he was free to do this one thing:
on his flank was a secretary with book and notebooks, hands armoured in winter
with long sleeves, so that not even bad weather should take any of his study-time;
for that reason he was even carried around Rome in a sedan chair. (Ep 3.5.15)193
Younger Pliny makes his uncle chastise him for walking, saying that time spent
walking is wasted. But Gellius is happy to walk, and as we saw found a way to occupy
his memory while walking home from a reading with a friend (17.2). More significant is
the comparison of travel time: Gellius suggested that riding in the wagon posed a threat
to his mind, introducing the threat of vacuous distraction (10.25). But this Pliny insists
on the sedan chair, and on having a note-taking slave with him to continue the extract-
making process. Are Pliny’s extracts the sort of trifle Gellius worried about? Read in
light of Younger Pliny’s characterisation, Gellius’s 10.25 strikes a powerful contrast, as
Gellius shows his mind able to engage with past reading and prepare for future reading,
to conjure a sort of mental textual environment, in the absence of any physical texts;
Pliny, on the other hand, clings to extract-making and its physical accoutrements.
So Pliny, in his nephew’s depiction, is not only devoted to mining texts, he is unable
to be without them. For Younger Pliny, this is a good thing. Extracts equal industry
and productivity, and he seems to find it a mark of his uncle’s devotion and perspicacity
that he was prepared to make an extract from anything.
nihil enim legit quod non excerperet; dicere etiam solebat nullum esse librum tam
malum ut non aliqua parte prodesset.
193Pliny’s labours are most impressive in winter, a significant detail for imagining Gellius’s rivalry.
Cf Ker 2004: 218 on winter nights.
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He read nothing that he did not excerpt from; and he even used to say there was
no book so bad that he could not profit from some part of it. (Ep 3.5.10)
We might get an idea of what Gellius’s reaction to this praise in the light of Plutarch’s
similarly structured comment in Listening, mentioned above, that there is no lecture
so bad that a wakeful listener cannot learn something from it; or, as Quintilian puts it:
paucos enim uel potius uix ullum ex iis qui uetustatem pertulerunt existimo posse
reperiri quin iudicium adhibentibus allaturus sit utilitatis aliquid.
I reckon you could find actually few, if any, of those texts to have weathered
the passage of time, that might not offer something useful to someone employing
their iudicium. (Inst 10.1.40)
What makes Younger Pliny’s report of his uncle’s reading differ from the models
advocated by Quintilian and Plutarch is the absences of any qualification of some
semblance of active reading (e.g. iudicium), or of a programmatic goal in reading (e.g.
utilitas); Pliny was simply confident that he could get something out of any book. This
may be trivial, but it is tempting to locate here part of Gellius’s challenge to Pliny.
Iudicium, for Quintilian, is the essential reflective quality in his programme for reading
that allows the reader to sift good from bad and decide what needs to be “handed over
to memory,” and in what way. Gellius articulates a similar value in his own stories of
reading and its uses. While Younger Pliny seems to mean this as praise of his uncle
(both Pliny’s ability and his commitment), the claim that Pliny would excerpt from
anything recalls clearly the criticisms of Noctes 9.4 and 10.12. That, Gellius seems to
be saying, is exactly Pliny’s problem — he would excerpt anything.
In the background of many of these comparisons has been the question of monetary
and other wealth; Gellius’s discussion of price in 9.4 seemed to implicate that element
of Pliny’s own rhetoric.194 One final element of Younger Pliny’s literary biography of
his uncle touches on that:
194If Gellius is thinking of greed, then perhaps we should think of Noctes 3.1, which explores the way
auaritia can render men effeminate because of the way it warps their attention and self-care(cf 10.5)
— or even 6.16 on helluones.
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referebat ipse potuisse se, cum procuraret in Hispania, uendere hos commentarios
Larcio Licino quadringentis milibus nummum;
He himself told the tale that when he had been procurator in Hispania, he could
have sold those notes to Larcius Licinus for 400,000 cash. (Ep 3.5.17)
The story of the attempt to purchase the raw material of the HN has various implica-
tions, but as far as constructing Pliny’s literary persona goes, it stands out here that
Pliny himself told the story.195 Is he proud of it? Certainly he seemed to think it was
worth talking about, not only the bid to buy the notes but the exact value offered,
which in context is clearly an indication of their mass.
This, then, is Younger Pliny’s Pliny: an enthusiastic, industrious and devoted copier
of extracts. He copied all the time, amassing a wealth of extracts; eccentric, perhaps,
but devoted, productive and thorough. But this too is Gellius’s Pliny: obsessive, and
unable to stop copying for a moment to think about what he had read. Pliny is
surrounded always by books and notes (and reading/writing slaves). Gellius, though
fond of books, also goes out of his way to explain how he occupied his mind when
he no longer had access to them. If the narratives of reading in 9.4, 10.12 and 17.13
are engagements with Pliny-as-reader as he appears in his own work, then the lifestyle
notes discussed above, and particularly 10.25, engage with Pliny as he appears in his
nephew’s treatment of him. Gellius has identified the ambivalent points in both versions
of the Plinian persona and adapted them both to make a point about that sort of
authority and to highlight his own. Gellius, seemingly a product of Roman rhetorical
thought along the lines of Quintilian, and Greek philosophical training along the lines
of Plutarch, acknowledges, examines, and then casts into doubt the particular nature
of Pliny’s auctoritas. Pliny worked hard and read much, but in Gellius’s final estimate,
was little more than a cipher for his books. At the moment of encounter, by Gellius’s
standards, Pliny failed; as a result, his HN contains good and bad intermingled, what
195T. Murphy 2004: 55.
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good is present only there by chance. For Gellius, for all future readers, the moment
of encounter with Pliny should be a test: rather than rewriting Pliny out of the canon,
Gellius is rewriting Younger Pliny’s positive memorialisation, not so much tearing down
his statue of his uncle but erecting another very different one next to it.
3.5 Conclusion: representing and prompting the reader
Gellius stands out among writers-about-reading, both in antiquity and beyond, for
following two roads simultaneously: he prescriptively opines about right and wrong
reading, laying out a model of reading to characterise his own work and criticise others,
and follows it up with descriptive narratives of reading which, reflecting on his read-
ing and others’, put those prescribed values to the test. Moments of reading are thus
moments of uncertainty; even more strikingly, these moments challenge the reader to
participate, examining his or her own reading values and constructing his or her own
reading narratives. Gellius’s depiction of reading is likewise remarkable: he systemat-
ically narrates the moment of encounter with the text, attaching various ethical and
intellectual stakes to how that encounter came to pass, what transpired during it, and
what its effects are. Through narrating these various personal mental qualities and
actions around reading, he makes the moment of reading a performative space with an
audience of one: the reader. Building on the Roman social awareness of reading, Gellius
accentuates the reader’s self-consciousness but excludes the group, focusing attention
on the reader’s own mental processes, and the wide variety of tools and ancillary ma-
terial which he or she can apply to reading. A Hellenising, philosophical method of
active reading is fused with Roman priorities of reading and subject matter to create
something that will trump both.
Gellius’s model of reading, expressed in various terms and enacted in a range of
165
formats, is difficult to express in modern terms. There is rarely a clear distinction
between visual or aural reading, and he does not, as we might today, use the language
of physical interiority to describe where his reading occurs.196 What does unite virtually
all of the reading narratives I have discussed, however, is their striking solitude: whether
they occur in what Romans would consider public or private, they are, unlike his social
encounters, solitary. Regardless of whether we should imagine him as literally alone in
any given scene, he narrates himself as if he were, focused only on his feelings, emotions,
and decisions around the text. In this way, Gellius shows the reader why, how, and
to what end he is reading, steps in the process that could well be taken for granted,
or indeed left out of what would otherwise be a collection of excerpts. This offers the
reader a model for his or her own reading; it also enacts a sort of self-awareness that is
also a model, challenging the reader to see the moment of encounter as something he
or she might recall later. Gellius the reader is thus not only solitary but self-conscious;
he is not content to just know things but must also watch himself learning them.197
Gellius’s unique, Hellenising approach to the traditional Roman reading styles may
be reflected in his response to the metaphorical tropes for the subject. Quintilian lays
out a reading programme in Inst 10 in the name of helping the orator acquire his own
ops — his copia rerum ac uerborum (10.1.5). He describes the raw oratorical material
acquired through judicious reading in terms of monetary wealth.198 Pliny uses similar
language, referring to his work in fiscal terms and even as a treasure-house.199 While
one writer is describing oratory and the other natural history, this nonetheless seems
196The old Roman idiom of in mentem venit notwithstanding (above, p160). See McMahon 2008 on
the mental interior.
197It is in this way that Gellius’s reading seems different from the kind prompted by Valerius Maximus
(Langlands 2008: 184-5) — his reading is not only self-improving but self-conscious. Nonetheless there
seems a close sympathy in the way Valerius “close[s] the exemplary loop” by putting in parity the
readers and doers of exemplary action.
198At 10.1.13, reading provides ubertas and diuitiae. For an alternative reading of Quintilian alongside
Pliny, Lao 2008: 67-70.
199HN Pr.17, 19, etc; Cf. Larcius Licinus in Younger Pliny Ep 3.5.
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to reflect a common Roman use of such language. But Pliny’s position is the riskier.
Quintilian prefaces his call to acquire the “capital” of oratory with a warning about
the orator who has a lot of material in his head but does not understand its proper use:
that man, he says, is reclining atop a locked-up treasure-pile.200 This recalls strikingly
Pliny’s proud claim to have shut away all his facts in a treasury, and indeed Pliny must
struggle to qualify his claims of great mental wealth by signalling his participation in
the community of lending and investment.201 Romans thus face a dilemma; it is good
to have knowledge, just as it is good to have money, but knowledge, like money, must
be spent, and preferably for the good of others.202 The rhetoric of compiled knowledge
as wealth may be a common one, but for Gellius, wealth is a recurring concern and so,
I suggest, an operative, dominant metaphor.203 Even Quintilian, with whom Gellius
seems to have much in common as far as reading goes, speaks of copia as an end
itself. Gellius, responding to the way this trope invites problematic reading priorities
of indiscriminate hoarding and static possession, responds by describing the Noctes, his
life in reading, as his penus. The definition of the word is debated at Noctes 4.1.17-
23, but it is essentially a store of possessions differentiated by utility and purpose
in the household.204 With this image, Gellius has incorporated the Roman concern
for knowledge as something possessed, but distanced it from the static, homogenized
thesaurus or the vaguer concept of copia and used instead an image that depends
20010.1.3: qui sciet quae quoque sint modo dicenda, nisi tamen in procinctu paratamque ad omnis
casus habuerit eloquentiam, uelut clausis thesauris incubabit. The image recalls the hoarding dragons
of Beowulf or Tolkien; cf Petronius Sat 38.8 and the incubo whose cap one can steal to gain access to
his hoard (OLD s.v. incubo).
201T. Murphy 2004: 64-5.
202T. Murphy 2003: 310-3. For more on money and social exchange in literary contexts, Rimell 2002:
101-102.
203Characters’ wealth/class is only mentioned when they are doing something problematic, e.g. 8.3,
9.15, 19.1.7. This metaphor feeds back in an interesting way to passages like 13.25, a discussion of
knowing-about-words triggered by words for booty (above, p79).
204Gunderson 2009: 75-7 rightly notes the “axial” importance of the word penus to the NA (cf Keulen
2009: 88), but it is important to remember that the argument actually reaches a conclusion of sorts
(4.1.17, 20-23): penus is a long-term storehouse of things that will be used, whether for eating or for
maintenance, etc.
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on purposeful acquisition and practical, regular use of possessions/knowledge.205 This
approach to reading clearly shows the Hellenic influence of Plutarch’s models, though
the imagery of wealth is hardly operative (and mostly absent) from those texts.206
The methods by which things are transferred to Gellius’s penus recall Quintilian’s
reading strategies, but the personal nature of the penus has more in common with
Plutarch’s philosophical concern for self-improvement.207 Gellius presents himself as
able to simultaneously acquire things for the right reason, evaluate their worth or
utility, and then put them in their proper place. The wealth of readers takes many
different forms; Gellius’s interest is to know what you have read, why, and what it is
for.
205This might explain the concern over stupid rich characters: they are cash-rich but knowledge-poor,
as it were (an alternative interpretation is simply that it is particularly gauche for someone wealthy,
whom you expect to be cultured, to act stupidly).
206From time to time Plutarch speaks of estate-management, as just one of many metaphors. On two
occasions Plutarch invokes Xenophon’s Oeconomicus to make a point. Just as the shrewd householder
can, if he carefully examines them, find profit in both his friends and his enemies, so the critical
reader can benefit from good or bad texts by imagining their composition and analysing their qualities
(Listening 40C on Oec 1.15). And in the mind of the overly curious busybody, each bad piece of
knowledge is carefully stored in its own place, a sort of mirror of the carefully differentiated and
organised storerooms of the householder (On Curiosity 515E on Oec 8.19-20).
207And yet Gellius’s reading is not quite exclusively philosophical (let alone, to use Plutarch’s dis-
tinction, sophistic or inquisitive) or rhetorical. The term that best covers the kind of reading Gellius
most closely narrates might be “informative.”
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Chapter 4
Notes and essays: discerning and
deploying mediations of the past
4.1 Introduction: tradition and antiquity in Imper-
ial culture
4.1.1 Structures and processes, performance and mediation
In this chapter, I argue that even in the absence of narrative, Gellius is interested
in — and represents — processes of intellectual activity, and their consequences, an
interest that manifests itself in what we might call “implied narratives” of reflective
processes. That interest is focused through Gellius’s unique engagement with the use
and presence of commentaries and other secondary literature.1 Gellius engages with
the presence and effect of tradition most frequently in the articles we might term “es-
says” or “notes”; the terms, used freely by modern scholars, are anachronistic, and the
1Descriptions of the use of commentaries as detailed and consistent as Gellius’s are hard to find
in other contemporary authors. Gellius, and later commentators, attest the existence of many in the
early Empire, but our understanding of their role and use is based largely on later examples of the
genre (see Kaster 1997, Starr 2007). For Gellius on commentaries cf Rust 2009: 152-153.
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distinction is one of perceived structure, but they helpfully describe discrete articles in
which Gellius discusses a question or topic in his own voice and without a narrative.
The structure of these articles, and their coordination of sources against one another,
echo the different stages of Gellius’s reading narratives, and likewise represent Gellius’s
mental activity as reader and researcher (this is implicit in the Noctes ’s commentarius
conceit but bears repeating).2 Within these articles, Gellius is always concerned with
something in the past, be it an antique text or some aspect of the antique world as dis-
cussed or attested in a text. I will show that he consistently examines these elements
of primary, antique material alongside the intervening processes of transmission and
interpretive, secondary text that facilitate his access to them.
Gellius considers his — and his readers’ — encounters with antiquity as mediated by
prior readers’ encounters with that same past. He does not pretend to direct contacts
with antique text; rather, he looks at the past and sees the chains and mechanisms of
tradition, the lesser, intervening pasts, that join it to the present. But “mechanisms”
are a post-industrial image. To Gellius the Roman, these processes and systems are
composed of individuals, individuals who, like the individuals he depicts (and trains his
readers to evaluate) in other scenes throughout the Noctes, lay claim to authority and
perform their intellects for all to see, with real consequences for both themselves and
those who respect their authority. I will explore Gellius’s depiction of these chains, and
particularly the importance of individual characters at these moments of encounter:
their performances are linked to their interests, their abilities, or even their entire life’s
stories. In presenting his inquiries as the result of a chain of secondary researchers,
and by staging simultaneously his and their readerly encounters with primary antique
material, Gellius engages both a Roman respect for the dynamics of tradition and a
common rhetoric of performing one’s mastery of a tradition. The ultimate effect is
2For Jacob 2005 they often represent actual processes.
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to present to his reader a sophisticated way of approaching and deploying knowledge
about the antique past in the Imperial Roman present day.
4.1.2 Obscurity, antiquity, and the spectrum of uncertainty
The Imperial Roman who engaged with his cultural past would find questions and
uncertainties in need of verification at every scale, from single characters in manuscripts
to interpretation of whole texts and understanding of historical realities.3 Even less
antique literature regularly posed questions by way of dense, challenging allusion;4 but
the “archaic” quasi-canon had its own challenges. As Vessey has shown, the fondness
for archaic style among Imperial Romans was inherently paradoxical (see above, p81 on
1.10). To qualify as antique, words and style must be visibly alien, other, and remote;
but to function effectively in communication, they must not be so remote and alien that
they are incomprehensible. Antiquity, as a style, flirts perpetually with obscurity.5
Autograph manuscripts and those from the hands of authoritative editors were in
high demand as collectors’ items, but they also offered the promise of reliable access to
the fundamental particles of ancient text: single characters.6 Antique style was often
a matter of a single syllable.7 Once spellings were confirmed, Imperials next needed
to understand what words had meant at a certain time in order to accurately read
3For manuscript criticism in antiquity, and Gellius’s unique place in that history, Zetzel 1981.
4Woolf 2003: 207; Starr 2001 on various needs met by commentaries.
5(Although sometimes that can be its goal.) Quintilian begins his discussion of obscuritas with
the example of those who search too zealously for ancient and obsolete words (8.2.12). Cf the figure
satirised in Lucian’s Lexiphanes, and Gellius on Cicero’s stylistic choices: 13.21.22-24. On language
through time, 13.30.
6Lucian’s Ignorant Book-collector satirises the fashion. Reynolds and Wilson 1991: 29-30 discuss the
phenomenon but suspect that most autographs attested in this period (e.g. Fronto ad M Caes 1.7.4)
were fakes. Quintilian complains of over-eager modern readers who mistakenly correct archaic spellings
such as dicae for dicam, quae in ueteribus libris reperta mutare imperiti solent, et dum librariorum
insectari uolunt inscientiam, suam confitentur (Inst 9.4.39) Cf Noctes 2.14.
71.21 is one of many such Gellian inquiries: Quod Iulius Hyginus affirmatissime contendit legisse se
librum P. Vergilii domesticum, ubi scriptum esset “et ora tristia temptantum sensus torquebit amaror,”
non quod uulgus legeret “sensu torquebit amaro.”(cap.1.21)
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ancient texts and to be able to rationalize their own use of them as antique.8 Antique
style was also reflected in whole sentences: grammar and structure, choice of various
particles or conjunctions, or simply tone.9 Antique texts also needed to be interpreted
for their rhetorical or philosophical meaning, whether in part or in full.10 Beyond
the interpretation of antique text lay the more nebulous question of what the ancients
thought, and beyond their opinions or ideas, Imperials might hope to glimpse the reality
of the past, how things were done by custom or law, to give context to accounts of the
past.11
4.1.3 Looking for help
Gellius foregrounds his constant desire to learn about the past. An ancient work
stumbled over in the library is, without question, worth reading.12 But when a ques-
tion of the sort discussed above arises, where does he turn? In the previous chapter, I
noted Gellius’s penchant for “further reading”, an apparently literal and bibliographical
version of the synkritic techniques for resolving uncertainty advocated by Plutarch.13
In the example of the lions in Homer and Herodotus (13.7, above, p 145), his further
8E.g. 18.7.1: “quaeso” [Fauorinus] inquit “te, magister, dicas mihi, num erravi, quod, cum uellem
demegorias Latine dicere, “contiones” dixi?”
9Marcus indicates to Fronto how much Cato he has been reading by mimicking a verbal tic: nam
uni M. Porcio me dedicaui atque despondi atque delegaui. hoc etiam “atque” unde putas? ex ipso
furore. (Fronto Ad Marc 2.13) Quintilian praises Catonian style, but notes its hazards for students
that cannot appreciate its antiquity (Inst 2.5.21).
10See discussion in previous chapter of reading programmes in Quintilian (p 101) and Plutarch
(p 108). Noctes 6.3, to be discussed below in this chapter, seems to take the form of a traditional
educational exegesis of a rhetorical text, as outlined in Quintilian Inst 2.5.1-9.
11We might term the latter “historical reality” were it not for the notoriously subjective nature of
the Roman equivalent of this concept. Despite the concern among Gellius et al for how the ueteres
actually spoke, Romans engaged in discussion about the past could generally construct a version of
events or origins that were “true enough” for the present context. E.g. Cicero De Rep 1.63, with the
rather improbably etymology of dictator from dicitur. Cf. Morgan 2007: 128 on historical reality in
exemplary discourse.
1211.17.1:Edicta ueterum praetorum sedentibus forte nobis in bibliotheca templi Traiani et aliud quid
requirentibus cum in manus incidissent, legere atque cognoscere libitum est..
13E.g. Plutarch Poetry 21D, discussed above, p 112.
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reading was within the realm of antique authority, but from time to time he specifically
narrates his (or his fellow readers’) further reading in the more recent realm of com-
mentary and criticism. I will now discuss a few paradigmatic examples in which Gellius
narrates the consultation of an interpretive authority.
Although 17.6 hints at a social group of readers, it more closely resembles an essay
about a particular interpretive point.
M. Cato Voconiam legem suadens uerbis hisce usus est: “Principio uobis mulier
magnam dotem adtulit; tum magnam pecuniam recipit, quam in uiri potestatem
non conmittit, eam pecuniam uiro mutuam dat; postea, ubi irata facta est, servum
recepticium sectari atque flagitare uirum iubet.” quaerebatur, “seruus recepticius”
quid esset. libri statim quaesiti allatique sunt Verrii Flacci de obscuris Catonis.
in libro secundo scriptum inuentum est “recepticium seruum” dici nequam et nulli
pretii, qui, cum uenum esset datus, redhibitus ob aliquod uitium receptusque sit.
Marcus Cato, arguing for the Voconian law, used these words here: Principio
uobis mulier magnam dotem adtulit; tum magnam pecuniam recipit, quam in
uiri potestatem non conmittit, eam pecuniam uiro mutuam dat; postea, ubi irata
facta est, seruum recepticium sectari atque flagitare uirum iubet. It was asked
what a seruus recepticius was. Immediately the books of Verrius Flaccus On
the Obscurities of Cato were asked for and brought in. In the second book, it
was found written that recepticius is used of a worthless slave of no value who,
having been given in sale, is returned because of some defect, and is taken back.
(17.6.1-2)14
The article opens with a quotation read, and the presence of a reading group only
emerges briefly after the primary quotation in question.15 From there Gellius proceeds
to excerpt Verrius’s proposed interpretation. The same form is followed, briefly and
apparently in solitude, in 20.2:
“siticines” scriptum est in oratione M. Catonis, quae scribitur ne imperium sit
ueteri, ubi novus eunerit. “siticines” inquit “et liticines et tubicines.” sed Caesel-
lius Vindex in Commentariis Lectionum Antiquarum scire quidem se ait liticines
lituo cantare et tubicines tuba; quid istuc autem sit, quo siticines cantant, homo
ingenuae ueritatis scire sese negat.
Siticines is written in a speech of Marcus Cato’s that was composed That the
former’s power should end when the new arrives. He says, siticines et liticines
et tubicines. But Caesellius Vindex in Notes of Ancient Reading says he indeed
14Note that to ask a question and request a book are the same verb (quaero).
15Cf 12.14, 13.28.1.
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knows that liticines play the lituus, and tubicines the tuba; but, being a man of
natural honesty, says he does not know what the siticines play. (20.2.1-2)
In sed Caesellius . . . , we should see the outline of a decision to consult a secondary
authority. Such a reading process underlies the juxtaposition of two texts in this way:
the narrative, modelled elsewhere explicitly, is here implied by the presence of the steps
that make it up.
Back in 17.6, an unclear word has been read. The readers’ first instinct is to consult a
secondary text promising interpretive assistance: a book specifically on unclear words
in Cato. Immediately, though, the risks of such assisted reading are made clear, as
Gellius warns against trusting Verrius.
cum pace autem cumque uenia istorum, si qui sunt, qui Verrii Flacci auctoritate
capiuntur, dictum hoc sit. recepticius enim seruus in ea re, quam dicit Cato,
aliud omnino est quam Verrius scripsit.
However, with the pardon and indulgence of those (if they exist) who are taken
in by the auctoritas of Verrius Flaccus, let this be said: namely, that seruus
recepticius in this case, which Cato was speaking of, is entirely different from
what Verrius has written. (17.6.4-5)16
Gellius then provides his own interpretation supported by an example from Plautus and
another from elsewhere in Cato (.7-8). He sets this up as a contest between Verrius’s
interpretation and his own, in which the reader is to be the judge, and closes with a
pun on his rival’s name.
plura dicere, quibus hoc nostrum tuear, supersedeo: ipsa enim sunt per sese eu-
identia et quod a Verrio dicitur et quod a nobis; utrum ergo uidebitur cuique
uerius, eo utatur.
I refrain from saying more in defense of this, my position: indeed the very words
are evident in themselves, both what Verrius has said and what I have said; so
you may use whichever one seems better Verified. (17.6.11)
Of the several “scholars” Gellius reads, Verrius is among the most problematic.17
Caesellius Vindex fares worse, while Gellius is slightly happier with Julius Hyginus
16For being capiuntur by auctoritas, cf 16.3.1. 17.7 follows a similar form to 17.6, as does 18.9.
17Holford-Strevens 2003: 162 for the term. Verrius Flaccus is rejected or criticized outright in 4.5
(discussed below), 16.4, and here at 17.6; he is dealt with ambivalently at 5.17, 5.18 and 18.7.
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and Gavius Bassus. He cites these latter three grammatici for everything from the
validity of spellings to the meanings and origins of words, from the interpretation of
political texts to the origins of Roman customs. Tullius Tiro, discussed in detail below,
is considered as an authority on every piece of this interpretive spectrum, and seems to
come up short almost every time.
Gellius’s engagement with grammatical commentaries and other treatises occupies
a unique place in our surviving Latin sources from the time. It is often assumed that
the numerous grammatical commentaries written in the triumviral and Imperial period
were, first and foremost, teaching aids for grammatici.18 Suetonius, in his biograph-
ical sketches of their authors, focuses primarily on their teaching careers, placing their
commentarii in the periphery.19 Meanwhile, Marcus writes to Gellius’s contemporary
Fronto that he has read plenty of Cato, but never gives any suggestion he has had any
help with his interpretation of it.20 This does not mean that Marcus and Fronto’s read-
ing of Cato was in fact unassisted; instead, it goes to show the variety and significance,
discussed in Chapter 3, of different ways of representing one’s reading.
The evidence from Gellius suggests that far from being teaching aids, commentaries
were regular aids for readers of all types. He has regular encounters with commentaries
that show no signs of being in a classroom, nor do his teachers ever offer commentarii
of their own.21 When these interpretive aids are not leaping off the shelves to be of
assistance, they are on the lips of learned friends; and though sometimes, as above,
they fail or mislead, sometimes too they can come to the rescue, as in 11.17, when a
18Nettleship 1881 surveys the attested commentators on Vergil. Gellius, along with Suetonius’s De
Grammaticis and later commentaries, is a major source. Kaster 1997: 160-1, 170 discusses grammari-
ans commentaries as “manuals” for other grammarians, and as teaching aids. See also Sluiter 2000:
202-3.
19To him they are teachers. E.g. de Gramm 17, on Verrius Flaccus, makes no mention of his
writings, and 24 delays Probus’s to the very end. Cf 2 (Parker 2009: 210n94).
20E.g. Fronto ad Marc 2.6, 2.9, 2.13, 4.5. The way reading Cato can relax and uplift (ad Ant 2.1)
suggests a model of reading more focused on immersion and aesthetic appreciation than the learning-
oriented Imperial reading models discussed in the previous chapter.
21Cf p67 above, on 18.5.
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friend’s reading of Bassus (who fares well, for a Gellian grammaticus) helps with an
old praetorian edict.22 And sometimes Gellius finds one that is correct and that can be
corroborated by other examples he finds himself (e.g., 4.9).
When a secondary authority fails and is proven to be of little use, the reasons
often recall those for which flesh-and-blood grammatici fail in Gellius’s social scenes.23
They might be inattentive, failing to notice other, relevant examples of the phenomena
they discuss (e.g. 7.6), they might even fail to read the rest of the sentence they are
commenting on (e.g., 6.2), or they might just be wrong, offering a flawed or incomplete
explanation (e.g., 2.4, 3.19, 16.4).
And like living grammatici, these texts that might first be summoned to assist
with reading need to be scrutinised for titles and self-advertisement which they do
not deserve.24 It is an unfortunate irony for Verrius Flaccus that his book “on the
obscurities of Cato” does not explain the obscurity of Cato at 17.6; likewise Vindex’s
“ancient readings” were clearly not wide or ancient enough. Gellius is keenly attuned to
the rhetoric of the title, as his playful engagement with his own and his rivals’ titles in
the Preface makes clear. But just as he hears a grammaticus advertise his own exclusive
authority and wonders whether the man can back it up, so Gellius sees the title of a
work of secondary literature as one that can inflate the author’s authority and seduce
and mislead its reader:
Aelius Melissus in nostra memoria fuit Romae summi quidem loci inter gram-
maticos id temporibus; sed maiore in litteris erat iactantia et σοφιστείᾳ quam op-
era. Is praeter alia, quae scripsit compluria, librum composuit, ut tum videbatur,
cum est editus, doctrinae inclutae. Ei libro titulus est ingentis cuiusdam inleceb-
rae ad legendum; scriptus quippe est de loquendi proprietate. Quis adeo existimet
loqui se recte atque proprie posse, nisi illas Melissi proprietates perdidicerit?
In my memory, Aelius Melissus was of the highest rank among grammarians of his
times, but with more boasting and sophistry than actual work in literary matters.
2211.17.3-4:“Retanda” igitur quid esset, quaerebatur. dixit ibi quispiam nobiscum sedens amicus
meus in libro se Gaui de origine uocabulorum VII legisse qretas uocari arbores[. . . ]
23E.g. 13.3.1
24Cf 3.10.16.
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He composed a book, among many others he wrote, that when it was published,
seemed (at the time) to be of renowned learnedness. The title of that book was a
certain remarkable enticement to reading; you see, it was written On Precision in
Speech. Truly, who could think themselves able to speak correctly and precisely
unless they had thoroughly learned the “proprieties” of Melissus? (18.6.1-3) 25
To ask questions of one’s reading, as Gellius urges his readers to do, is only the
beginning: next, one must identify the correct source of an answer. The first source
consulted might have over-represented its authority, and its answer might hold up to
scrutiny. The correct answer might (or perhaps should) already reside in the reader’s
mind, or it might be found in a less obvious, derivative, or grammatical source, like
the collected writings of a jurist (which, Gellius might be suggesting, one ought to be
reading anyway). And the stakes of right or wrong access to the antique are non-trivial:
as I will show, Gellius understands how bad interpretations can contaminate intellectual
traditions, and mislead future generations. Gellius is not alone in his sensitivity to the
nature of commentary and tradition — or in his awareness of the rhetorical potential,
for one’s own auctoritas, of demonstrating a comprehensive command of it.
4.1.4 Commentary and tradition in Imperial Rome
It is now worth examining briefly the world of commentary and tradition at Imperial
Rome that is the background for Gellius’s interest.26 By the time he wrote the Noctes,
the term commentarii had attained a state of sort of semantic exhaustion, having
since the Republic meant, simultaneously, personal notes, official records, and some
form of literary work posing as one or both;27 that pose (“my notes on reading”) had
25This passage is thus critical in bridging the gap between flesh-and-blood authorities and those of
papyrus or parchment. The grammatici typified in 6.17 have hollow reputations, and the rhetor of
17.5 was nothing but a sophista. For inlecebra, see above p46. On 18.6 Springer 1958: 127.
26On slightly later forms of literary commentary, Budelmann 2002.
27Boemer 1953 gives a full account in the Republican period; more helpfully, Riggsby 2006: 133-50,
in pursuit of a formal identification for Caesar, explores the various real implications of the word for
Roman readers (though nb his reading of Noctes 18.5.12, p147, is problematic; cf above, p67). Gellius
was himself well aware of various different kinds of commentarii (cf 14.7, 16.8.3).
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evolved into (but was not limited to) a tag indicating a work derived from and offering
exegesis on another work or works.28 Gellius’s use of it, at least, suggests there was
still plenty of room to use it in the latter sense and still hint at and play with the
former ones.29 And Gellius, we should remember, consults and reflects on more than
just what we would formally identify as commentaries. He frequently turns to Hyginus’s
Commentarii in Vergilium (1.21, 7.6, 10.16, 16.6) but also knows a book by him De
Vita Rebusque Inlustrium Vivorum (1.14) and often finds the answer in the writings
of a jurist instead of a grammaticus (20.2). But any text that promises exegesis of
an older one is commentary; this was a high-stakes intellectual dimension in which all
authority is open to negotiation.
Commentary was one element of intellectual tradition, a glue that cemented tradi-
tion together and a medium in which a new authority could lay claim to mastery of
that tradition.30 The use and maintenance of tradition was thus for Romans critical
within a certain discipline, but was also a way of authorising a discipline to the rest
of literate society. It is for this reason, Harries argues, that Gellius’s contemporary
Pomponius begins his work on law with a history of the discipline that enhances and
perhaps invents powerful lineages of intellectual transmission and descent, teacher-pupil
and author-reader relationships that provide, for the discipline of jurisprudence, the au-
thority of a long-lasting and thoroughly cemented tradition.31 His story is a dramatic
one, conjuring a mythic-historical past of larger-than-life legal minds: Appius Claudius
“the hundred-handed” who built roads and aqueducts and invented the letter R (Digest
28Vardi 2004: 162-5.
29Sluiter 2000 for the formal “genre” of commentary that depends on one other text, the clearest
way in which Gellius’s commentarii are not commentary in that sense, but closer to Riggsby’s “what
I[the author] have to say about topic X ” (Riggsby 2006: 135-6).
30On doxography and disciplinary history, van der Eijk 1999.
31Harries 2006: 49-50, though cf van der Eijk 1999: 5-6 for such histories as historiography, with
all the creative license that entailed. Pomponius’s history of the law is preserved in Justinian’s Digest
1.2.2, where he notes that he is beginning his work with it so that apparent a quibus et qualibus haec
iura orta et tradita sunt(.35).
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1.2.2.36); Sempronius, so wise the Romans called him “wise” in Greek (.37); Quintus
Mucius, who stood up to the Carthaginians with a wit and bravery that is literally ex-
emplary (.37; cf Noctes 10.27). From the foggy mists of improbable achievement emerge
a series of masters and students who in turn become masters themselves. Quintus Mu-
cius had many students, including Aquilius Gallus, Balbus Lucilius, Sextus Papirius
and Gaius Juventius (.42). In a dramatic story of discovery and revelation about the
true nature of knowledge, Servius Sulpicius abandons advocacy to study the true law
and legal tradition with Aquilius and Balbus, then uses all of Q. Mucius’s students’
books to write his own (.42-44). Then his students wrote their own books, which were
all edited together (.44); and so on, to the present day (.45). Some books produced
by this tradition are still read today (.47). The jurists of today and yesteryear are
thus joined, Pomponius argues, by an authorising tradition of continuity and succes-
sion; their assertions, and their citation by advocates and judges, should be respected
accordingly.32 By the second century CE jurists already benefited from political and
imperial recognition; nevertheless, their distance from the rhetorical world of advocacy
and the courtroom was a persistent reminder of their lack of exclusive legal authority.
Pomponius here authorises his own work as a writer on the law and lights the way for
others who wish to cite juristic writing and give it reliable authority.
The medical discipline depended heavily on its authentic tradition (and, by the
Imperial period, saw established rivalries between different sects with their own tradi-
tions) and put great stock in a large, often bewildering body of primary material. This
was a field in which command of tradition was its own inherent virtue.33 The physi-
cian and writer Galen, another of Gellius’s contemporaries, discusses commentary in a
way that is much less systematic but nevertheless recalls Gellius’s own approach and
provides a useful comparative example of the rhetoric of engagement with tradition. A
32Cf van der Eijk 1999: 15 (but cf 18n74), Runia 1999: 42-3.
33Vallance 1999: 231, von Staden 2009: 144-5.
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prolific author, Galen invested substantial effort in writing commentaries (ὑpiόνηματα)
on the Hippocratic corpus. There he found it difficult to resist engaging with previous
commentators.34 In two treatises, On his own books(henceforth: Books) and On the
order of his own books(henceforth: Order), he locates these efforts both in his own au-
thorial career and in the educational career of a reader learning medicine. In the former
work, Galen outlines a theory of commentaries. They are a helpful tool for accessing
important, antique primary texts.35. But they should be approached with caution: if
they are in serious error, they can be dangerous to the unsuspecting doctor who trusts
them (Books 32). Knowledge of a primary text may be a prerequisite of reading a
commentary on it (42). His commentaries were both personal notes and attempts to
guide his readers on the right path; he provided helpful access to the primary text and
also refutations of other sects’ interpretations (34, 38).
In Order he sketches out a battlefield of commentary in multiple dimensions. The
utility and value of a commentary depends on 1) its author’s interpretive goals and
ability, and 2) the intellectual tradition to which it belongs (i.e., its sources and in-
fluences). In this treatise the worry that he will not finish commenting on the entire
Hippocratic corpus in his lifetime leads him to muse whether other commentaries could
be appropriate substitutes (Order 57). His assertions of who is good and bad give way
to a formative tale of being a student himself and learning to tell the difference, and
his mastery of the commentary tradition is embedded into his own autobiography and
his student’s development. First, he names authorities worth seeking out: Pelops, his
own favoured teacher, and Numisianus, whose works are hard to find (57). Then he
names commentators to be avoided, and why: Quintus did not understand Hippocrates
and so offers incorrect exegesis; Lycus did not understand Hippocrates either, and so
attacks him out of ignorance; and Satyrus, under whom Galen studied before he went to
34von Staden 2009: 133-4.
35Vallance 1999: 230-1.
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Pelops, and who “preserves doctrine of Quintus... without adding or removing” (58)36.
The first two are condemned for errors of reading Hippocrates (and Lycus for being
too critical), while the sin of the third is an error of reading an erroneous reader and
transmitting it wholesale. Thus do traditions emerge and thus, Galen suggests, are
errors perpetuated. Galen learned this firsthand:
ἡμεῖς οὖν ἑτέρως μὲν ἔμpiροσθεν ἀκηκοότες Σατύρου τὰς ἐξηγήσεις Κοΐντου, μετὰ
χρόνον δ᾿ ὕστερον ἀναγνόντες τινὰ τῶν τοῦ Λύχου κατέγνωμεν ἀμφοτέρων ὡς οὐκ
ἀκριβῶς ἐγνωκότων τὴν ᾿Ιpipiοκράτους γνώμην.
I had the two different experiences of, first, hearing Quintus’ interpretations from
Satyrus and then, some time later, reading some of Lycus’ works; and I convicted
both of having not interpreted Hippocrates’ views accurately. (Order 58)37
An autobiography emerges: a younger Galen who read bad commentaries under a bad
teacher, but who then saw the light about both and so sought out better ones — and
who now writes his own, superior commentaries. Moreover, his writing will prepare a
reader to venture into this world of scholarly uncertainty on his or her own: followers
of Sabinus and Rufus are all right to consult, he says, but anyone who finishes reading
Galen’s own work will be able to tell good from bad on his or her own (58).
Galen’s engagement with earlier iterations of the tradition must be careful to avoid
the “free publicity” (or, worse, conferred authority) for his rivals that might result
simply from naming them.38 He addresses this by destroying their authorial mys-
tique with his own performance. In the pages of his own Hippocratic commentaries he
regularly shores up his own authority by invoking prior commentators’ erroneous inter-
pretations (in spite of his claim, at Books 34, to the contrary). He not only declares
them wrong, he re-stages the interpretive encounters and moments which produced
their commentaries, creating an imaginative space in which the reader beholds Galen’s
encounter with Hippocrates, his encounter with prior commentators, and those com-
36Trans. Singer 1997: 27.
37Trans. after Singer 1997: 27
38Vallance 1999: 231.
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mentators’ encounters with Hippocrates — an elaborate performance of which Galen
is the sole author. This provides negative examples to which he compares favourably
as an interpreter of the ur-text, but it also performs his mastery of the tradition itself.
He can see through commentaries to the people (commentators) and mental actions
(interpretive commenting) beneath them. Galen, like Gellius, performs his readings on
several registers at once. He shows his superior, independent access to more antique
readings (whether individual words or authoritative texts39), but also his panoptic, total
grasp of a chaotic tradition.40 Finally, he enhances his authority by showing himself
commenting on philosophical as well as medical texts, and connecting the two activit-
ies. That he is something of a philosopher makes him all the more authoritative as a
doctor.41
Commentary binds a tradition together, and tradition authorises a discipline.42 A
discipline might justify itself to outsiders by indicating (or inventing) the presence and
mechanics of its tradition. A practitioner in a discipline can authorise oneself both
to co-disciplinarians and to outsiders by showing a command of that tradition. To
stake a new claim for authority in a tradition, especially a tradition with canonical
or antique texts behind it, is to indicate familiarity (but not dependence) on previous
authorities and simultaneously to display one’s own original and direct interface with
those primary texts. What we might term “interdisciplinarity” is just another feather in
the commentator’s cap, and a way of testing the boundaries of tradition. These themes
of influence, and the idea of imagining past writers as having a prior text or person
in mind as they write, are also to be found in other spheres of thought, such as the
diiudicatio locorum approach to comparative translation criticism found throughout the
Noctes, in which passages of Latin authors are considered as emulation or adaptation of
39von Staden 2009: 146.
40Vallance 1999: 241.
41He argues as much, in more general terms, in another treatise That the best doctor is a philosopher.
42For another study of Galen’s disciplinary commentary, von Staden 2002: 109-23.
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Greek poets.43 Gellius’s attitude toward commentary and disciplinary tradition reflects
a larger understanding of where literature comes from.
It remains now to examine in-depth Gellius’s engagement with tradition in the
course of his various literary and historical enquiries, in order to better understand
how, for him, acknowledging the presence of — and narrating his relationship to —
intellectual traditions functions, rhetorically, within his larger programme in the Noctes.
I will examine how he problematises aetiologies and interpretive traditions to prompt
reflection on the transmission of knowledge, how he constructs rival scholars through
different encounters with their work, and how he shows these complex attitudes toward
tradition in action towards specific goals of resolving questions and becoming informed
on a topic. It is important to note that the distinction between primary and secondary
literature that is so operative in modern thought does not map easily onto antiquity.44
But my argument in this chapter will ultimately be that Gellius inserts the familiar
dynamics of “secondary” literature into “real-life” activities of research, reading and
learning in order to model for his reader more productive and critically aware approaches
to intellectual traditions.
43Vardi 1996.
44Sluiter 2000: 198-9. “Secondariness”, as this chapter will show, is a phenomenon that emerges
from particular values of what constitutes primacy or “the classical” — and, more importantly, from
a specific idea about how later texts relate to earlier ones. In Gellius’s case, they relate by way of the
later author’s attentiveness and ability. Vardi 2004 reminds us there was no ancient formal genre of
“miscellany either”: in many ways, then, Gellius’s generic situation is, by its nature, ad hoc, and may
at first elude the reader.
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4.2 Gellian essays: case studies of traditions in ac-
tion
4.2.1 Questionable advice on questionable advice (4.5)
In Gellius’s “essays”, his engagement with another authority as he answers a ques-
tion or discusses a topic can often signal a shift in register or focus for the piece, pointing
the way for the reader to that “further study”. Noctes 4.5 neatly illustrates this tech-
nique. I will show that Gellius’s treatment of what seems to be a single question —
the origin of a common saying — reframes the question as one with multiple possible
answers, adding a dimension to the discussion by offering an alternative answer and
placing the decision between alternatives at the point of encounter with the original
material.
4.5 offers to connect a story from the chronologically vague distant Roman past to
an aetiology for a verse sententia. It begins with a portentous event, and describes the
treacherous deception of the Etruscans summoned to Rome to expiate it. At this point
it has the tones of annalistic primary material, although Gellius provides no specific
citation or quotation (as he does elsewhere when it suits him).45
statua Romae in comitio posita Horatii Coclitis, fortissimi uiri, de caelo tacta est.
ob id fulgur piaculis luendum aruspices ex Etruria acciti inimico atque hostili in
populum Romanum animo instituerant eam rem contrariis religionibus procurare
atque illam statuam suaserunt in inferiorem locum perperam transponi, quem sol
oppositu circum undique altarum aedium numquam illustraret.
At Rome, the statue located in the comitium of that boldest man, Horatius
Cocles, was struck from the heavens. The haruspices summoned from Etruria for
the sake of offering expiation for the lightning decided, because of their unfriendly
and hostile attitude toward the Roman people, to administer contrary religion
in the matter; they recommended incorrectly that that statue be relocated to a
45Frier 1979: 58 hopes it might be original. Cf 4.6.1-2, a collection of notes based on a question
arising from the specific language of a senatusconsultum that Gellius quotes verbatim. We should read
the annalistic style of 4.5.1 as an authorial choice.
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lower place, which, surrounded on every side by the obstruction of high buildings,
the sun never illuminated. (4.5.1-3)
The sparse style is unlike Gellius and efficiently lends the passage an air of antiquity.46
The tale continues, without explanation or detail, as the treachery is exposed and
punished, and the children of Rome express the moral of the story in a jingle.
tum igitur, quod in Etruscos aruspices male consulentis animadversum uindicatum-
que fuerat, uersus hic scite factus cantatusque esse a pueris urbe tota fertur:
malum consilium consultori pessimum est.
Then, therefore, because their bad advice had been noticed and brought in pun-
ishment against the Etruscan haruspices, it is said that this verse was knowingly
conceived and chanted by boys all over the city:
Bad advice is worst for the adviser.
(4.5.5)
Up to this point, the narrative bears all the hallmarks of exemplary discourse as, by
making the Etruscans the subject of all verbs including their own death, the story
focuses on them as ethical agents. The sententia that expresses the moral of the story
is then seen to emerge as if from the collective ethical consciousness of the Roman
people: even the children can see the Etruscans’ crime, and together they express it in
a memorable Latin form. The story is pat and engaging, giving a colourful origin to
what may well have been a common expression.47 But at the last minute, Gellius backs
away from responsibility for its veracity (fertur).
Gellius’s citation on the story changes immediately into a further observation that
casts doubt on the whole discussion, inviting his reader to see it in, as it were, three
dimensions: to evaluate the tale as the product of one tradition, but not the only one,
and to consider alternatives. Perhaps explaining the curious style of the Latin, Gellius
46Cf 4.6.
47Frier 1979: 60.
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notes that the story of the jingle’s origin is from the Annales Maximi and a book of
Verrius Flaccus’s — but that it seems to him to have another origin entirely.
ea historia de aruspicibus ac de uersu isto senario scripta est in annalibus max-
imis, libro undecimo, et in Verri Flacci libro primo rerum memoria dignarum.
uidetur autem uersus hic de Graeco illo Hesiodi uersu expressus:
ἡ δἐ κακἠ βουλἠ τῷ βουλεύσαντι κακίστη.
This story about the haruspices and that senarius verse is written in the Annales
Maximi, in Book XI, and in the first book of Verrius Flaccus’s Res Memoria
Dignae. However, it seems to be a verse-from-verse translation of that line of
Hesiod’s:
Bad advice is worst for the advice-giver.
(4.5.6-7)48
Verrius is cast here in the role of a ready reference work, likely more accessible than the
Annales themselves.49 By arranging the material as he does, Gellius implies a narrative
of reading and reflection, in which he encountered the Verrius version of the story, but
had his own reaction to it; it also implies a version of Verrius’s reading in which the
earlier author was insufficiently inattentive. The same processes played out in detail
with Pliny the Elder (above, p121) here are present between the lines.
Gellius’s innocent observation about the origins of the uersus are a challenge to
Verrius’s authority as a guide to the relationship between Rome’s present and its antique
past. The shift here is jarring, reminiscent of (or perhaps foreshadowing) the end of
Noctes 18.5, where Antonius Julianus’s authoritative claims to autopsy are later found
to be the stuff of notebooks. The line was, Gellius suggests, translated verbatim from
a Greek γνώμη.50 In narrating his recognition of this fact (uidetur), Gellius stages
48Gellius typically follows several items on a topic with an authorial intrusion about other relevant
items, e.g. 1.13.9, 2.3.5, 6.11.6, 12.4.3, 14.4.5. For closing with an alternate detail, 3.7, 6.4, 10.27,
6.19, 7.7, 9.10, 10.27. Cf 9.11.1.
49Rawson 1991: 15.
50Hesiod, Works and Days 266. Morgan 2007: 84-90 on “gnomai” generally. uersus... de... uersu ex-
pressus recalls the expression uerbum de uerbo expressum at 11.16.3, which refers to literal translation,
perhaps suggesting a pun; and indeed here the word orders closely match.
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his encounter with the uersus and seems to invite his reader to imagine Verrius’s own
(failed) encounter. With only this briefest gesture to the moment of encounter with
the central element of this inquiry, Gellius destabilises the rest of the passage, breaking
the simple aetiological inquiry out of its normal frame. 4.5’s capitulum promised it
would relate the story that is told about the haruspices, and the fact that the uersus
had its origins in that story.51 By the end of the article, Gellius has framed its central
anecdote not as an authoritative or exclusive account, but as just one of several possible
accounts.
This engages with several programmatic aspects of Gellian reading.52 Perhaps most
destabilising to this very Roman exemplum is Gellius’s suggestion that its resultant
uersus is not natively Latin but a mere translation from Greek, an interpretation that
echoes Gellius’s approach elsewhere to understanding canonical Latin literary works.53
Gellius’s recognition of this fact depends both on his Greek literacy (advocated through-
out the Noctes) and on his particular, Plutarch-derived style of reading, which — as
discussed in the previous chapter — emphasises the identification, extraction and dy-
namic later recall of important material. Plutarch himself extracted the line from
Hesiod and invokes it twice in the Moralia.54 Some or all of the language of 4.5 may
be from the Annales, or from Verrius, but its overall form, approach and message are
Gellius through and through. It reflects Gellius’s awareness that Rome’s past pervades
its present, and that behind every piece of the modern landscape (whether of the city
or the language) there is a story. It also shows that background to be subject to evalu-
51cap.4.5: Historia narrata de perfidia aruspicum Etruscorum; quodque ob eam rem uersus hic a
pueris Romae urbe tota cantatus est: “malum consilium consultori pessimum est”.
52Although Morgan forthcoming’s discussion of evidence for the use of moralising compendia —
mostly in the form of related sententiae quoted in proximity or series — might suggest what truly
underlies this passage.
53Vardi 1996 describes the Gellian understanding of literary influence and tradition, specifically as
regards Latin emulation and imitation of Greek. Other parallel anecdotes: 1.5, 1.17, 3.25, 4.1 (esp.),
6.14.6-7, 11.18. Other parallel translations: 1.8, 2.27, 13.28, 16.8.4-6, 17.10, 19.11, 20.5. Cf more
general parity, above p72.
54Poetry 36A and De sera numinis vindicta A554.
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ation, the product of a tradition; that tradition’s authority is shown to be conditional
on its author’s credentials as a reader. Gellius, in this very brief essay (almost a single
note unto itself), models an interest in and an ability to research and discuss antique
Rome, but also an ability to say, in response to the usual account of such a topic,
“I think you’ll find it’s more complicated than that”, authorising his command of the
everyday stuff of Roman rhetoric and knowledge.
Finally, it is worth noting the self-reflexive undertones in 4.5, which comes after a
series of articles that refer to consulting jurists for authoritative explanations.55 Verrius
Flaccus is, here and elsewhere, cast by Gellius in the role of an authority a reader
might turn to for advice in reading. The tale’s exempla-style focus on the ethical
agency and ultimate fate of the Etruscans in their role as advisers may be an oblique
gesture to the fate of Verrius’s authority. The Romans turned to the Etruscans as
religious authorities, but that customary authority was undermined by these Etruscans’s
deceptive and spiteful nature, which led them to give bad advice. Bad advice, the story
says, is always found out, and has consequences. In the Noctes, Verrius gives bad
advice, but Gellius notices it, and makes a point of undermining the earlier writer’s
authority.56 Both Plutarch’s philosophical reading programme and Roman exemplary
thinking oblige the reader of a story to examine its ethical implications in context and
apply them to other circumstances.57 Gellius would be satisfying both approaches in
using this story of unreliable authorities to provide his reader with an examination of
the nature of authority.
55In 4.1, Favorinus and Gellius demonstrate their recall of juristic definitions of penus. 4.2 is the
story of an obscure provision in the curule aediles’ edict, as a result of which the iure consulti ueteres
inquired into the meaning of key terms. 4.3 and 4.4 cite the jurist Servius Sulpicius on divorce; 4.3
ends with a vocabulary note: ut pleraque alia, ita hoc quoque uocabulum de Graeco flexum est (4.3.3).
56By which no one should be impressed (17.6.4-5, discussed above, p.174)
57Langlands 2008.
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4.2.2 Pythagoras’s beans and the afterlife of error (4.11)
Now I will examine Noctes 4.11, which takes the vagaries of intellectual tradition
as a central topic. Gellius here participates in a long tradition of interpretive debate,
exploring one of the more notorious of the many cryptic sayings by which the wisdom
of Pythagoras was transmitted.58 The Pythagoreans regularly attempted to discern the
hidden meaning behind such sayings.59 This would have appealed to Gellius’s interest
in interpretation; also of interest, in his treatment in 4.11, is the way that an erroneous
interpretation can enter the tradition, as earlier readers’ failed encounters with the
cryptic primary text are repeated by later, even less skeptical readers. That Pythagoras
forbade his followers to eat beans was a popular target of those seeking to discredit the
sect, but the saying also prompted serious interpretive effort as early as Aristotle.60
Gellius’s eye would have been caught by the inherent problem of textual interpretation,
as the views of Pythagoras — legitimately of interest to Gellius elsewhere, as at 1.9 —
were accessible only through the writings of his immediate followers like Empedocles.61
As I will show, Gellius sketches out a diachronic ecosystem of individuals responding
to texts in ways that illustrate their abilities and affect their own later readers.
The opening lines of Gellius’s assault feature strong language. Two common ideas,
Pythagoras’s abstention from beans and from animals, are condemned as fallacies, and
he proceeds to illustrate the auspicious pages in which the error lives on:
opinio uetus falsa occupauit et conualuit Pythagoram philosophum non esitauisse
ex animalibus item abstinuisse fabulo, quem Graeci κύαμον appellant. ex hac
opinione Callimachus poeta scripsit: [. . . ] ex eadem item opinione M. Cicero in
libro de Divinatione primo haec uerba posuit: [. . . ]
An ancient and false opinion has taken root and thrived, that the philosopher
Pythagoras did not partake of animals and likewise abstained from the bean,
which Greeks call κύαμον. As a result of this opinion the poet Callimachus wrote:
58Johansen 1998: 37.
59Burkert 1972: 174.
60Burkert 1972: 183-4.
61Huffman 1999: 76-7.
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[. . . ] As a result of the same opinion Marcus Cicero in his first book On Divination
wrote these words: [. . . ] (4.11.1-3)
Pythagorean anti-legumism is framed as an opinio, a sort of subjective idea that is often
open to examination and, when expressed, may require the citation of an authority.
Authorial compositional choices are a direct result of opiniones — Callimachus and
Cicero, great antique scholars of their respective cultures, both accepted the idea, and
their work is evidence of it. But Gellius has not yet proven his assertion of the idea’s
falseness; unlike the case of the lions in Homer and Herodotos, it is these well-known
authorities’ word against a less prominent source, whom Gellius accordingly introduces
by commending both his individual intellectual character and the tradition to which he
belonged:62
sed Aristoxenus musicus, uir litterarum ueterum diligentissimus, Aristoteli philo-
sophi auditor, in libro, quem de Pythagora reliquit, nullo saepius legumento Py-
thagoram dicit usum quam fabis, quoniam is cibus et subduceret sensim aluum et
leuigaret.
But Aristoxenus the musician, a man most attentive to ancient letters, a student
of Aristotle the philosopher, in the book he left behind On Pythagoras, said that
Pythagoras used no legume more often than the bean, because that dish both
slowly lifts up and smooths the belly. (4.11.4)
Gellius quotes Aristoxenus’s assertion that Pythagoras specifically recommended beans.
Aristoxenus, with what Gellius casts as the authority of antique proximity, also contra-
dicts the claims of vegetarianism (.6-7).
Contradictions must be reconciled, and for Gellius this means (as in the case of the
lions) understanding not just which is correct but the origins of the error.63 Gellius
makes the recognition of the original error a matter of personal observation on his part,
in which he looks at what turns out to be the original primary material and imagines
erroneous and correct readings alike.
62Gunderson 2009: 66.
63As in 7.8.6. Cf 7.12.1.
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uidetur autem de κὐαμῳ non esitato causam erroris fuisse, quia in Empedocli
carmine, qui disciplinas Pythagorae secutus est, uersus hic invenitur:
δειλοί, piάνδειλοι, κυάμων ἄpiο χεῖρας ἔχεσθαι.
opinati enim sunt plerique κυάμους legumentum dici, ut a uulgo dicitur. sed qui
diligentius scitiusque carmina Empedocli arbitrati sunt, κυάμους hoc in loco testic-
ulos significare dicunt, eosque more Pythagorae operte atque symbolice κυάμους
appellatos, quod sint αἴτιοι τοῦ κυεῖν et geniturae humanae uim praebeant; idcir-
coque Empedoclen uersu isto non a fabulo edendo, sed a rei ueneriae proluuio
uoluisse homines deducere.
However, it seems that the cause of the error about not eating the bean is that
in a poem of Empedocles, who was a student of the Pythagorean teachings, this
verse is found:
Miserable ones, wholly miserable ones, keep your hands off the beans.
Many supposed that “beans” meant the legume, as it is commonly used. But
those who have considered the poems of Empedocles more diligently and know-
ledgeably say that here, “beans” signify testicles, which were called “beans” in
the obscure and symbolic way of Pythagoras, because they are the “origin of con-
ception” and supply the force of human reproduction; and therefore that Empe-
docles by that verse wished to dissuade men not from eating beans but from an
abundance of sexual activity. (4.11.9-10)
Opinati... plerique recalls 4.11’s opening lines and answers the question of how
the opinio uetus falsa occupauit et conualuit (4.11.1). Opiniones do not exist in a
vacuum: they are the result of interpretive acts by readers. Gellius shows himself
seeing individual pieces of knowledge as products of dynamic processes. It is only at this
point, having established that were are good and bad original readers of Empedocles
(the primary source for Pythagorean eating habits, as Gellius would have it) and,
consequently, good and bad traditions on the question, that Gellius clears up the meat-
eating question with an assertion from Plutarch (homo in disciplinis graui auctoritate,
4.11.11).
4.11 models a skeptical response to received wisdom that can be effectively deployed
against the standard elements of philosophical tradition. It shows how established au-
thority may be wrong, and how counterintuitive material might nevertheless be author-
itative. It sketches out a model for the transmission of knowledge and demonstrates
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how to focus on and critically examine different stages of it. Its conclusions may be
improbable, but its conclusions and priorities are typical of Gellius’s understanding of
intellectual tradition. As in 4.5, Gellius has destabilised a piece of common received
knowledge in terms that focus his reader’s attention on the mechanisms of intellectual
tradition and point out how he or she can find his or her own way — with the right
guides — to an understanding of the antique past.
4.3 The media of “archaism”: the problem with
Tullius Tiro
4.3.1 Slaves, transmission and the Gellian imagination
In eight articles, Gellius encounters Tullius Tiro, the freedman of Marcus Cicero.64
I will now examine Gellius’s treatment of Tiro as a rival author, and analyse the role
Gellius assigns him in the mediation of Imperial-era access to the Republican past.
Gellius, unsettled by the image of a freedman asserting independence in the creation
and transmission of knowledge, systematically criticises Tiro’s credentials as editor and
scholar with oblique but consistent reference to his class.
Tiro, secretary and literary executor to Cicero and scholar and author in his own
right, is ubiquitous at the interface between a second-century CE Roman and his an-
tique past.65 His editorial oversight guarantees manuscripts of the vaunted Cicero, his
scholarship and interpretive essays are closer to the past and his auctoritas is naturally
enriched by that of his former master and patron. Gellius consults him for explorations
of various topics, and finds faults with him, but unlike the grammatical commentators,
64His manumission in 54/53 BCE discussed in Cicero ad Fam. 16.6 (inter al.; Bradley 1994: 1-2).
Treggiari 1969: 259-63.
65Gunderson 2009: 186.
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whose flaws may be easily identified with their status as grammatici, Tiro’s situation
is unique.66 He has no clear professional or social identity. He writes on a range of
topics as wide as Gellius’s own. He is simultaneously a guarantee of others’ texts and
an author of his own texts. Like Pliny, Tiro is a post-Republican author who has
made a claim to ubiquitous authority, but whose ultimate place in the canon is not yet
secure. And just as Pliny’s equestrian, acquisitive, militant project of imperial data-
hoarding challenges Gellius’s conservative vision of the gentleman-scholar as an orator
with philosophical inclinations, Tiro’s personal history, his move from the state of reli-
able and obedient amanuensis to independent and assertive freedman-scholar presented
an unsettling threat to the very machinery of Roman literary activity.
Tiro’s metamorphosis from amanuensis-slave – and his corresponding dual role in the
Roman intellectual tradition — would have been an unsettling one for elite Romans
accustomed to slaves as the ubiquitous machinery of their lives and literary work.
Slaves read aloud to their masters, took dictation, copied notes, produced manuscripts,
managed letters, carried messages. Roman literature depended on slaves’ functioning,
as the Younger Pliny shows his uncle’s secretaries in the litter, as obedient machines,
conduits for ideas and texts. Yet they had to exert some intellectual independence,
in overseeing copying, or editing their masters’ work, or managing a master’s library,
or devising such organisational or tachygraphical schemes as were necessary for those
duties. Though they occupied an inhuman role, slaves’ owners could not but see them
as human.67 Writers reflect this discomfort in acknowledging slaves’ presence, whether
it is the back-talking Davus of Horace or the nameless amanuensis who can, Quintilian
muses, even when just taking dictation, make the writer working “alone” feel self-
conscious.68 For a slave to thus emerge from the closely circumscribed mechanical role
66Although many grammatici, like Tiro, were freedmen or the sons thereof.
67Fitzgerald 2000 generally discusses the phenomenon, esp. p88ff for the discomforting implications,
for the free, of enslavement.
68Fitzgerald 2000: 20ff for Davus. Quintilian Inst 10.3.18-20.
193
of the amanuensis, the transmitter of a master’s ideas, to claim indepdendent authority
on a par with his former master, and so begin transmitting his own ideas, thus challenges
the basic premises of the relationship.69
Like women, slaves are largely invisible in the Noctes, considered more often as ob-
jects to which certain kinds of law apply than as individuals.70 They feature occasionally
in anecdotes, performing normal duties and facilitating their masters’ lifestyles.71 The
exception is 2.19, the list of slaves who were also philosophers; they were distinguished
by their superior capacity for philosophy or, in a few cases, by being owned by renowned
philosophers. It is the most interesting of these that may help us better understand
Gellius’s response to Tiro: a passage that offers a striking image of interpretation and
transmission, and a glimpse of the roles slaves were assumed to play in those processes.
In 17.9, Gellius collects four examples of clever cryptographic strategies from history:
Caesar’s cipher (17.9.1-5), the Spartan σκυτάλη (.6-15), a Carthaginian writing on wax
tablets’ wood backing (.16-7), and Histiaeus tattooing a slave’s scalp (.18-25). Each of
the first three are, in their way, a subversion of normal textual practice. Not even the
basic elements of interpretation, the syllable, can be extracted from Caesar’s epistles.72
The unnamed Carthaginian writes on the wrong part of the writing medium (but where
anyone used to using them would know you might inadvertently make a mark if you
pressed too hard). Gellius is concerned throughout the Noctes with having the right
context and external knowledge needed to interpret something correctly: his interest in
69Fitzgerald 2000: 13 discusses the slave as part of his master’s mind. Tiro is of course a freedman,
not a slave, and a certain amount of loyalty was expected from a freedman in the world of letters;
consider Pompey’s freedman, Lenaeus, profiled as a grammaticus by Suetonius (Gramm 15) and con-
sulted once by Gellius (17.16, possibly after Pliny, who cites him in Book 25, also Gellius’s source for
hellebore in 17.15).
70On women, e.g. 4.3. Slaves: 4.2, 5.19, 6.4, 11.18, 17.6. Bradley 1994: 107-8 observes unique
attention to the slave’s perspective in the Androcles story at 5.14.7.
711.11, 3.19, 15.22, 20.1. See also 2.23, 5.6, 5.14, 10.3, 17.8.
72In his epistulis quibusdam in locis inueniuntur litterae singulariae sine coagmentis syllabarum,
quas tu putes positas incondite; nam uerba ex his litteris confici nulla possunt. (17.9.2) Syllables
were fundamental elements of literacy; ancient readers learned them along with letters, and they were
considered the building-blocks of words.
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17.9, aside from historical curiosity, is likely this image of hidden text, this metaphor
for the extraction of knowledge and construction of meaning.73 His unique take on the
Histiaeus story offers us a glimpse of his values concerning the role of slaves in the
process: he has Histiaeus select for the scheme a slave whose eyesight had long since
deteriorated (seruo suo diu oculos aegros habenti . . . ), the better to explain the shaving
of his head as pre-operative.74 A slave with poor eyes would also be unsuitable for the
duties of an amanuensis, but he can still transmit his master’s instructions. His body is
paper on which Histiaeus may write. The slave’s role as means of transmission is here
in its purest form: rendered completely passive by the process, he does not mediate in
the slightest its content.75 He is, as we would see it, a mechanism by which an order
is transmitted from Histiaeus to his lieutenant.76 The tale may be about Histiaeus’s
ingenuity, but it also hints at Gellius’s ideal for the role slaves should play in the lives of
men of letters. Accustomed to dictation himself, Gellius would count on slaves to take
down his words faithfully, edit and transcribe them accurately, and, later, read them out
correctly.77 The production, distribution, and consumption of literature depended on
slaves being as passive and inert as Histiaeus’s blind, tattooed messenger. Some slaves
may have been smart enough to become philosophers, but their role in thought and
communication is as vessels, unthinking machines connecting ears and eyes to hands
and mouth, their bodies so much paper waiting to receive and transmit their masters’
thoughts.
In this context, a culture that depended on slaves as semi-mechanical, highly limited
73Holford-Strevens 2003: 319 assures us all are from “a source, compiling στρατηγήματα”, but admits
the theme here is “clandestine letters. Compare here Gellius’s solution to the bean problem at 4.11.”
Gellius recommends a commentary by Probus for help deciphering the Caesar cipher.
74Cf Herodotos 5.35. Holford-Strevens 2003: 305, 319. Richmond 1998: 11, Leighton 1969: 142,
Reinke 1962: 114 (for whom Gellius is an “anecdotist”!).
75Such passivity recalls the sexual dynamics of slavery.
76ita litterae perlatae sunt. (.27) “Perfero” can refer to the physical as well as the interpretive aspects
of communication (OLD s.v. perfero (2c)).
77Rust 2009: 142f, adducing interestingly Reay 2005: 335 on “masterly extensability”. Cf 3.18.9
(versum. . . notari iussimus. . . .) vs. inter al) 10.22.3 (verba ipsa. . . scripsi). Whiteley 1978: 105.
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in their autonomy, Tullius Tiro could have seemed profoundly unsettling. Freedmen,
especially in the Imperial period, were ambiguous. Their influence and potential for
social improvement tremendous, but their literary and cultural aspirations distasteful
and threatening to the freeborn elite.78 Freedmen permeated various intellectual and
educational spheres at Rome; indeed, histories of fields like grammar and rhetoric give
freedmen a key role in those fields’ development.79 But Tiro transitioned between
the two roles while remaining close to the same figure and interests: his activities as
freedman were constant reminders of his enslaved past (not uniquely, of course, as we
see from the case of Pompey’s freedman Lenaeus80). The idea of a slave moving from
the role of amanuensis to author might, then, stir in a man like Gellius — so concerned
with the circumstances of literary production and transmission — anxieties that we
express today in science fiction with the image of computers and robots transcending
the autonomy and capacity with which we have endowed them, asserting their own
individuality or self-awareness; these anxieties in modern fiction, too, orbit around
similar questions of humanity and individuality as the ones which were inescapable for
the free members of antiquity’s slaveholding societies.81
Gellius seeks not to write Tiro out of existence but to condition his use by others
by drawing attention to his influence and his failings.82 In the passages I will now
discuss, Gellius encounters Tiro in the course of learning various things about the Latin
language and the city of Rome in the past. Whether he is trying to learn about how
Cicero spoke Latin, or how the Republican Senate functioned, Gellius finds Tiro as
78Bloomer 1997: 197-8, Nauta 2002: 21, Keulen 2009: 261-2. Gellius 5.19.11-12 quotes Masurius for
the opinion that freedmen should never be allowed the status of freeborn.
79Vogt 1974: 125-9, Treggiari 1969: 110-128 (and for other fields, 119-42). Gellius adds little to
these histories.
80Suetonius de Gramm. 15.
81Bradley 1994: 132-45 for a survey of various Roman responses to these questions. It is a striking
metric of the depth (or lackthereof) of Gellius’s engagement with philosophy that, unlike Seneca, he
reveals no interest in the moral issues of slavery.
82Cf Gunderson 2009: 186.
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the intermediary authority. But as he consults Tiro as a scholar in his own right, he
finds obvious errors of interpretation that call his role as handmaiden of Ciceronian
knowledge into doubt. In one lengthy engagement, Gellius uses a close critical reading
of Tiro’s own critical work to indicate fundamental flaws in Tiro’s authority. All Tiro
knows, he knows because he was Cicero’s libertus ; all he does not know, he never could,
being at his core still a seruus. Tiro’s manifest errors in reading will be finally traced
to the source of his ubiquitous authority: even at the point of his encounter with his
master Cicero’s works, he was committing the failures of interpretation characteristic
of the insufficiently learned.83
4.3.2 Tironian care
Antique Latin needed to be accurate down to the letter. Imperial readers might
wish to embellish their own Latin with archaic spellings, but they might also learn
stylistic lessons from antique Latin spellings. The principle of euphony, an important
part of Gellius’s values for good Latin, demands that the speaker or writer of Latin
consider which of multiple possible spellings sounds best in a given context.84 Thus to
appreciate an older writer’s mastery of this principle, Imperial readers needed to be sure
that the given spelling they had encountered was, in fact, original. On encountering a
surprising spelling in an older text, two questions had to be asked:
1. Is the spelling grammatically correct and/or common at the time the text was
written?
2. What is the effect the author’s choice of that spelling?
83Keulen 2009: 258-64 and Gunderson 2009: 186-193 have both touched on Gellius’s engagement
with Tiro.
84On euphony, 2.17.
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Given the high error rate of transcription, ancient readers may have been quick to
correct apparent errors; Quintilian testifies to this as a risk of letting students read
Cato’s archaic Latin before they are properly prepared.85 Readers who overzealously
“correct” archaic spelling both harm the future transmission of that text and deprive
themselves of the chance to learn from the author’s choice of that spelling.
In two scenes, Gellius models this behaviour and Tiro’s important role as guarantor
of the individual letters of a Ciceronian text.86 In 1.7, a scene of narrated conversation
discussed already in Chapter 1, overzealous students, delighted to have apparently
caught Cicero in the act (manifestarius), wish to correct a “u” to an “a”.87 They fail
the first test, but Gellius’s more learned friend passes, observing that the word they
have seen is not the participle they suspect, but is rather an infinitive. This prompts a
lengthy discussion of the nature and use of the infinitive. Gellius appends some notes
of his own on other instances of the infinitive.88 His final example prompts him to
reflect on the principle of euphony which Cicero followed (.19-20). The entire chain
of reflection, though, begins with the simple guarantee of manuscript quality, and the
overzealous students are set up for failure by Gellius’s introduction of the reading in
question being found
in libro spectatae fidei Tironiana cura atque disciplina facto
in a book of evident fidelity (having been produced with Tironian care and dis-
cipline)(1.7.1)
There is no criticism whatsoever implied here.89 Tiro emerges as an adjectival guarantor
of quality: passive but indispensable in his role, which is to provide cura. But cura —
care, or attention — is a subjective quality.
85Inst 9.4.39.
86Holford-Strevens 2003: 190 finds it unlikely the manuscripts and readings in question are in fact
authentic, but they are treated as such.
87neque dubitabant, quin liber emendandus esset, ne, ut in Plauti comoedia moechus, sic enim mendae
suae inludiabant, ita in Ciceronis oratione soloecismus esset “manifestarius”. (1.7.3)
88Gunderson 2009: 144.
89Rust 2009: 55-6.
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13.21 is a lengthy exposition of euphony made up various examples collected by
Gellius and prompted by a secondhand anecdote about the grammarian Probus. Pro-
bus, whose scholarship Gellius generally approves of and recommends, was apparently
asked a question familiar to any Latin student: in the case of two different but gram-
matically correct spellings for the same form of a word, which one the speaker ought
to use (13.21.1).90 Probus, perhaps illustrating why he is among Gellius’s favoured
grammatical scholars, explains that this question cannot be answered by the rules of
grammarians, but instead must be answered by the principle of euphony: which one
sounds better? Even after Probus provides several examples, the questioner fails to
comprehend, and Probus angrily dismisses him as hopeless (.8-.9). Casting this les-
son as a dialogic encounter (even secondhand) helps Gellius to make the point: as the
reader watches the tin-eared boor fail to appreciate euphony, the point is underlined
that euphony is not an objective quality that can be prescribed by a rule but rather
exists in the ear of the hearer.91
Putting the lesson in the mouth of Probus is necessary for the problem of textual ac-
curacy.92 Probus, the great scholar of Vergil, knows whereof he speaks when, attempting
to illustrate the principle of euphony, he invokes the authority of a manuscript:
nam in primo Georgicon, quem ego, inquit, librum manu ipsius correctum legi,
“urbis” per i litteram scripsit. uerba e uersibus eius haec sunt: “urbisne inuisere,
Caesar . . . ”
“For in the first book of the Georgics, which I,” he said, “read in an edition edited
by his own hand, he wrote urbis with the letter I. These are his words from that
verse: urbisne inuisere, Caesar . . . ” (13.21.4)93
When the difference is between “i” and “e”, that the text be guaranteed by the author’s
own hand is essential. Similarly, when Gellius has embarked on his own collection of
90Cf 1.15.18. On this see Rust 2009: 68-74.
91For Probus’s speech, cf 4.7, 9.9.12.
92Holford-Strevens 2003: 163-4.
93Cf 9.14.
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such examples, he reminds us that Tiro is similarly important for close readings of
Cicero.
itidem in secunda [in Verrem] simili usus modulamine “manifesto peccatu” inquit,
non “peccato”; hoc enim scriptum in uno atque in altero antiquissimae fidei libro
Tironiano repperi. uerba sunt Ciceronis haec: . . .
Likewise in his second [Verrine], using a similar melody, he said manifesto peccatu,
not peccato; for this is written in one and another Tironian editions of most
antique fidelity. These are the words of Cicero: . . . (13.21.16-17)
Tiro’s name commanded a high price for a manuscript at Antonine Rome, perhaps
high enough that some manuscripts claiming to be Tironian were not.94 If this worried
Gellius, he does not show it; and indeed, given the sophistication of Gellius’s under-
standing of textual transmission, it seems likely that procedures existed for identifying
fakes. Tironiana cura, like autographs of Vergil or Ennius, were worth paying for, for
the valuable access they provided — the closest that would ever be possible for an
Imperial reader — to the Latin of an earlier time. Textual errors, Gellius reminds
his reader, may be hiding anywhere, and they are, by the basic mechanisms of book
culture, easily both introduced and reproduced. Manuscript quality was an important
authority to claim for a close reading. As with other things that are the product of
tradition, Gellius keeps one eye on the mechanism of the tradition itself; in this case,
there is more to see of Tiro than just his name on a manuscript.
4.3.3 Turning to Tiro for words and facts
As Cicero’s companion and assistant, Tiro provides anecdotal accounts of Cicero’s
handling of particular situations, and reports at secondhand events that Cicero wit-
nessed that might also be of interest. In these situations, Tiro is a silent but undeniable
presence: Gellius finds no grounds for criticism, and depends on him for the Ciceronian
94Holford-Strevens 2003: 190, Reynolds and Wilson 1991: 29-30.
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chreia; but they are another example of Tiro’s proximity to Cicero and his role as ex-
ecutor of Cicero’s intellectual estate. These accounts also appear in Tiro’s own works,
written independently of his duties as Cicero’s secretary, and Gellius finds himself turn-
ing to those books for the learning they purport to contain about other, non-Ciceronian
matters. But there, Tiro’s departure from his duties as amanuensis threatens to be his
undoing. As ever, Gellius, in reading Tiro, also reads Tiro’s own reading.
For the Imperial reader wondering what Cicero did or saw in a certain situation, Tiro
is the most sympathetic and reliable source. At 10.1, Gellius, looking into the history
of Pompey’s inscription of TERT on his theater to avoid committing to TERTIUM or
TERTIO, finds in a letter by Tiro an account of Cicero’s role in the matter;95 Varro
had ascribed the choice to Pompey’s timidity, but Cicero had in fact recommended
the noncommittal abbreviation in the name of tact (10.1.7).96 In his research on the
protocols of the Senate, and their disruption at the end of the Republic, Gellius reads
Tiro’s report that Cicero heard Caesar give the Senate a reason for his violation of one
particular procedure (4.10.6). There, Gellius emphasises that Tiro’s knowledge is not
firsthand: refert itaque se ex patrono suo audisse scribit. Tiro depends on Cicero, as
he did for his education and indeed his freedom, for the knowledge that makes him
valuable to later readers. No criticism is made explicit, but Gellius finds the same
fact, with more interesting elaboration, in what seems a more authoritative source, a
book by Ateius Capito On Senatorial Duty (4.10.7). Perhaps Tiro’s secondhand client
knowledge is not the best account available.
Tiro’s proximity to Cicero is implicated in other kinds of knowledge as well. While
Gellius needed Aristotle to settle the disagreement between Homer and Herodotos re-
garding lions in Noctes 13.7, he feels qualified to adjudicate by himself the disagreement
95Gunderson 2009: 186-7.
9610.1, in which Gellius reads Tiro’s letters as he writes a letter of his own, is the only scene in
which Gellius narrates himself writing something other than the Noctes. He is especially fond of
reading letters (e.g. 3.8, 9.13, 14.7.2, 15.7.3, 20.5) and watching them be read and written (13.18).
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of Valgius Rufus and Tullius Tiro about the origins of the word lictor in 12.3. Advert-
ised in the capita as a summary of the disagreements (super eo diuersae sententiae),
the passage is really a pointed critique of Tiro: not only is Rufus’s explanation right
and Tiro’s wrong, but Rufus’s cites evidence from a speech of Cicero’s as authority for
his interpretation.97
. . . utiturque ad eam rem testimonio M. Tulli uerbaque eius refert ex oratione,
quae dicta est Pro C. Rabirio: “Lictor”, inquit “conliga manus”. haec ita Val-
gius. et nos sane cum illo sentimus; sed Tiro Tullius, M. Ciceronis libertus,
“lictorem” uel a “limo” uel a “licio” dictum scripsit: “licio enim transuerso, quod
“limum” appellatur, qui magistratibus” inquit “praeministrabant, cincti erant”.
si quis autem est, qui propterea putat probabilius esse, quod Tiro dixit, quoniam
prima syllaba in “lictore”, sicuti in “licio”, producta est et in eo uerbo, quod est
“ligo”, correpta est, nihil ad rem istuc pertinet. nam sicut a “ligando” “lictor”
et a “legendo” “lector” et a “uiendo” “uitor” et “tuendo” “tutor” et “struendo”
“structor” productis quae corripiebantur uocalibus dicta sunt.
. . . and he cites in this case the testimony of Marcus Tullius and reports his words
from the speech which he gave For Gaius Rabirius: “Lictor”, he says, “bind his
hands.” Thus Valgius. And I happily agree with him; but Tullius Tiro, freedman
of Marcus Cicero, wrote that “lictor” is said from “limus” or “licio”: “For those
who attended on magistrates,” he says, “were wrapped with a transverse string
called a limus.” But if there’s anyone who thus judges what Tiro says more
probable because the first syllable in lictor is long, as it is in licium, while in
ligo it is short, there is nothing to that. For just so, lictor (from ligendum)
and lector (from legendum) and uitor (from uiendum) and tutor (from tuendum)
and structor (from struendum) are spoken with the first vowel, which was short,
elongated. (12.3.1-4)98
The reader is left to form his or her own opinion of the details of Tiro’s account, but
as elsewhere in the Noctes, Gellius is interested not just in critiquing an expert in the
wrong, but in implicating those who venerate that expert’s authority; here he imagines
a response to the disagreement that is sympathetic to Tiro, and explains why it is
wrong. Tiro, whose hand edited the speeches of Cicero, nevertheless does not seem to
have read them as closely as Rufus; and his consequentially erroneous account of lictor
seems correct only to those who themselves do not understand basic principles of Latin
97See Cavazza 2004: 90-1 for the etymologies.
98Cf 4.9.12, 9.6.3.
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vowel quantity. Gellius’s choice of words to demonstrate the lengthening of an initial
“i” also reflects figuratively on this criticism. They recall in part, of course, the duties
of a slave or household servant.99 But more importantly, the linguistic relationship is
based on a conceptual relationship — “reader” comes from “reading”, “weaver” comes
from “weaving”, etc — and Tiro is here, as in every other passage where he is cited,
tagged “freedman of Marcus Cicero”. If that is what Tiro is, what activity does that
title imply? For all the significance of Tironiana cura in 1.7 and 13.21, being Cicero’s
freedman does not seem to guarantee much close attention to his works.
Gellius moves on, in 13.9, to criticise Tiro explicitly as a scholarly writer — and
his works as a useful guide to the antique past — in terms by now familiar to us.
Gellius has encountered Tiro’s account of the origins of a Latin constellation name,
the suculae, and found it wanting. In 2.21, discussed in Chapter 1, Gellius established
constellation names as an important locus for cultural situation: there, he divided his
fellow students into those who were interested in the minutiae of Greek knowledge,
and those who were well-informed about Latin culture.100 In the case of the suculae,
Tiro has attributed to the ancient Romans some poor linguistic reasoning from Greek:
imagining the Greek name ὑάδες to have its origins in the Greek word for a pig, they
used a diminutive of the equivalent Latin term (13.9.4).101 He condemns the Roman
ueteres as ignorant of Greek — rudes and opici.102 Gellius feels obliged to defend the
ueteres, arguing that rather than reverse-engineering the idea behind the Greek name,
99Bradley 1994: 61-5. For structor cf Petronius 35.2. On lictores Starr 1991
100The cultural politics of this are obscure but no doubt significant; neither Greece nor Rome has
chronologically prior claim on the sky, but Greek astronomy dominated by the Imperial period, and
the negotiation of constellation names between cultures and across time must have involved some sort
of rationalisation process not unlike that involved in colour-words (Noctes 2.26).
101For Holford-Strevens 2003: 282, Gellius’s condemnation of Tiro for this is evidence that he “does
not know” Cicero’s de Natura Deorum, in which the same account is given (2.111). But accounts are
also given in Ovid (Fasti 159-82) and Pliny the Elder (HN 18.247); we might just as well say Gellius
has singled Tiro out. The Hyades also come up in Horace Odes 1.3.14, one of the poems that might
lie behind the discussion of 2.22 that in turn seems linked to the other astronomy conversation of 2.21.
102Cavazza 2004: 91-3. For opicus cf 2.21.4, 11.16.7.
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they simply re-expressed it in Latin as syades, which naturally became suculae by the
normal processes of vowel changes in Latin.103 Aside from the fact that Tiro has also
not even properly identified where the stars in question are (13.9.6104), he appears — in
Gellius’s estimate — to not have a proper grasp of where Latin words come from. Not
only is Tiro inadequate as a mediator of the antique past, but he does not grasp the
processes of mediation that define that past.105 This criticism is particularly pointed
in terms of the article’s opening lines, which appear on first reading to authorise Tiro
as a scholar, but are ironised by what Gellius finds within the scholarship:
Tullius Tiro M. Ciceronis alumnus et libertus adiutorque in litteris studiorum eius
fuit. is libros compluris de usu atque ratione linguae Latinae, item de uariis atque
promiscis quaestionibus composuit. in his esse praecipui uidentur, quos Graeco
titulo Πανδέκτας inscripsit, tamquam omne rerum atque doctrinarum genus con-
tinentis.
Tullius Tiro was brought up by Marcus Cicero, his freedman and assistant in his
literary studies. Tiro composed several books on the use and rules of the Latin
language, and also on varied and indiscriminate inquiries. Of that category, those
volumes seem to be outstanding that he gave the Greek title Pandects, as if they
comprise every sort of matter and learning. (13.9.1-3)
Tiro’s relationship with Cicero should authorise his Latin scholarship; that he composed
additional learned miscellaneous works is not out of the question. And, by Gellius’s own
standards, a work with a title that alludes to Greek learning (or Greek-style learnedness)
should sound promising. But the noncommittal uidentur signals that this introduction
is ambiguous: after all, it was the Greeks that Gellius cast in his Preface (where the
Pandects features in the list of rival works) as the worst offenders of misguided miscel-
lanism, and the encyclopaedic approach, the attempt to include everything sine cura
discriminis (Pr.11) was the essence of that approach.106 Just as Pliny the Elder had
103Gunderson 2009: 187.
104Gunderson 2009: 188.
105Like 4.5, 13.9 hints at a peculiar anxiety on Gellius’s part about the origins of old Latin things,
a noncommittal blurring of the distinction between natively Latin and originally Greek. And like in
2.21, one is an opicus if one is insufficiently attentive to comparative Greek and Latin vocabulary.
106Vardi 2004: 161.
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only been existimatus the most learned man of his age (9.16), and just as the gram-
maticus of 6.17 gave the lie to his reputation primae in docendo celebritatis, Tiro’s
Pandects only seem outstanding. Gellius knows better than to trust a title, and the
learning in his miscellany proves to be flawed, based as it is on apparent ignorance of
the Latin language — which casts doubt on the rest of Tiro’s oeuvre. Gellius shows
Tiro in the act of giving guidance on one subject, authorised by his apparent expertise
in another, then illustrates his failures on both counts. Gellius also, in this direct cri-
tique of Tiro’s own independent work, emphasises Tiro’s proximity to Cicero and the
former’s dependence on the latter, both for learning and auctoritas.
4.3.4 Tiro the critic (6.3)
One of Gellius’s lengthy and most clearly-structured essays is Noctes 6.3, a critical
reading of Tiro’s critical reading of Cato’s Pro Rodiensibus. The essay discusses the
various strengths of the speech in the course of defending it from Tiro’s misguided
criticism. Systematically, Gellius disassembles Tiro’s authority as a reader, indicating
that he is unqualified to read rhetoric in every way: he is blind to context and text
alike, lacks the capacity for the complex ethical reasoning of civic life, and cannot
appreciate rhetorical strategy.107 The terms of each criticism allude to Tiro’s own status:
his blindness to text gives the lie to the authority that derives from his attachment
to Cicero, and both his ethics and his rhetorical strategy are better suited to the
gladiatorial arena than the Roman Forum. In its structure and its narrative language,
6.3 stages Tiro’s own critical work as a series of failed encounters with primary, antique
literature. Though it lacks a clear narrative account of reading, Gellius’s discussion of
Tiro clearly imagines the earlier writer’s own reading, exploring the judgments, faculties
107Keulen 2009: 258-64 focuses on the political content to Tiro’s critique, imagining the emperor as
reader. Morgan 2004: 193-4 notes the emphasis on “defending good rhetoric”. Cf Gunderson 2009:
190-1.
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and reactions that lie behind Tiro’s criticisms. Gellius also uses an evolving rhetoric of
reportage in his own essay to indicate Tiro’s unreliability as a reporter — despite lengthy
quotations — of Cato. The speech, apparently well-known and widely circulated, is, in
Gellius’s estimation, worth reading as a model of classical rhetoric, and he encourages
his reader to seek it out and form his or her own judgments; Tiro’s critical epistle on it
is worth reading not as a guide to Cato’s merits, but as an example of the irresponsible
mendacity and rhetorical tone-deafness of the learne`d Tiro.
6.3 (too long to quote in full) appears to the reader as a self-contained lesson in
rhetorical reading. Quintilian, in prescribing how rhetoric should be read with students,
notes that the class can only appreciate a speech if they are told in what context it was
given and by whom.108 Because 6.3 is a study of two works simultaneously, Gellius offers
two introductions. First, he gives a potted history of Roman relations with Rhodes in
the First Macedonian War, explaining how it fell to Cato to defend the Rhodians from
plunder by hawks in the Roman Senate (6.3.1-7). Then he sketches, at the greatest
length anywhere in the Noctes, a biography of Tiro M. Ciceronis libertus, who was
raised and “liberally” educated by Cicero, served him as a sort of assistant in literary
matters, and in his own right was “hardly ignorant of antique matters and letters” (.8).
But in setting out for literary accomplishments of his own, Tiro crossed a line:
sed profecto plus ausus est, quam ut tolerari ignoscique possit. namque epistulam
conscripsit ad Q. Axium, familiarem patroni sui, confidenter nimis et calide, in
qua sibimet uisus est orationem istam pro Rhodiensibus acri subtilique iudicio
percensuisse.
But surely he was more audacious than can be tolerated or forgiven. For he wrote,
too confidently and warmly, a letter to Quintus Axius, a friend of his patron, in
which he imagined he critiqued, with sharp and strict judgment, that speech For
the Rhodians. (6.3.9-10)
Gellius’s reader is thus prepared to look kindly on Cato for his thankless but noble task,
108Inst 2.5.1-12. Understood in this context, 6.3 might be the closest we get in the Noctes to a
commentary-text intersecting with a classroom environment — but for rhetoric rather than grammar.
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and to be skeptical of the audacious and overbold freedman who tried to “out-censor”
(percensuisse) Cato the Censor.109
In the first section, Tiro accuses Cato of speaking with poor rhetorical strategy, but
Gellius shows that it is Tiro who reads with the poor rhetorical eye of a superficially
educated slave (.12-22). Cato, Tiro says, failed to correctly propitiate his jury (.12-14)
and even admitted his clients’ guilt (.15-16).110 For these first two charges, Gellius
casts the flaws in Tiro’s criticism as self-evident, first summarising and quoting Tiro,
then relaying the relevant quotations from Cato that Tiro also provides, and finally
explaining why Tiro is wrong in both cases.111 As with some of his dialogic scenes,
Gellius thus allows the intellectual fraud to expose himself, giving the reader a chance
to observe the self-evident error, then explaining it himself. Gellius says Tiro is right
about how a lawyer defending clients should address a jury, but should have known
(scire oportuit Tironem) that Cato was speaking here in the Senate as a former consul
and censor (.17). Gellius learned the difference between the strategies of the censor
and the advocate from Titus Castricius at 1.6.112 Tiro learned his rhetoric at school
(quippe recte et utiliter in disciplinis rhetorum praecipitur... (.19)), but lacked the basic
historical knowledge about the speech from which Gellius’s reader benefits. Tiro, though
“liberally” educated in Cicero’s care, has not transcended his education at the hands
of rhetores (perhaps like the one encountered at 17.9). And as for the second charge,
Gellius says Tiro is a liar and has misrepresented Cato’s words (...iam hoc primum Tiro
inprobe mentitur. uerba ponit Catonis et aliis tamen eum uerbis calumniatur. (.22-3);
109On Gellius’s “patronizing criticism”, Treggiari 1969: 263.
110Holford-Strevens 2003: 78 rejects .13 as actual Tironian language.
111The structure is:
(12-13) Tironian criticism 1
(14)Catonian passage 1
(15)Tironian criticism 2
(16)Catonian passage 2
(17-21)Gellian refutation of criticism 1
(22-25)Gellian refutation of criticism 2
112Holford-Strevens 2003: 205-6.
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far from admitting that the Rhodians hoped the Romans would lose, Gellius says, Cato
earned his audience’s trust by admitting that he thought they probably had, but then
pointing out that if that had been their hope, they were all the more deserving of Roman
admiration for not acting on that hope (.24-5). Gellius contrasts his own judgment with
that of Tiro (in qua re, ut meumquidem iudicium est,. . . (.25)) and shows himself the
more well-informed and insightful reader, while Tiro, for all his sharp criticism, was
equally blind to both text and context. So much, then, for his liberal education, and
for his lack-of-ignorance about ancient affairs.
The next criticism of Cato that Gellius quotes from Tiro concerns ethics, while
Gellius’s critique of that criticism makes a new and cruel attack on Tiro (.26-32). In
the previous section, Gellius offered one kind of comparative reading experience: read
Tiro’s criticism, then the passage of Cato being criticised, then form an opinion. But
in the final lines, he signaled an awareness that one author, criticising another, might
quote verbatim and yet still misrepresent.113 Now he shifts tactics, providing first
Cato’s own words (.26) so that the reader might form an opinion, before then quoting
Tiro’s response, against which the reader can compare his or her own (.27-29). Cato
challenges his audience as to whether they would actually betray their friendship with
Rhodes, something Rhodes only wished to do (.26). Tiro invokes Lucilius’s criticism
of Euripides on this matter, arguing that Romans, knowing the Rhodians planned to
betray them, certainly should strike first in preemptive self-defense (.27-9). As in the
previous section, Gellius begins his response by making Tiro the subject of a verb that
clearly indicates his error: in this case, Tiro animum non aduertit that most ethical
challenges facing the Senate were hardly as black and white as kill-or-be-killed:114
. . . Tiro animum non aduertit non esse in omnibus rebus cauendis eandem causam,
neque humanae uitae negotia et actiones et officia uel occupandi uel differendi uel
113Cf 6.2.2, discussed above 134.
114Here Tiro’s pretensions at learning betray him; Gellius might respect the quotation of Euripides
were it not a reflection on murder rather than diplomacy.
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etiam ulciscendi uel cavendi similia esse pugnae gladiatoriae.
Tiro did not grasp that that there is not the same cause for taking defensive
action in every affair — that the business and suits of human life, and the duties
of taking positions or deferring or even taking revenge are not like gladiatorial
combat. (6.3.30)115
Gellius locates the action inside Tiro’s unqualified mind.116 Using words that allude to
forensic business, Gellius contrasts the nuanced ethics of “the life of men” (hominum
autem uita (.32)) with the stark world of the arena. The repeated reference to gladiators
is an uncomfortable reminder of Tiro’s past as a slave. And, recalling the apparent
ignorance to historical context in the previous section, Gellius asserts the Romans’
historical tendency to refrain from vengeance contradicts Tiro’s arena-ethics (.33).
Finally, Gellius deals with Tiro’s critique of Cato’s specific rhetorical tactics. Tiro
charged that Cato used “sophistic” arguments to spare the Rhodians from being pun-
ished on the grounds of wishing to be enemies of Rome (.34-47). Cato, arguing by
induction from other legal situations, made the case that wishing to commit a crime
was not in itself a crime.117 Gellius summarises Tiro’s argument (.34-5), offers examples
of Cato’s arguments (.36-8; presumably the ones quoted by Tiro), then summarises and
quotes Tiro again (.39). This third strategy for presenting the two texts underscores
Gellius’s challenge to Tiro’s criticism. Gellius says that although Tiro has identified an
apparently troublesome ἐpiαγωγή (argument by induction), it is not nearly so incom-
plete or unjustified as Tiro’s allegations of Greek-style sophistry suggest (.43). Cato is
not, Gellius says, engaging in philosophy, but rhetoric (.47). Once again, Tiro’s failure
is one of attention, and in order not to be misled by his faulty criticism, we will need to
read Cato directly. Accordingly, Gellius shifts from reporting Tiro’s reportage of Cato
115Occupandi and differendi are words with variable meaning; Gellius has chosen terms that can refer
to battle, rhetoric, or forensic procedure.
116For animum non advertit, cf e.g. 11.16, 12.1, 13.16.4, 15.14.1, 17.13.5.
117Tiro treats ἐpiαγωγή as unforgivable, but cf Cicero Topica 42 for a discussion of its uses and its
Socratic pedigree.
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to providing his own direct and independent quotation of Cato’s words quoniam Tiro
ea praetermisit.118 Gellius issues a final criticism of Tiro’s attentiveness — his ability
to perceive all the parts of a rhetorical strategy — in terms that once again recall the
arena:
praeterea animaduertere est in tota ista Catonis oratione omnia disciplinarum
rhetoricarum arma atque subsidia mota esse; sed non proinde ut in decursibus
ludicris aut simulacris proeliorum uoluptariis fieri uidemus.
Furthermore, it is to be noticed that in the entirety of that speech by Cato, every
weapon and reserve force of the rhetorical discipline is fielded; but to that extent,
we do not see it being done as we do in mock battles or pleasant simulations of
combat. (6.3.52)
The rhetorical classroom, with its stakes-free epideictic exercises, here merges with the
mock-battles fought by gladiators (i.e., slaves). Both characterize Tiro’s limited grasp
of rhetoric. Cato, Gellius says, was in a real, desperate battle, a battle for the fate of
a Roman ally (.52 cont’d). He accordingly pulled out all the stops, employing a wide
array of strategy that would not be easily apparent to someone acquainted only with
spectacle.119 Tiro’s criticisms were unfair (inique, .54).120
If one thing is at stake in 6.3, it is response to uerba. Gellius’s reportage of Tiro
ad Axium conjures, with narratively suggestive language, an image of Tiro’s reading,
which Gellius casts as a series of failures at the point of encounter with Cato. Tiro is
rendered in an almost teacherly presence which, like the other teachers in the Noctes,
we observe in pedagogical failure. Gellius has Tiro give Cato’s words (e.g. .26: postea
uerba haec [. . . ] ponit [. . . ] ), and then say something (e.g. .27: “hoc” inquit [. . . ], cf
14.7), show that even though he has Cato’s words right in front of him, he has failed to
understand them. Like Galen, Gellius stages Tiro’s moment of encounter, and plays out
118For praetermisit as an omission to be avoided, cf 5.8.8; see also Gellius’s tic of ending an article with
non praetereundum/praetermittendum, e.g. 1.9.12, 13.14.7, an implication of relevance that challenges
the reader to make the same connection.
119Cf 10.3.16. Holford-Strevens 2003: 196.
120Gunderson 2009: 190-2. Of course Gellius is himself unfair to imply Tiro was unfamiliar with real
statecraft, given his proximity to Cicero.
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its errors. Gellius, attaching such stakes to a reader’s response to uerba and engaging
fully with the ability of a critic to misrepresent his source material even in the presence
of direct quotation, closes by challenging his reader; if 6.3 takes the form of a rhetorical
“school” exercise, as I suggested above, then Gellius wants his reader to do what Tiro
never did and move beyond the classroom.
commodius autem rectiusque de his meis uerbis, quibus Tullio Tironi respondimus,
existimabit iudiciumque faciet, qui et orationem ipsam totam Catonis acceperit
in manus et epistulam Tironis ad Axium scriptam requirere et legere curauerit.
ita enim nos sincerius exploratiusque uel corrigere poterit uel probare.
He will more appropriately and correctly evaluate and judge these words of mine
with which I have responded to Tullius Tiro who both takes in hand both that
entire speech of Cato’s itself, and takes care to seek out and read the letter of
Tiro written to Axius. For thus will he be able to more purely and thoroughly
either correct or vindicate me. (6.3.55)121
Tiro’s motivations for this reading of Cato are murky, though Gellius suggests emu-
lation of Cicero.122 His methods as a reader were clearly deficient, his closed-mindedness
and inattentiveness linked, almost tragically, to his past as a slave and his inability to
move beyond the education that should have put him on a par with free men. And
as a result of this flawed writing, he has produced a critical essay that misrepresents
its source material and would mislead an unsuspecting reader. Though Tiro’s letter is
not a commentarius, nor Gellius’s encounter with it narrated as such, his treatment is
nevertheless strongly reminiscent of the rhetoric of commentary and tradition: with one
eye on the prior commentator, and another on the original material, Gellius indicates
his mastery (and prescribes the reception) of both. 6.3 is by far Gellius’s most vivid
and devastating picture of Tiro — a long way from the confident authorisation of a
manuscript by its Tironiana cura.
121Commodius is a significant word for Gellius’s approach to commentary. It recalls ἀκριβῶς in Galen,
above 181, and will be discussed more below 219.
122Tiro wrote 1) in the epistolary form, 2) to one of Cicero’s familiares, and 3) on the subject of
rhetoric. Keulen 2009: 261-2.
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4.3.5 Tironian care reconsidered (15.6)
Gellius’s descent into skepticism of Tiro’s fundamental abilities as a reader is bookended
by his seemingly innocuous consultation of “Tironian” manuscripts. When he consults
Tiro’s own writing, he finds Tiro to be at best a medium for Cicero’s own ideas, and at
worst a deeply flawed reader and scholar. We might notice a similarity between Gellius
and Tiro the scholar:123 both are miscellanists, both concerned with antique history
and literature, both close readers, would-be critics, students of rhetoric. For Gellius’s
entire spectrum of interests, Tiro’s work presents itself as a possibly helpful second-
ary source. Regardless of their authenticity (on which Gellius seems not to voice an
opinion), “Tironian” manuscripts seem to have been common and commanded both a
high price and eminent auctoritas. Gellius’s encounters with Tiro cast Tiro not just as
authoriser of manuscripts but as an editor — a reader, and an independent intellectual
agent whose mediation of Cicero’s texts may well not have been without consequence.
It is this message that he underlines in his final encounter with him, in 15.6.124
Gellius recalls his prior mentions of Tiro in this passage, a brief notice on an error
in Cicero’s De Gloria. He opens by characterising the error, then excuses Cicero and
shifts the blame to Tiro instead.
in libro M. Tullii, qui est secundus de Gloria, manifestus error est non magnae
rei, quem errorem esse possit cognoscere non aliquis eruditorum, sed qui tantum
legerit ῾Ομήρου τὸ Η΄. quamobrem non tam id mirabamur errasse in ea re M.
Tullium, quam non esse animaduersum hoc postea correctumque uel ab ipso uel a
Tirone, liberto eius, diligentissimo homine et librorum patroni sui studiosissimo.
In that book of Cicero that is his second On Glory, there is an obvious error
of no great significance, an error which not some one of the most learned, but
simply someone who has read book 7 of Homer, could recognise. For that reason
I am not amazed so much that Marcus Tullius erred in this matter as that it was
not noticed and later corrected, either by him or by Tiro, his freedman, a most
diligent man and most attentive to his patron’s works. (15.6.1-2)
123Gunderson 2009: 186.
124Gunderson 2009: 188-9.
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With manifestus, Gellius recalls the reaction of his overzealous fellow readers in 1.7. His
reference to erudition brings to mind his challenges in 12.3 and 13.7 (and Tiro’s passive
role in 4.10 and 10.1). His surprise that the error was not “noticed” recalls Tiro’s
wandering attention in 6.3.125 And the low standards he sets for catching the error —
simply having read Homer — are as fundamental a critique on Tiro’s learnedness as
any other he has made. Once again Gellius reminds us of Tiro’s critical role as editor
of Cicero, his close relationship to the great man, but also his libertus status. This, he
suggests, is the other side of Tironiana cura — all well and good when the text is being
copied, but immediately wanting when editorial intervention is called for.
As with Histiaeus’s slave, Tiro’s eyes seem not to have been up to literary work.126
Had he not read his Homer? In Tiro, Gellius sees a freedman who would always be a
slave, and at that a slave who was not content with his passive role as a conduit for his
master’s ideas and words. Never mind that the amanuensis of a busy writer no doubt
had many active responsibilities127 — the wealthy man of letters depended on slaves
who knew their places, and the self-directed reader who seeks erudition depends on
authors qualified for the scholarship they practice.128 In punishment for his excessive
boldness, Gellius crafts for Tiro a reputation of unreliability, refusing to let him escape
his patron’s shadow.
The punishment for runaway slaves was tattooing of a different sort from Histiaeus’s:
a permanent brand.129 The indelible tag with which Gellius brands Tiro is “Tullius
125Gellius does not accuse Tiro of haste, but that is a typical comic quality of the slave (Fitzgerald
2000: 15).
126If we look to 17.9 for images resonant with Gellius’s treatment of Tiro, we might also notice that
Caesar’s cipher (17.9.1-5) protects his letters even from the prying eyes of a slave carrying the letter.
Tiro famously — though Gellius makes no mention of it — edited Cicero’s letters. Yet we might also
ask whether Caesar, Oppius and Balbus trained any amanuenses specially to handle the cipher.
127Fitzgerald 2000: 26-7.
128We expect our word processors to spell-check, but not compose. The human element in Roman
slavery makes the paradox of autonomy more pointed: Gellius expects Tiro to edit for content, but
not to generate his own.
129Jones 1987. Fitzgerald 2000: 17, 113. See Petronius 57 for a freedman proud of escaping his past.
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Tiro, freedman of Cicero”, denying Tiro the intellectual independence and auctoritas
he sought.130 Gellius, through his construction of and attack on Tiro as a scholar,
reminds his readers that their access to past knowledge is mediated and curated by
individuals, and that the nature of that medium and curation — and the intellectual
qualifications of those individuals — are just as worthy of inquiry as the knowledge
itself. To look at primary material with no regard for the secondary authorities that
make it available risks submitting to any errors they might have made; so to accept the
errors Tiro introduced into the intellectual tradition is, for the elite reader, to submit
to the authority not just of a freedman, but of a former slave.
4.4 Gellian fragments as a depiction of navigating
traditions (3.16)
4.4.1 Introduction: doctors in the courtroom
So Gellius sees knowledge about or from the antique past as mediated by the indi-
vidual authors and editors who make it available to the present. What does this mean
for the process and consequences of thinking about a topic or answering a question? To
find Gellian bifocal approach to antique knowledge in action, I will now discuss one of
the longest examples of Gellius’s “notes” collections. In Noctes 3.16, he gathers, appar-
ently around no more unifying a principle than stream of consciousness, various notes
and recollections pertaining to a particular question of medical science.131 But Gellius
130Libertus (as opposed to libertinus) refers to the freedman’s patronal relationship with his former
master (Kaster 1995: 66, 109). Fitzgerald 2000: 88 discusses the lingering stigma of the freed slave.
We might extend the metaphor: perhaps 6.3 shows that if Tiro has anything valuable to offer us, it
will only be obtained after torturous treatment (on torturing slaves in the courtroom, Bradley 1994:
165-72).
131But it has much in common with Gellius’s amateur doxographies and collected notes on various
topics, too many to cite individually (e.g. 1.3, 1.11, 1.12, 1.20 . . . .)
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is not practicing medicine. The material he has gathered, along with the frameworks of
descent, context and evaluative rhetoric in which he swaddles it, show the question to
be one of substantial legal import for Roman elite society, and the various approaches
Gellius takes to it are critical to finding an answer that suits that setting. The article
is a striking testament to the potential for the relevance and consequence of Gellius’s
material to transcend simple academic curiosity.
At the beginning of this chapter, I touched briefly on the rhetoric of commentary
in the ancient medical tradition, and noted in passing that “interdisciplinarity” — e.g.,
Galen’s claims to philosophy — can be an important part of that rhetoric. Likewise, for
us, to understand 3.16, it is important to understand that the authoritatively antique
sources on which doctors, philosophers, and the simply curious might draw to answer a
question about medicine are the same ones on which an advocate or judge might draw
to rule on one of the most important kinds of case in Roman society: an inheritance
suit. The question underlying the 3.16’s gathered notes is: how long might a human
pregnancy reasonably last? This is a question with profound consequences for determ-
ining the legitimacy of children.132 The birth of a posthumous child could break a will,
or risk infamia for the mother.133 It also implicates a controversial piece of medical
wisdom, the idea of the doomed eight-month child, in a way that intersects with the
desirable legal rights available under the ius liberorum.134 The provisions in Roman law
for defining the term of pregnancy were few and ambiguous — the 12 Tables’ imposition
of a 10-month mourning period, whatever its origins, was retroactively identified, by
Gellius’s time, with the conventional length of pregnancy — and any case that hinged
on the “limits” of pregnancy was decided at the praetor’s discretion.135 The advocate’s
132Hanson 1987: 589.
133Treggiari 1991: 29,Gardner 1986: 51.
134The phrase refers to the legal status conferred by the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus. For women,
this could mean being their own guardians and avoiding the inheritance restrictions imposed by the
lex Voconia (Milnor 2005: 153).
135Gardner 1986: 51-3.
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job was to make the most persuasive or authoritative case, and appeals to the most
antique medical authority of them all were not unheard of in the Roman courtroom.
Justinian’s Digest preserves Ulpian’s report of a ruling by Antoninus Pius in which the
emperor cites Hippocrates for a ruling about the duration of pregnancy.136 Not long
after, Paul gave the opinion that, because Hippocrates allows for a seven-month child,
a child born in the seventh month of a marriage may be considered a child of that
marriage.137 A case did not have to be decided on such authority, but it could, and
clearly they were, even in Gellius’s own lifetime.
By the end of 3.16, Gellius will have modelled an approach to the question of
pregnancy length, and reminded his reader of the importance of using good judgment
with an example of a praetor who, apparently ignorant of the matter, ruled that a
pregnancy had lasted far longer than is reasonable. Gellius finds that the conventional
wisdom, which prescribes hard and fast rules about the duration of pregnancy, is not
supported by the various antique literature in which older opinions on the matter of
preserved, nor is it compatible with the Hippocratic corpus. Both the Hippocratic
position and the poetic evidence are authoritative but vague. Gellius starts out as
a reader of interpretations of those vague texts, but ends up able to issue his own
authoritative interpretations. The answer, he finds, is that no hard and fast rule applies
— the question is one not of hard sums but of common sense applied to numerical
guidelines. To arrive at that answer, Gellius considers the various kinds of evidence
that might be invoked in a pregnancy-related debate, and evaluates them as the result
of certain kinds of influence, tradition and authority, a complex synthesis of evidence
that elides time, space, language and genre.138 The question is answered not only
by finding the right primary evidence but also by identifying the correct secondary
136Digest 38.16.12.
137Digest 1.5.12.
138Cf van der Eijk 1999: 24.
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authorities through which to understand them.
4.4.2 Initial inquiries
Gellius represents in 3.16 the characteristic activities of his authorial persona’s mind.
Six kinds of evidence, along with their mediating processes, are considered before a con-
clusion is ultimately reached. Interspersed between them are two recollections of legal
disputes that hinged on the question at hand. The article then closes with a synthesis
of these two types: an account of a legal ruling on pregnancy, embedded in a chain
of mediated reportage, against which the reader may test both his or her sensitivity
to interpretive authority and his or her mastery of the pregnancy material. By tak-
ing the form of gathered notes and recollections, 3.16 models for the reader a process
of learned thought: research and reasoning. It very directly enacts the approach to
reading discussed in the previous chapter, where things read are evaluated in their own
right and alongside other things read and known. But 3.16 also withholds initially the
aim of that research: it advertises medical and philosophical knowledge in its caput and
opening lines, but Gellius then starts reading comedy, and it is not until he interrupts
that by recalling a court case at .12 that the legal context comes into focus. Hadrian’s
authorised ruling in the matter contradicts the multa opinio. That contradiction stays
with Gellius and the reader as he returns to literary and medical evidence and seems
finally to come to a reliable answer; in his second recollected legal example (.21) Gellius
re-phrases the question but does not indicate how the matter was settled, allowing the
reader to guess at what the “right” conclusion would have been. The final legal ex-
ample, though, shows that the right conclusion is not always reached. I will now briefly
survey each element of 3.16 in order to show how Gellius’s discussion of his material
focuses on the same intellectual processes and values I have discussed previously, and
to demonstrate how, in the absence of a narrative or argument, Gellius still builds a
217
case for a certain approach to a question.
Gellius’s goal in 3.16 seems to be not so much to contradict the conventional wisdom
(multa opinio) as to cast it as the wrong kind of answer.139 He begins by introducing
the opinio (a word we saw above, p189, as signifiying an idea that is the result of
a particular interpretive process and thus, along with that process, open to critical
evaluation), “now accepted as the truth” (.1: multa opinio est eaque iam pro uero
recepta . . . 140), as the general conclusion of illustrious philosophers and doctors. The
origins of the opinio are authoritative enough, but when Gellius describes a concept as
“accepted” (recepta) he is drawing attention to its nature not as true but as something
considered to be true by the intellectual or cultural community, something that applies
both to established law and erroneous pronunciation or speech.141 This rule about
pregnancy, then, is authoritative in its origins, but may not have been examined with
sufficient scrutiny since then. It is that children are born “rarely in the seventh, never
in the eighth, often in the ninth, more often in the tenth; and that this is the ultimate
limit on human gestation: not the beginning of the tenth month, but the end.” (.1) In
the search for data points from literature and science that might confirm or reject this,
Gellius finds the origins of the uncertainty around the issue: the primary material we
might consult, be it Hippocrates or Homer, is in its form enigmatic and, when properly
interpreted, indicates not a hard and fast rule of possible and impossible durations,
but rather a general principle of reasonable variation around a norm. Each piece of
evidence, however, is considered in turn alongside the interpretive assistance required
to correctly understand it.
Gellius begins by relating a first encounter with the disagreement in the evidence.
The first set of material considered comes not from medical writing but from old comedy
139Cf Heath 2004: 304-5.
140Cf κοιναὶ δόξαι in Herophilus, von Staden 1999: 146.
141e.g. 6.9; 12.13.3, .14.
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(.2-6). Ancient knowledge informed ancient literature: antique writers wrote what they
knew.142 So Gellius notes that Plautus testifies to the multa opinio when he refers in
his Cistellaria to a baby being born in 10 months (.2); likewise Menander, “a more
antique poet, and most well-versed in humane opinions”, does the same (.3).143 But
Caecilius, in a play whose close derivation from Menander’s is noted here and explored
at greater length elsewhere (2.23), also attests seven-, eight-, and nine-month terms
(.4).144 Antique comic evidence thus presents a conflict, and Gellius’s habit when
presented with dissensio among authorities is to seek an explanation. In this case the
question is why Caecilius would deviate from his source material, and an intermediate
authority is found:
eam rem Caecilium non inconsiderate dixisse neque temere a Menandro atque a
multorum opinionibus desciuisse M. Varro uti credamus facit.
Marcus Varro leads us to believe that Caecilius did not say this thing thoughtlessly
nor depart rashly from Menander and the opinions of many. (3.16.5)
Here Gellius narrates the effect of reading Varro’s account of the matter — it leads him
to think in a new way about the evidence of Caecilius. Varro refers to variations from
the multa opinio both above and below; that is, eight-month and 11-month babies.
For both, Varro writes with the authority of one who has read Aristotle (.6). But this
contradicts the conventional wisdom
Having encountered disagreement, Gellius now suggests his own search for its cause.
With a perspective similar to that in 4.11, he declares that the dissensionis causa, at
least over the eight-month child, can be found in the pages of Hippocrates (.7). He
quotes an aphoristic line from On Nurture and then observes that it is obscure, terse,
and sort of contradictory (.8) — in other words, he shows that he has not only found
142Cf 3.2.14-16.
143humanarum opinionum is troublesome; the sense seems to be that Menander was up on the latest
knowledge as befitted a man of letters, but there may be a pun tied to the term for human gestation
(humanus partus, e.g. 3.16.1).
144Holford-Strevens 2003: 215.
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the textual locus that is the source of the confusion, but also perceives others’ confused
response to it. Then he indicates his approval of a helpful intermediate commentary:
id [. . . ] dictum Sabinus medicus, qui Hippocratem commodissime commentatus
est, uerbis his enarrauit:
Sabinus the doctor, who commented on Hippocrates most fittingly, explains that
assertion with these words: (3.16.8)
For a secondary work in Gellius to be commodus to its original seems to mean that it
is well-fitted to that original: it is properly derived, faithful, perceptive, and thus offers
helpful access to that original.145 Galen bemoaned other commentators’ “imprecise”
treatment of their primary material; likewise, to Gellius, commentary should “fit” its
subject. Sabinus’s interpretation, which allows to access the otherwise too-obscure
antique material, is that the eight-month child only appears to be born but is in fact
always stillborn. The Hippocratic line itself may be the origin of the uncertainty, but
Gellius is not done seeking to resolve that uncertainty.
Gellius then returns to literary evidence, using a conventional antiquarian approach
to literature to stage a simultaneous encounter with primary and secondary texts. That
the antiqui Romani did not think births in the eighth month were impossible, but
considered the ninth and 10th the standard months for delivery (.9), Gellius says, is
proven by the the names they gave the Fates (Parca (=partus), Nona, Decima).146
Gellius has Varro as his guide for this course of reasoning. But he also highlights a
similar but wrong reasoning: anyone reading the more recent scholarship of Caesellius
Vindex will be misled about the names of the Fates. Gellius shows Vindex misreading
Andronicus:
Caesellius autem Vindex in lectionibus suis antiquis: “tria” inquit “nomina Par-
carum sunt: ‘Nona,’ ‘Decuma,’ ‘Morta,”’ et uersum hunc Liuii, antiquissimi
poetae, ponit ex ᾿Οδυσσείᾳ: “quando dies adueniet, quem profata Morta est”. sed
145Cf 1.3.11, 6.3.55, 9.9.14, 11.6.3, 12.4, 16.12.5, 16.14.5. The term applies to translations as well.
Consider e.g. 2.23, on Caecilius vs Menander; Vardi 1996: 507.
146Cavazza 2004: 74-6.
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homo minime malus Caesellius “Mortam” quasi nomen accepit, cum accipere
quasi “Moeram” deberet.
But Caesellius Vindex in his Ancient Readings says, “The three names of the
Parca are: Nona, Decuma, and Morta”, and he gives this verse from the Odyssey
of Livius, the most ancient poet: “when will come the day which is foretold by
Morta”. But Caesellius, hardly an incompetent man, has taken “Morta” as if it
were a name, when he ought to have taken it as “Moera”. (3.16.11)
The attack, with its double-negative compliment and focus on attention, should by now
be familiar. The grammaticus Vindex is a known offender.147 Here, the readerly error
that makes him a poor guide to the old names of the Fates seems to be inattentiveness
to Andronicus’s Odyssey ’s nature as a Latin translation of Greek.
4.4.3 Gellian autopsy
The next important stage of the research process that Gellius must represent is the
synthesis of scholarly learning and personal expertise and experience. At this point, his
own authorial pose moves closer to that of the authoritative commentator on primary
material. He interrupts his readings with a personal recollection: a lawsuit he learned
about at Rome that hinged on whether an 11-month child was possible (.12). Gellius
forefronts his own research:
sed diuum Hadrianum causa cognita decreuisse in undecimo quoque mense partum
edi posse; idque ipsum eius rei decretum nos legimus. in eo decreto Hadrianus id
statuere se dicit requisitis ueterum philosophorum et medicorum sententiis.
[I learned that] the deified Hadrian, having considered the case, declared that
birth can occur even in the eleventh month; and I read his very decree in the
matter. In that decree, Hadrian says that he decided this having sought out the
ideas of ancient philosophers and doctors. (3.16.12)
With this comment, Gellius indicates the legal stakes for what might have seemed
idle musings. He also arrogates Hadrianic authority for both the overall nature of
the inquiry (doctors and philosophers, as advertised in .1 and the caput), and for his
147Holford-Strevens 2003: 168.
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continued skepticism of the multa opinio. We don’t learn what Hadrian found, but
it must have satisfied him. By casting the inquiry as a legal one, Gellius reminds his
reader of the responsibility of the judge in such a situation, and shows how the most
princely of judges dealt with it.
As if newly emboldened on his quest, Gellius returns to literary inquiries, his voice
now more authoritative and his readings more focused. “Just today” (.13) he happened
to read a satire of Varro’s that contained a humorous clause from a will. In accordance
with legal practice, Varro’s testator provides for the possibility of a 10-month postumus,
but then, citing Aristotle for the possibility of such a thing, assigns the same status to
an 11-month postumus, using in the process a peculiar idiom. Varro has now taken on
the role of obscure primary evidence (again authorised by his reading of Aristotle), and
Gellius steps in as interpreter:
“. . . si quis undecimo mense κατὰ Α᾿ριστοτέλην natus est, Attio idem, quod Tettio,
ius esto apud me.” per hoc uetus prouerbium Varro significat, sicuti uulgo dici
solitum erat de rebus nihil inter sese distantibus: “idem Atti, quod Tetti”, ita pari
eodemque iure esse in decem mensibus natos et in undecim.
“If anyone should be born to me in the eleventh month, like in Aristotle, let Tet-
tius’s legal relationship to me be Attius’s.” With this antique saying Varro indic-
ates, just as it is commonly said about things with no difference between them,
“Attius’s is Tettius’s”, that there should be equal and the same legal standing for
children born in the tenth month and in the eleventh. (3.16.13-14)
Gellius here links his interpretive authority to his command of Latin. Where previously
he needed Sabinus to explain what Hippocrates meant (.8), or indeed Varro’s report of
Aristotle to reconcile Caecilius with his fellow comedians, now it is he whom the reader
needs to understand Varro. Again, Aristotle lurks in the background as an underlying
authority against the multa opinio.
Gellius next stages an encounter familiar in many ways from other parts of the
Noctes : a personal observation on some canonical text, a search for an explanation,
and a conclusion that also passes judgement on various kinds of expert. This is one
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example of how episodes in the implied narratives draw on patterns and types from
the explicit narratives. The evidence in question is not Livius’s Odyssey but Homer’s
original: a line in which Neptune seems to promise to a woman he has raped a child
“in a year” would seem to be evidence for a 12-month pregnancy. Gellius does not
accept this as a self-evident challenge to the multa opinio, but — as in the case of
Caecilius — asserts that it should be asked why Homer wrote it (quaeri oportet, cur
Homerus scripserit (3.16.15)). In search of an explanation, he makes a mistake repeated
elsewhere: he consults grammarians. They offer unsatisfying explanations (.16).148 As
usual, Gellius gets the correct interpretation from an unlikely source.149
sed Fauorinus mihi ait piεριpiλομένου ἐνιαυτοῦ non “confecto” esse “anno”, sed
“adfecto”.
But Favorinus told me that piεριpiλομένου ἐνιαυτοῦ was not “ended” but “nearing
the end”. (3.16.17)150
The philosophus offers a basic literary interpretation that the grammatici certainly
ought to have managed.151 Although the mediating interpreter is flesh-and-blood rather
than a text commentarius, his authority is still grounded in command both of Greek
(in recognising the true sense of the word) and Latin (in being able to express it pre-
cisely).152 The content of his explanation is also notable: the line is, it turns out, not
so much specific evidence for a pregnancy that contradicts the multa opinio, but more
an indication that the limits on the term of pregnancy are vaguer than the opinio says.
Underscoring this, and emphasising his own role as mediating authority, Gellius offers
an interpretation of Favorinus’s speech, invoking a Ciceronian usage of adfectus in the
same sense; to understand correctly the explanation of Homer, one needs to be well-
148The attempt to reason by the 10-month Romulan calendar is also in Ovid Fasti 1.33-6. The
year/month distinction is an important one to make here, but as Gellius shows does not solve anything.
For the dismissive roundup of competing interpretations, cf von Staden 2002: 117.
149Holford-Strevens 2003: 123.
150On adfectus cf 15.5.
151Cf 18.7.3.
152Precise word-for-word translation is a regular concern, e.g. 1.16.
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versed in Cicero. Homeric evidence for the term of pregnancy is thus wrapped in a first
layer of good and bad interpretation that requires the presence of a second layer to tell
the difference.
With secure, well-authorised authority and a clear legal application for both the
inquiry itself and the hypothesis that the multa opinio is in error, Gellius, now ready to
perform his own exegesis of the antique material, returns to Hippocrates’s On Nurture.
Hippocrates did more than offer aphorisms on the eight-month child: he spoke directly
to the question at hand. He specified the term of pregnancy, but also noted that a
certain amount of reasonable variation is to be expected. Gellius quotes the line, then
offers the sort of assured interpretation that he found in Sabinus earlier.
quibus uerbis significat, quod aliquando ocius fieret, non multo tamen fieri ocius,
neque quod serius, multo serius.
With these words he indicates that though it sometimes happens sooner, it hap-
pens not much sooner, nor when later, much later. (3.16.20)153
This seems to be the key to the inquiry: not unlike the position of the antiqui Romani,
Hippocrates tells us although there is a normal period for gestation, birth can occur
somewhat later or earlier — but not too much later or earlier.154
4.4.4 Implications and applications
Gellius the researcher invites the reader to join him in testing their grasp of the
lessons learned in the course of the article’s inquiry. His memory again interrupts book
learning, here not with something he has investigated (.12: comperi), but something
he seems suddenly to recall (.21: memini).155 The inquiry into the limits of gestation
153As in 4.11, and above in 3.16.13, significo is used by the commentator to refer to the true sense of
what the primary source said (dico).
154Cf von Staden 1999: 144-5 for a medical counterpart of presenting one’s own views as more
nuanced.
155Cf 3.3.1, 4.17.10-11, 6.9.15, 6.20.1, 9.14.3, cap.10.7, 10.20.9, 11.2.5, 13.12.5, 15.3.4, 15.29.2, 15.30.5,
17.4.5; on in mentem uenit above p160.
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is framed as having been necessary (quaesitum negotio non rei tunc paruae postulante)
for a legal case. One or both parents claimed in court the privilege of the ius trium
liberorum, but the claim was challenged on the grounds that their third child, apparently
stillborn, had been an eight-month child, and therefore not brought to term (partus) but
miscarried (abortio). If, as the first (and notoriously confusing) Hippocratic aphorism
(as well as the multa opinio) asserts, the eight month child never survives, then a third
child has not actually been brought to term and the lex Iulia not satisfied. There are
various ways such a claim might end up in court, and Gellius does not explain the
rest of the case;156 nor does he explain the outcome, although it seems reasonable to
imagine a ruling like that he cites in .12 being available to one so inclined. It is left to
the reader’s imagination to supply the sort of inquiry that the case required: was that,
after all, the origin of 3.16? Or does 3.16 represent the sort of inquiry Gellius wishes
had been carried out? In .12, Hadrian consulted doctors and philosophers; having done
roughly the same, through various levels and kinds of mediation, Gellius offers enough
evidence for the reader to draw his or her own conclusion.
Given the unfinished sentences, pointers and hints throughout the passage, and
the Noctes ’s general interest in stimulating research, it is worth considering what that
conclusion might be, and whether further reading might be in order. Certainly a vi-
able eight-month child would seem to be possible under the “reasonable variation” rule
that emerges from Hippocrates, Homer, and the wisdom of the antiqui Romani. Is
there any further evidence Gellius has left un-consulted? He promised, after all, Had-
rian’s sources: doctors and philosophers. Gellius quotes Hippocrates thoroughly, but
the only philosopher mentioned, Aristotle, is cited at remove and never verbatim. As
a prompt to further reading, this would not be the only occasion on which the text
Gellius seems to have in mind is Aristotle’s Historia Animalium (see in the previous
156Perhaps the parents have sued for some privilege reserved for the ius, or perhaps a second heir is
trying to remove from the mother possession of an inheritance she claimed access to under the ius.
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chapter 13.7); nor, indeed, the only one on which the gestured-to-but-absent passage by
another author has substantial implications for the discussion in which Gellius gestures
to it. Gellius is an enthusiastic reader of and about Aristotle.157 He quotes verbatim
from the HA on human reproduction elsewhere (10.2). Aristotle’s works have pride of
place in Gellius’s educational experiences: Taurus reads the Physical Problems with
him (19.6), and assigns the Universal Problems as improving reading to a troublesome
student (20.4). Gellius draws attention to his own attentive reading of and extract-
ing from Aristotle (2.30.11: cuius rei causam, cum Aristotelis libros problematorum
praecerperemus, notaui.).
First-hand experience of Aristotle has a powerful effect. An Aristotelian work makes
a physical appearance in a dialogic scene: a man well-versed in Aristotle cites the
philosopher in warning Gellius and his friends not to drink melted snow, but it is not
until the man retrieves the actual text and shows it to them that Gellius believes him
and takes the Aristotelian teaching to heart. It is not enough for Gellius to hear the
authority of doctors and this philosopher invoked (19.5.3: adhibebat nobis auctoritates
nobilium medicorum et cumprimis Aristotelis philosophi . . . ); he is influenced only by
what is written in Aristotle’s work (19.5.5: in eo libro scriptum fuit . . . ). Aristotle is
an author to be read widely, deeply, closely and — even when his authority is invoked
by an expert — for oneself. Aristotle’s full discussion of the term of pregnancy in
Hist Anim agrees completely with the conclusion Gellius reaches, and as in the case of
the lions in 13.7, provides not only an assertion that the idea of the 8-month child is
wrong, but an explanation of how the wrong idea persists.158 Even error is the result of
interpretive activity. It remains unclear who these medici et philosophi inlustres (3.16.1)
157Of: 1.11, 2.12, 2.22, 2.30, 3.6, 3.11, 3.15, 6.6, 8.7, 15.26, 17.21, 19.2, 19.4. About: 3.17, 9.3, 13.5,
20.5. Aristoxenus, who raised suspicions about Pythagorean bean-prohibitions in 4.11, is authorised
by having been a pupil of Aristotle (Gunderson 2009: 66).
158Aristotle Hist Anim 584a33-584b14 (7.4) explains that eight-month children die more frequently
in Greece, so that when one survives, mothers assume they must have miscalculated the term of
pregnancy, reinforcing the misconception. Gellius has been reading this: 10.2.
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who gave birth to the multa opinio are, but what is clear is that between Hippocrates
and Aristotle there is a clear case to disregard it.159
The lower limits thus established, the final item in Gellius’s research explores the
upper limits of the term of pregnancy, offering another case in which the reader can
form his or her own opinion, as well as an excess of mediating texts that tests the
reader’s attention to the nature of authority in the context of that role.
sed quoniam de Homerico annuo partu ac de unecimo mense diximus quae cognouer-
amus, uisum est non praetereundum, quod in Plinii Secundi libro septimo Nat-
uralis Historiae legimus. id autem quia extra fidem esse uideri potest, uerba ipsius
Plinii posuimus: “Masurius auctor est L. Papirium praetorem secundo herede lege
agente bonorum possessionem contra eum dedisse, cum mater partum se tredecim
mensibus tulisse diceret, quoniam nullum certum tempus pariendi statutum ei
uideretur.”
But because I have said what I learned about the Homeric “year-birth” and the
eleventh month, I think I ought not to omit what I read in the seventh book of
the Natural History of Pliny the Elder. But because it might seem to be beyond
belief, I have added the words of Pliny himself: “Masurius tells us that Lucius
Papirius, as Praetor, ruled against an heir in the second degree seeking possession
of inheritance, though the mother said she had borne the heir after 13 months,
because it seemed to him there was no certain established time for parturition.”
(3.16.22-3)
Gellius here reverses the distinction at .12, when he made a point of moving from what
he had “read” to what he had “learned”, shifting as he did the register of his own
authoritative statements. He truly mastered the material subsequent to the Hadrianic
ruling, particularly the Homeric evidence, and now, by shifting back to the register
of material read (but perhaps not fully mastered), he casts what follows as in need
of examination. He invokes a chain of authority for something otherwise incredible,
but the opening words of the quote show Pliny’s role is marginal: Masurius is the real
authority for this anecdote.160 Gellius seems uncertain whether we really need Pliny;
on the other hand, his citation to Book 7 of the HN directs the reader’s attention to
159Gellius has recently reminded us that Aristotle is a philosophus in 3.15.
160Gellius happily cites many works by Masurius directly, e.g. 4.1.21, 4.2.15; see also 4.9, 4.20, 5.6,
5.13, 5.19, 7.7, 10.15, 11.18. But Masurius is among the jurists whose works are no help in 14.2.
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an alternative exploration of the same topic, which also seems to depend on Aristotle
and reaches the correct conclusion.161 But with the less plausible ideas Gellius appends
as original Plinian material (.24), he seems to be inviting the reader to consider Pliny
the mediator of gynecological knowledge.162 Masurius’s anecdote itself is the opposite
of Hadrian’s ruling at .12, an object lesson in the dangers of failing to correctly inquire
about the length of pregnancy. By either the multa opinio or the Hippocratis Aristoteli
Gelliique opinio, there is no reason to rule in favour of a 13-month pregnancy.
3.16 is a representation, no less complex or careful than 9.4, of an intellectual process:
the answering of a question.163 Gellius shows how such a question might come up and
how it should be answered; he stages encounters between himself and the various ideas
and primary material that might be presented to answer the question, as well as with
the various secondary authorities who, by their use, guarantee correct or incorrect use of
such material. Opiniones and praetors’ rulings are the result of interpretive processes,
of choosing to answer a question in a certain way and ask certain further questions
about the answers one finds. The loose, stream-of-conscious commentarii form of the
passage enhances the feeling of looking in on a thought process, one idiosyncratic to
Gellius and his personal experiences but also crafted to invite the reader to take part.
The acquisition and use of knowledge is here a constant process, involving consistent
values across different media. The antique past is ubiquitous in the present day, but
so is its mediator, secondary authority. In 3.16, Gellius shows his reader how to think
about both at once and so arrive at better kinds of answers.
161Pliny HN 7.38-40. For citations as references, see above p127.
162Gunderson 2009: 183.
163It should be clear by now that Gellius’s approach has much in common with ancient doxography,
but his interdisciplinary interests are a key point of departure. On doxography see van der Eijk 1999.
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4.5 Conclusion: the gathering shades of authorities
invoked
Imperial Rome’s performance-oriented society pervades the Noctes. Romans per-
form their masculinity, their Latinity, their class; they perform, too, in their choice of
to whom they attach themselves, their patrons and associates. Gellius watches people
speak, and looks through their speech to their private lifestyle, their character, their
intellect. In the pages of books, too, authors perform; and wherever they read, readers
perform their selection of reading material and their responses to it. In this chapter,
we have seen how that performance culture even maps onto the diachronic landscape of
Romans’ intellectual history. The time between the antique authoritative “then” and
the demanding, relevant “now” is full not (as we post-Industrial moderns are inclined to
say) of mechanisms of transmission and reception, but of crowds of individuals, speak-
ing and listening to one another, acting out social relationships and characters across
time and space, between languages, and in the pages of commentaries, translations
and collections. One who speaks or writes on a topic may be expected to provide a
doxography of sorts for their authority. To have the weight of a discipline or tradition
behind one’s expertise is not a matter of a title, but of generations of prior authorities
who hover, like funereal imagines, around one’s authoritative stance. To expose one’s
ignorance is to reveal the lesser authorities, disgraced by their own errors, on whom
one depends. Gellius obscures the exact use of his own text; despite positioning his
work alongside those he criticises and uses, he alludes only infrequently to its actual
consultation as a resource, never quite creating a sense of what Fitzgerald identifies in
Martial as the “society of the book”.164 Gellius is more interested in how he and others
have read other books: he never quite closes the loop as regards reading his Noctes,
164Fitzgerald 2007: 139-66.
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leaving that largely to the reader’s own self-scrutiny.
It was not always in fashion for Roman writers to acknowledge their relationship
with some systems of tradition. If Gellius is uneasy about Augustan or triumviral
writers, whether Verrius Flaccus or Livy, it may be because of what seems to have been
a rejection of the interweaving complexities of prior traditions.165 If Gellius partook
of “archaism”, it was not the sort practised by Fronto and his correspondents, who
imagined themselves in a space outside of time, alone with their Cato. But Gellius is
a man who likes to know where his knowledge comes from, and that goes for others,
too. If a teacher cannot read the text he promises exegesis on, is that not worth
knowing?166 If an orator does not know what archaic words he uses, what good is
he?167 Even favourite teachers speak sometimes from books.168 With the conceit of
his own incompletely adapted commentarii, Gellius can show his readers a process
of encountering, evaluating, learning and applying knowledge that has an eye toward
such considerations. The rhetoric and procedures of commentary are familiar from the
genre;169 but Gellius turns them outward, making them a performance for an audience
beyond any particular discipline.
He models the process of finding an answer to a question as one of skepticism and
critical evaluation. An opinio is born when an interpreter misses the obvious (as Verrius
had not read his Hesiod, 4.5) or lacks qualification (as few could decrypt Empedocles,
4.11), and they thrive when uncritical readers repeat them. Antique texts and deeds are
essential for the present, and yet our access to many of them — more than you might
165Glinister 2007 for Verrius. Livy, absent from the Noctes, seems to lurk behind a variety of episodes
he relates but which Gellius gets from “ancient records” or from the other Republican historians Livy
has, for us, replaced. Cf inter al 9.13 from Quadrigarius, 3.8 from Quadrigarius and Valerius Antias
(the latter a target of Livy’s own criticism). On other cultural shifts in authority in the Augustan
period, Wallace-Hadrill 1997.
16613.31.
16711.7.
16818.5.12.
169Sluiter 2000.
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think, Gellius seems to suggest — are mediated by authorities whose qualifications and
character should, as in the case of Tullius Tiro, be seriously questioned. Gellius is
almost as anxious about Antonine manuscripts factus Tironiana cura as are modern
scholars;170 but while they are assured in their grasp of the dynamics of transmission,
Gellius has seen the man behind the manuscript, and found him wanting. And when
the game of authorised evidence is played for real stakes in the courtroom, finding the
right or wrong interpretive guide for any particular piece of evidence is the difference
between a ruling with regal authority and going down as a laughingstock of legal history
(3.16). The multa opinio is insufficient: an opinio is a subjective response to other ideas,
ideas that can perhaps be better experienced firsthand, and why trust the multi, the
uulgus, who show a demonstrated inclination to follow each other blindly, when specific
inlustres may be found and consulted directly?
In these notes and essays, we find ourselves closest to the intellectual habits that,
because of their vivid depiction and appealing habits, have earned Gellius the fondness
of readers since the Renaissance; even today he seems a kindred spirit of enlightened
humanism, an erudite gentleman of letters, a fellow scholar. It is perhaps for the best,
then, that in these most mentally intimate passages, we also find a stark reminder of
the alien values on which the Gellian mind is built: slaves as machines for reproducing
the ideas of the wealthy, women as machines for making more men and ensuring the
correct transfer of wealth, whose role in elite society is to be carefully regulated. For
all the resolve to learn about his own health in 18.10, Gellius’s gynecological inquiries
of 3.16 could not be further from an actual interest in women’s health.
Gellius’s unique depiction of the use of commentaries reveals something fundamental
about his project. If grammatical commentaries were produced exclusively for the
classroom, Gellius’s engagement with them is certainly peculiar; it seems far more
170Though I should be clear: he never casts doubt on their textual veracity.
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likely that he offers an argument against that assumption, demonstrating instead how
they permeated reading habits well beyond the schools.171 Commentaries and other
secondary literature seem to haunt his readings: he is all too happy to turn to one
at the first sign of confusion in his main reading material.172 Sometimes, as we have
seen, they are unnecessary, and he could have answered the question himself; other
times, there are other places one could look instead. Where Caesellius Vindex failed to
help with Cato in 20.2, the jurist Ateius Capito provided an answer (20.2.3). Juristic
authors are frequently favoured by Gellius, and he seems to suggest that although they
cannot be consulted with as much ease as a commentary, having read enough of them
will better prepare one for reading antique text and so reduce the need for comment-
aries at all.173 But even jurists’ commentaries have their limits (14.2.1). Ultimately,
Gellius’s representations of his researches acknowledge that reading the antique past
never happens in a vacuum, and will always require assistance — but that such assist-
ance must not be sought and followed blindly. He urges his readers to consider whose
authority they are trusting. The profession of the grammatici (many of them freed-
men) threatened the conservative ideal of the elite man of letters, the jack-of-all-trades
orator; but the role of distant antiquity (and the fashion for its stylistic invocation)
in Imperial society seemed to present more challenges of interpretation and contextual
knowledge than one man could hold in his head. Pliny the Elder’s encyclopaedic efforts
notwithstanding, there was simply too much knowledge, its quality too subjective with
regard to its sources and mediators, to encapsulate it all in one text. Gellius could not
assemble all the material his readers might need to know. But he could try to represent
to his readers the processes of intellectual encounter, the skills of critical and contextual
171It may be that, as Kaster 1997 and Sluiter 2000 argue, some commentaries have their origins in
teaching environments, but Gellius testifies clearly to their use in other environments, alongside other,
different kinds of secondary literature.
172Cf 6.11.3 (qui exempla horum uerborum requirit, ne in libris nimium remotis quaerat, inueniat ea
in M. Tullii secunda Antonianarum.), 10.14.
173E.g. 2.24.
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reading and learning, that would prepare them to successfully evaluate not just the real
and fraudulent authorities who haunted the bookstores and courtrooms of the present
day, but the generations worth of such individuals who clustered, like the shades of the
dead, around any point of encounter with the antique past they had cause to make.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
There are still many questions to ask of the Noctes. But a few major points should
now be apparent, and offer new guidance for future inquiries. The first is the consistent
sophistication with which Gellius examines and represents mental activity. It would
be easy to assume that each of the different internal subgenres of the work has its
own function, so different are their forms: that the dialogic encounters are meant to
commemorate or vilify beloved or loathed teachers, that the reading scenes are meant
to boast of Gellius’s own access and erudition, and that the notes and essays are meant
to offer the reader baubles of knowledge with which to impress his or her peers, or to
assert his own authority more forcefully. But to understand each subgenre as “meant”
to have one effect or another is to deny the work any meaningful coherence, and I
have argued that the opposite is true: that well beyond what we formally recognise
as narrative, much of the Noctes is in fact stylistically and thematically consistent
in the ways in which it represents intellectual activity. Whether scrutinising others
in face-to-face encounter, relating his own intimate moments of reading, examining
commentators in critical essays, or collecting the fruits of a research project, Gellius
has the same concerns and interests in how he and others conceive of questions, are
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attracted to certain authorities to answer them, scrutinise and evaluate that authority,
and put what they learn to use for themselves and others. The variety that is Gellius’s
most obvious aesthetic quality is made all the more powerful for the consistency and
unchangingness of the representative strategies and ethical concerns that underlie it.
Those concerns are the other part of my argument: that Gellius holds and pro-
motes very clear values of learning and knowledge. Several ideas emerge clearly from
his various (and variously narrated) encounters: that authority is rarely what it seems,
that much of the classical literature and knowledge in circulation in his time is heavily
mediated by intervening years and authorities, and that in order to acquire and use
knowledge accurately and effectively, elite Romans must be not only critical and skep-
tical, but highly self-aware. The level of scrutiny to which Gellius subjects authority
figures — living and dead — is tremendous, but he models it for the reader as some-
thing well worth the effort: the Gellian programme, when put into effect, allows one to
look at a piece of knowledge and see stretching out behind and around it the processes
by which it was created and interpreted and conveyed to one. It also allows one to
look at a person, to examine their speech or writing and understand that speech and
writing as the result of complex (but not incomprehensible) phenomena. And finally, it
allows one to subject oneself to the same scrutiny, to ensure that one’s own knowledge
and expertise are not superficial or shallow, but sincere, justified, and founded on real
understanding and desire for knowledge.
In each of the different strategies Gellius employs for scrutinising the intellect and
what goes in inside it, he is significant and sometimes unique as an ancient author.
His scenes of public encounter are startlingly brief and varied, and each represents
simultaneous processes: the answering of a question, but also the scrutinising both of
those who ask the questions and those who offer answers. And the scenes are forcefully
self-aware, sometimes foregrounding their own fictionality, and often reminding the
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reader of their place not only in Gellius’s autobiography but in the programme of
the Noctes which that autobiography serves. But perhaps most significant about the
dialogic scenes is the way they are integrated into a larger work composed of many non-
dialogic elements. Chief among these are the accounts of reading that seem without
precedent in antiquity in their scale, coherence, and level of detail: Gellius brings the
reader with him every step of the way, from before the book enters his hand until
long after, when only its words remain in his mind. Although this offers us as modern
readers an unparalleled glimpse at an Imperial Roman understanding of the cognitive
aspects of reading, it is also powerful for its ancient reader: the lucubratory premise is
expanded from a simple rhetorical tag to a complete literary motif, drawing into the
light the private activity of reading and subjecting it to the same sort of scrutiny used
in public encounters. The cognitive element is here key for the ancient reader: Gellius
fixes on and expands the moment of encounter with a text, exploring the various stages
and responses around that process, showing his audience all the different points of
failure or chances for success in the act of textual engagement. He confronts directly
the mannerisms of self-construction that around one’s own reading and offers a clear
rejection of mere bibliophilic acquisitiveness.
No less concerned with these stakes are his critical essays, which hold authorities and
scholars to the same standards as he navigates the strands and chains of transmission by
which knowledge descends to his present day; and, besides offering his reader all these
varied explicit discussions of the stakes for engagement with authority and tradition, he
lays out the results of his own encounters, with notes and reflections on them arranged
so as to show these interpretive processes in action. Gellius’s unique take on the mis-
cellaneous form, his premise of offering commentarii revised from personal notebooks
kept in the course of study, thus allows him to represent and promote his intellectual
values with impressive intimacy and comprehensiveness: we are shown learning and
236
knowledge in every stage of their acquisition, development and use, from the teaching
of educational authorities to the labours of private research, and its end-product in
critical essays and studies. His form may be obscure, and his interests recondite, but
the Noctes ’s literary qualities should earn Gellius more attention among Latin works
that use variety of both form and subject to explore and represent the life of the mind.
This understanding of Gellius’s work as more closely internally unified should allow
for further study of its various aspects. There is certainly room now for a closer search
for internal structure to the Noctes — individual Books which might seem largely dis-
ordered could, with more insistence on linear reading than I have allowed, now be seen
to have more consistent interests. A serious and systematic examination of the rela-
tionship between capita and article contents could shed more helpful light on the work’s
paratext and indeed the state of paratextual sophistication in Gellius’s time. With a
better understanding of Gellius’s concerns about engagement with older authors, we
might more easily examine his reception of authors like Cicero or less-studied groups
like the jurists. There should also be room now for a more nuanced approach to his rela-
tionship with Imperial literature; though he is often read alongside Fronto and Apuleius
as closer contemporaries, it may be possible that immediate predecessors with closer
interests to his own, like Suetonius, could be equally or more fruitful points of compar-
ison, particularly where the representation of research (especially using correspondence)
is concerned.
With Gellius’s demanding standards for elite reading better elucidated, we should
also now more closely examine the less frequent glances he casts at the larger picture
of literacy in Imperial Rome: the selective responses to monumental media (13.25), or
the curious frequency and flourishes with which physical texts are produced (e.g. 17.3),
or indeed the hints at other less elite literate practices such as blueprints (19.10) and
gaming tokens (10.27, with 18.13). I have suggested various roles that locations play
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in framing intellectual encounter; but the city of Rome has yet to be clearly analysed
as an element of the Noctes. And with Gellius’s narration and examination of intellect
characterised and analysed as I have done in this thesis, a more pressing question of
context remains: how does Gellius relate, in both his depictions of intellect and his
concern for its functioning, to other Imperial authors with similar interests?
One thing Gellius as mental reporter offers us most clearly is a glimpse of the anxi-
eties of the Imperial mind: the reading I have offered here suggests that at least some
Romans under the Empire had an extremely nuanced understanding of the processes
and media by which knowledge and authority were generated and conveyed. The Noctes
responds to these phenomena not just with satire but by promoting a specific, literate
understanding of them that accords to the reader substantial individual responsibility.
It is not uncommon, in studying Imperial literature, to assume that the emperor and
empire as political entities are points of obsession (conscious or otherwise) for the au-
thor. But Gellius’s approach to knowledge and authority suggests a mindset highly
concerned about the empire as an intellectual environment — not because of its em-
peror, but because of all its various other qualities: the wealth of intellectual resources
it makes available, the changes it imposes on social order, the new vectors and stimuli
it creates for the movement and authorising of knowledge and experts, and the ambi-
guities of identity and cultural affiliation it creates and enhances. The question, then,
is whether and how other authors might represent the intellectual spaces of the Roman
empire, and what the larger role of the intellect and the individual can be seen to be.
Gellius claims significant status for Latinity and Roman thought; but it is likely that
his Greek contemporaries might share some of his more fundamental concerns.
The Noctes that emerges more clearly from my study here is, I hope, the very
opposite of encyclopaedic. As a response to a world that demanded regular displays
of knowledge and erudition, it functions very poorly as a cheat-sheet. But it functions
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somewhat better as a discourse on erudition: an invitation to its reader to reflect, while
he or she is learning interesting facts, on what it means to learn, and where facts come
from. Gellius and his peers encountered, and indeed comprised, an enormous mass
of experts on various subjects, and their libraries contained more literature than they
could hope to read. In response, some withdrew behind the walls of professionalism,
laying proud but carefully delineated claim to the areas of their expertise. So too did
specific literary canons become popular, as fashion offered a shortcut to determining
what did or did not need to be read. In this environment, Gellius offered his readers
a strong argument for taking individual responsibility for one’s own intellectual life.
He seeks to complicate the simplicity of stylistic fashions, the boldness of professional
claims, and indeed the authority of the written word. He has long been valued, rightly,
for his depiction of the “life of the mind.” What I have shown here, I hope, is the
complexity with which that depiction is effected, and the reasons for his insistence in
doing so. Our intellectual lifestyle, in Gellius’s depiction, need not be a matter of idle
diversion: we should take responsibility for it, because — whether we like it or not —
it has real consequences, for ourselves and others.
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Appendix: Writing about reading
in the post-antique West
In the examples discussed in Chapter 3 above, we saw that depictions of reading
come in many forms, ranging from self-presentation to construct authority and frame
approaches to a work, to journalistic narration, to instructive theorisation within a
larger educational or intellectual model. Interpretations of such depictions and their
functions must depend on the particular, culturally determined nature of reading and
textual practice in the society in which they are produced. In order to get a sense of
how and why authors choose to depict reading in certain ways, I offer here a brief survey
of some examples, drawn largely from scholarship of other time periods, of significant
depictions of reading, their unique qualities, and the cultural phenomena to which they
may have been responding or which they may have been intended to affect.1
The rise of silent reading is held by modern scholars to be a significant develop-
ment in monastic culture, surely the most self-conscious intellectual environment of the
Middle Ages. Apparently contemporary with this development is the appearance of
texts that treat of reading as a critical process. Beginning in the 12th century, texts
produced in monastic contexts take on the clear visual characteristics needed for silent
reading, presenting the text so that it need not be read aloud.2 One consequence of
1For these case studies I am substantially indebted to the work and conclusions of other scholars.
2Saenger 1999: 120-22.
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the shift to silent textual interaction seems to have been an increased concern over the
mechanics of reading. In this view, when a monastic reader vocalised his reading, his
peers were aware of his interpretation of and reaction to what he read, which provided
a social safeguard against incorrect or heretical readings (and thus thoughts). Reading
aloud exposed the thinking that accompanied reading to social scrutiny. Reading si-
lently, which had become a norm in some libraries by the 13th century, “removed the
individuals’ thoughts from the sanctions of the group.”3 It is in this context that his-
torians of medieval reading see the work of Hugh of St Victor, who, in addition to being
responsible for some texts with the new necessary visual apparatus for silent reading,
authored works such as the Didascalicon, a treatise on reading which divides it into
different types and isolates different motivations, subject matter and uses for reading,
and lays out for its reader a way of reading that is self-aware and critical.4 With the
Didascalicon, Hugh constructs reading as a discrete activity with qualities, goals, and
risks, and seeks to create a reader who perceives his own reading as such. It seems likely
that Hugh and his peers, perceiving the changes in reading habits, grasped the need
to provide (as Plutarch might put it) an internal governing force for reading to replace
the external one that silent reading was rendering ineffectual. It is in this context that
they wrote about reading with a focus on internal response and self-awareness.
In other times and places, it is not changes in reading habits but new readers that
prompt this approach. The production of new kinds of literature for – and their ac-
ceptance by – new social groups attracts the attention of those who think and write
about reading. In Golden Age Spain, the widespread popularity of romantic fiction,
which was often read privately or in small groups by young members of the merchant
3Saenger 1999: 136.
4Saenger 1999: 120-22. Early in the work, Hugh explains the interpretive function of reading, and
the importance of different interpretive frameworks: “Reading consists of forming our minds upon
rules and precepts taken from books, and it is of three types: the teacher’s, the learner’s, and the
independent reader’s.” (3.7, trans Taylor 1961).
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class, was a distinct literary market from and seemed a curious phenomenon to the
bourgeois readers of classical and humanistic literature.5 Awareness of this new liter-
ature being consumed silently and in private by the less-educated prompted anxiety
among the traditionally literate classes over the “dangerous spell” reading could weave,
an anxiety rooted in their own familiarity with the dynamics of reading.6 This concern
over this alien reading focused specifically on the fictional nature of the reading ma-
terial, expressing criticisms which were at times fierce and, as Ife argues, often rooted
in Platonic ideas about poets and poetry.7 “Resurgence of anti-fictional attitudes,” Ife
writes, coincides with an increase in the private reading of fictional literature. Though
the critics and defenders of fiction took different views of reading, both were interested
in the cognitive effects of reading, and the extent to which the reader responded with
cognitive engagement or exertion. Fiction’s potency works internally on its reader. In
Ife’s view, writers like Cervantes agreed with critics about the intoxicating effects of
reading fiction, understanding that it lured readers with the promise of compelling nar-
rative and threatened to overwhelm their critical faculties. But where Cervantes and
Quevedo (among others) departed from their humanist and Neo-Platonist critics was in
identifying this as a locus for artistic expression and the pleasure of fiction.8 Reading
was attracting more attention: reading of new texts, and in new contexts. Defenders
and critics found in this challenge to the literary status quo a prompt to scrutinize
the act of reading and its various functions and effects. Reading could no longer be
taken for granted, nor could habits of reading be assumed, because the old rules might
not apply to the new literature, and the newly active readers could not be assumed
to have the right education or values. The underlying assumption of this anxiety —
5Chartier 1999: 270-2.
6Chartier 1999: 272.
7Ife 1985: 4-18, re: Plato Rep 3.397, 10.595-607.
8On Quevedo, Ife 1985: 144ff. On the attempt to “locate the legitimacy of fiction precisely where
the Platonist critics found it most wanting”, 172.
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that bad reading has bad effects — was engaged with in newly experimental forms of
literature, the fiction which from time to time made use of scenes of reading within its
narratives to explore its own medium.9 Writers about reading in this period homed in
on language’s ability to insinuate itself and the ideas it relates into consciousness before
they can be evaluated, and wrestled with the question of whether this was a threat or
an opportunity; either way, it was to be explored.10
In nineteenth century France, changes in how literature was consumed were inter-
twined with changes in how that consumption was depicted. In his comprehensive study
of representations of reading in personal correspondence, novelistic representation and
the visual arts, Allen identifies an increase in private, solitary consumption of various
kinds of text. “From 1800 onward,” he writes, people of all ages encountered print
deliberately and alone.11 Related to this is an increased awareness among readers of
their own participation in the act of reading, and reading “came to be marked by more
self-conscious individuals.”12 In novels from earlier in the century, characters read “ro-
mantically,” having emotional and imaginative reactions to texts they encounter; but
by the turn of the 20th century, readers in novels are more deliberate in their inter-
pretation of the written word.13 One effect of this change is the rise of reading as a
device for characterisation in novels; in an early example, Julien, the protagonist of
9Ife 1985: 85-88. The most obvious and basic example is of course Don Quixote, a romance, the
protagonist of which suffered various delusions as a result of reading romances.
10Ife 1985: 172-3 “Key episodes [in Quevedos’ “La Vida del Busco´n llamado don Pablos”] seem to
make explicit what is implicit throughout: that, indeed, the literary artist and the liar are one and
the same; but that a reader’s gullibility is, by the same token, a form of blindness from which he can
and must be cured. His natural engagement with the text — not, pace the Platonists, a source of
danger, but a source of strength — is countered by the equal and opposite sense of disengagement
that comes with a recognition that he has, as a reader, been made to work hard at his reading, to
interpret difficult and conflicting evidence, to judge complex issues and ultimately to submit himself
for judgment.” This reading of Quevedo has much in common with my own of Gellius.
11Allen 1991: 223-4.
12Allen 1991: 223-4.
13Allen 1991: 197-8. “Whether or not French men and women at the turn of the century actually
followed suit... the reading experience in the novel evolved over the course of the nineteenth century,
and with it the interpretative models for literate audiences to copy.”
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Stendahl’s 1830 Le Rouge et le Noir, experiences adolescence through his reading. He
is single-minded about which texts he cares enough about to interpret correctly, which
Allen cites as an indication by Stendahl of Julien’s social ambition.14 Because writers
are also readers, changes in readerly perception of themselves are quickly fed back into
literary culture through literary innovation. Allen finds the apex of this change in
Proust’s Marcel, who signals his maturity and social self-awareness by his comparison
of the social perception of an individual with the readers’ perception of a book: readerly
self-awareness and maturity is, in a variety of cases, used to indicate intellectual and
social maturity.15 It is worth noting that Allen does not compare public and private
reading, but instead focuses exclusively on the latter, finding in it the clearest examples
of character expressed through reading.16 Though this methodological choice excludes
any culture of public reading, he makes it clear that private reading not only increases
but changes in its nature. Private reading is not inherently self-aware or reflective, but
it has the potential to foster these qualities, and France in the 1800s seems to be a
case of self-aware readers writing about their own self-awareness and thus defining and
propagating it as a new model of reading to other readers. Writers who represent read-
ing in this way are as much expressing their own experience of reading as attempting
to convey it to others.
In the same century, two groups of new readers in England were attracting attention
and arousing concern. In 1841, Charlotte Elizabeth Browne, making the case for keeping
the young — especially young girls — away from poetry and other literature that
was not clearly morally enriching, recalled the effects of reading Shakespeare at the
tender age of seven: “I drank a cup of intoxication under which my brain reeled for
many a year,” she wrote, describing among Shakespeare’s various influences on her
14Allen 1991: 186-7.
15Allen 1991: 191.
16Allen 1991: 173.
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immature mind a lack of interest in anything other than poetry and fiction and a decline
in her obedience toward her elders.17 As with the Neo-Platonist critics of fiction in
Spain, Browne describes reading metaphorically as the imbibing of a powerful chemical
substance, giving it the force to subvert her normal mental functions. Children and
adolescents, Browne says, should be kept away from such literature because they lack
the active mental rigour to stand up to such overwhelming power. In this case, the
use of a personal recollection lends an authoritative intimacy to her construction of the
relationship between the mind and the text.18 More vexing to England’s literate elite,
however, was the rise of working class readers, for whom new literature was produced,
in a new medium. The author Wilkie Collins identified to his peers in 1878 what he
termed the “Unknown Public” – the readers of a popular new form of printed periodical,
the “penny journal.”19 Professing confusion at the readership of such publications —
he saw them for sale everywhere, he wrote, but could not get anyone he met to admit
to reading them — he proceeds to divine the intellectual character of these readers
from their reading material alone.20 He begins with their motivations for reading,
concluding based on the predominance of fiction in the journals that “the Unknown
Public reads for its amusement more than for its information.”21 Then, finding that
the merchants of the journals recommend all equally as “good pennorths” but fail to
provide any “criticism” of a particular journal’s contents, Collins concludes that his
17Lyons 1999: 320ff.
18Browne’s position is not unique. Compare e.g. the account by “S.” in “What is the Harm of
Novel-Reading,” part of a series in 1855, that portrayed young women led into sin by the romantic
images they found in novels. An excerpt may be found in King and Plunkett 2005: 48-9.
19“The Unknown Public” first appeared in Household Words 21 August 1858. It may today be found
in various places online (e.g. http://www.digitalpixels.org/jr/wc/misc/curiosities1.html (accessed 8
Dec 2009), and while Lyons refers to an edition in Nadel (ed) 1986, Victorian fiction: A Collection of
Essays, I cite page numbers here from King and Plunkett 2005: 207-216.
20King and Plunkett 2005: 210: “In the absence, therefore, of any positive information on the
subject, it is only possible to pursue the present investigation by accepting such negative evidence as
may help us to guess, with more or less accuracy, at the social position, the habits, the tastes, and
the average intelligence of the Unknown Public. Arguing carefully by inference, we may hope, in this
matter, to arrive at something like a safe, if not a satisfactory, conclusion.”
21King and Plunkett 2005: 210.
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readers are primarily interested in quantity rather than literary quality.22 He then
turns his attention to the sections of the journals where readers send in questions (on
seemingly any topic) for the Editor to answer. For Collins, these questions from the
journals’ readers are not just an indication of their level of intelligence or morality
(though he makes much of these).23 In them, he perceives the way the readers respond
to the journals — literally, the questions they ask of what they read. Collins’s entire
discussion of this Unknown Public is heavily larded with class distinctions, and though
he frames the discussion in terms of discovering a previously invisible part of the English
reading public, these Unknown readers are clearly set apart as of a lower class, lacking
not only education and morals but also reading ability. The new popularity of reading
among the working class threatened middle and upper class confidence that reading was
exclusively their activity;24 Collins combats this possibility by specifically constructing
the motivation and methodology of these readers as in opposition to his and his peers.
The working class were becoming readers, but they were still distinctly working-class
in their reading.
Electronic media presented educationalists and cultural critics with new challenges
in 20th century, and the anxiety about how the texts produced in these media should be
and are “read” mirrors the anxieties we have seen throughout history, often expressed
in critical theory or, as with the case of Plutarch’s treatises, pedagogical writing.25
The rise of media theory focused critics’ attention on the semantic role of the form
in any particular mediated communication, an approach that forms the basis of both
media studies and the subsequent pedagogic field of media literacy. Heightened aware-
22King and Plunkett 2005: 210-11 for a dialogue that emphasises the merchant’s working class
dialect. The value the merchant expresses recalls the modern British idiom “value for money.”
23King and Plunkett 2005: 211-12. Here King and Plunkett elide some of the more amusing examples,
which are preserved in full in the online version cited above.
24Lyons 1999: 315.
25Here, as in the discussion of Plutarch above, by “text” and “reading” I understand broadly any
mediated communication and its interpretation.
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ness of the medium’s role, whether television, radio or film, led to increased concern
about readers of texts in that medium to cope adequately with the particular nature
of that medium. In early ideas of media literacy, cultural critics saw entire media as
threatening, and those who wrote on the subject worried that media such as film would
overwhelm students’ critical faculties and expose them to generally inferior cultural con-
tent; these approaches thus focused on training students to see through the effects of
the medium (e.g., the impressive visuals of a film) to assess the true cultural “value” of
the text within.26 More recently, though, educators have begun to see electronic media
as part of society and essential, neutral elements of cultural exchange and communica-
tion. The focus has thus shifted in writing about media literacy to training students to
analyse and understand the creation and effects of different forms of media.27 Just as
the critics and defenders of fiction in Golden Age Spain acknowledged the intoxicating
effects of the genre, both early and later approaches to media literacy share a central
concern for the critical faculties of the reader in the face of powerful media;28 but just
as fiction’s champions found a source of enjoyment and expression in the self-aware
and conscious control of those inherent qualities of fiction, recent approaches to media
literacy emphasize students’ awareness of their own role as readers of media.29 Me-
dia literacy curricula emphasize “simulation” of media production, combining critical
analysis of professional or canonical media with training in the technical processes of
creating in those forms. Students learn to read movies, and then to make movies. Some
educators advocate an understanding of the industrial and commercial processes that
go into the creation of media, and particularly in the realm of advertising, students
26Buckingham 2003: 6-7. And, implicitly, to reject it as inferior to “high culture.” Buckingham
terms this period in media education in the UK “Discrimination.”
27Buckingham 2003: 5.
28“[T]his history,” writes Buckingham 2003: 10, “is . . . one of defensiveness. It reflects a long-
standing suspicion of the media and popular culture that might be seen as a defining characteristic of
modern education systems.”
29Buckingham 2003: 107ff on the politics of teaching students to be “critical.”
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are encouraged to understand themselves as the target of advertising by pretending to
create (or actually creating) advertisements targeted at themselves and their peers.30
Pedagogical writing on media literacy thus represents the readers as highly involved
with the construction of meaning and interpretation of text, and demands their in-
dividual and conscious mastery of the parameters of the medium. In his analysis of
various approaches to media education, Buckingham argues that in a culture saturated
by electronic media, indicating one’s literacy in those media can be an important way
of constructing social identity.31 He uses the example of the terms in which schoolchil-
dren debate the “reality” of television programmes as indicators expressing their own
interests, tastes, values or insecurities about a host of social questions. This raises the
interesting question of how readers of electronic media narrate their own reading.
An example of this may be found in the weblog, which has become perhaps the
defining format for text publishing on the Internet over the last 15 years. In his recent
history, Rosenberg identifies several key elements of this form: a chronological scheme
of “updates,” in which new material is added to a site regularly, with the newest on
top; and a focus on providing hyperlink references to other content elsewhere on the
Internet. Weblogs thus often form, to one extent or another, an autobiography of
reading: for an author to link to something is usually to indicate that she has read
it, and the chronological format creates a journalistic effect. Various shorthands exist
for a writer to indicate that she found the text to which she is linking from another
weblog, allowing writers quickly to narrate an entire chain of referenced and hyperlinked
reading. Rosenberg discusses several examples of the way the narrations of one’s reading
that are built into weblog writing can contribute to expressions of persona. Justin Hall
30Burn and Durran 2007: 95-109. We might recall here Plutarch’s admonition to someone hearing
a speech to imagine the speaker’s goals and process (in formulating the speech) as a way of better
understanding its successes and failures, and identifying its “true” content.
31Buckingham 2003: 47-9. It should not be surprising that in a [media-]literate society, there is
social cachet to be gained form establishing one’s [media-]literacy relative to others’.
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was one of the first to write in this form, at a time before effective large-scale search
engines when much of the content on the Web was un-indexed.32 Early weblogs served
as a personal and slowly-increasing guide to new (or newly discovered) content. Hall
took pride in linking to not the front or top pages of another website - the equivalent
of mentioning just the title of a book - but instead linking “a few levels down” -
in other words, indicating a deeper and more thorough reading of the site.33 This
both increased the intimate idiosyncrasy of his weblog and contributed to his image
of himself as an interested denizen of the Internet. As weblogs became more popular,
it became clear that the choice of links was an essential part of identity in the form –
weblog authors “would write their intellectual autobiographies, one link at a time.”34
In the context of the weblog, a hyperlink reference to another text implies, “here is
what I have read, and found interesting, and think you should read.” Weblog writers
might just provide the hyperlink, or they might indicate where they found it, or they
might narrate the entire process of encountering the linked text, and reacting, and
seeking more information, thus establishing an intellectual persona in terms of their
tastes and attention, and the associations they tend to make or questions they tend
to ask. Although the Internet shares many qualities with earlier electronic media,
it dramatically reduces the difference between the producers and the consumers of
material.35 In this context, writers establish themselves in terms of their reading and
32Rosenberg 2009: 18-45. Before the large-scale and effective indexing of content that makes search
engines like Google indispensible today, the Internet was substantially more disordered. The advent
of indexing and search has made it easier to find some kinds of content, but the amount of content
available has continued to grow as well. The weblog, in some incarnations, thus serves a similar
function to that imagined for the Noctes by scholars like Holford-Strevens, for whom it serves as a
shortcut to a massive canon of material that, without a guide, would be impossible to master.
33Rosenberg 2009: 22.
34Rosenberg 2009: 94-6 for the story of Jorn Barger, who linked to an anti-Semitic tract and so
destroyed his reputation as a writer online through a principle he himself described, apparently ignorant
of its relevance to his own experience: “Webloggers gamble their reputation with every link they offer.”
35In other words: it is expensive (though increasingly less so) to produce television with the same
production values as the BBC, but it is very cheap to produce online content with the same production
values as news.bbc.co.uk. The Internet may thus have much more in common with ancient elite culture
than any other modern media sphere: in Imperial Rome, as on the Internet, the primary media
249
the particular way in which they related it: evidence of reading equals evidence of
their participation in the exchange of ideas. As a rhetorical device, writing about one’s
reading online enhances the intimacy and “authenticity” but the cultural politics (to
use Goldhill’s term) of this reading serve to authorise the reader-narrator as a literate
and participatory member of the media ecosystem.
From this brief and haphazard survey some themes nonetheless emerge. Discussions
of the cognitive or ethical effects of reading, its power to access and change the mind
at a fundamental level, seem to be consonant with awareness or concern on the part
of the writer about how reading is being done. For writers who conceive of reading
operating a deep mental level, describing or relating reading can be a powerful way of
characterising oneself or others: tastes in, modes of and reactions to reading reveal and
have consequences for a fundamental part of the psyche. But it is the inaccessibility or
intimacy of those activities that prompts this attention: members of a literate status quo
concerned about new readers or reading styles seem to be responding to their perceived
lack of control over that new reading. For an artist fashioning a depiction, reading is
a shortcut to the fundamental processes of mind and character. A writer seeking to
attack another’s reading must draw that reading out into a public sphere to examine
it, even if that means reconstructing it rhetorically. And a writer seeking to share his
or her inner life with another, whether for social intimacy, self-construction or didactic
purposes, can do so by describing his or her reading. Different dimensions of distance
and intimacy manifest in different contexts: silent versus spoken reading, solitary versus
group, supervised versus unsupervised, institutional versus popular. As Goldhill has
shown, details of reading as discovered through such intimacy can be expressed in terms
of, as well as implicate, different cultural values; just from this survey, we have seen
reading-depictions as expressions of ethics, class, family and politics.
— rhetorical speech and personal literary production — were open to participation by anyone with
sufficient education and leisure time.
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